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Part 1 
 
The Development of the Scenarios
1 Introduction 
Jürgen Enders  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Today, universities and other higher education providers are key to the development of 
the knowledge-based society in Europe. They produce, teach and transfer knowledge; 
they perform most of Europe’s fundamental research and employ one-third of 
European researchers. They have an increasing role to play in innovation, thus 
becoming crucial to regional development. Universities live in times of rapid political 
and economic change within and beyond Europe. Public expectations about access to 
higher education, government concerns about the role that universities can play in 
socio-economic development and the application of certain principals of market 
economics and organisational management have created a new context for higher 
education. The strategic question facing higher education systems is not if but how to 
pursue major changes entailed by the ongoing transitions of our modern societies.  
 
Certainly, this is an issue for the European university – a term that served until recently 
as a rather historical reminiscence. Nowadays it is gaining again in prominence in the 
search for a successful and sustainable future for our European societies and beyond.  
With this book, we wish to broaden the debate on the future of the European university 
through a presentation and discussion of scenarios that provide possibility spaces for 
the European Higher Education and Research Landscape of 2020. The research for 
these scenarios was undertaken by the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies. In 
preparing the scenarios, we made use of the views and perspectives of higher 
education experts (scholars, policy-makers, managers and practitioners) from across 
Europe in undertaking a Delphi-study on the future of European higher education. In 
September 2004, we presented the scenarios at CHEPS’ 20th anniversary conference 
and discussed them with experts from Europe and beyond. Later on, we invited further 
comments on our scenarios that are documented in this book. 
 
We know that looking into the future is a risky though inspiring undertaking. 
Obviously, only time will tell about the things to come. Thus it is important to stress 
that this book is not an exercise in prediction. But we are convinced that it matters how 
people think about the future and what they do about it. This book is meant as a 
contribution to such a debate that allows for a mapping of possible futures. 
2 Scenarios as a Method 
Harry F. de Boer and Don F. Westerheijden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why Look at the Future? 
‘The changes visible in the last few years ... are expected to be dwarfed by the changes 
to come.’ (Ringland, 1998). Surely this is a cliché, but the deep-rooted feeling there 
may be some truth in the phrase keeps people in all walks of life interested in knowing 
about the future, either because they feel they need to enact the future (plan or 
influence it), or because they want to react timely to the unplannable. In both options 
‘...creating models of the future as a way of rehearsing change’ (Ringland, 1998) 
seems highly desirable, and that is what we aimed at in this exercise with the three 
scenarios for Europe’s future higher education landscape. The only alternative is 
fatalism: the future cannot be planned and we cannot react. As a research centre such 
fatalism goes against our nature and in particular our mission, which includes 
contributing to the social debate about higher education. Being a research centre we 
are also committed to scientific approaches to the questions we tackle, yet we are 
extremely aware that there is no such thing as a science of the future. For the future, 
the only science is science fiction. 
 
In this chapter we describe how we balanced science and fiction when creating our 
scenarios, using the basis established through a Delphi study and then the method 
underlying the development of the scenarios, which present possibilities for the future 
intended to stimulate further discussion among all persons interested in Europe’s 
higher education and research on what may be likely to happen and what they would 
like to see happen. But prior to this, we will substantiate epistemologically in section 2 
the claim there is no science of the future. 
Futurology Is Not a Science 
Many have tried to predict the future, sometimes of whole societies, sometimes of 
relatively simple events. The blunders in the latter category make hilarious reading as 
when Thomas Watson, chairman of IBM, in 1943 is supposed to have said: ‘I think 
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there is a world market for maybe five computers.’1 The blunders in the former 
category of predicting (and then enacting) the future of whole societies led to genocide 
and war as, amongst others, Karl Popper commented in his fulminations against 
historicism in fascism and communism. Putting his rightful anger to good use, Popper 
investigated to what extent we can know the future at all. The crux for him lay in the 
growth of knowledge:  
 
We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our 
scientific knowledge (…) The argument does not, of course, refute the possibility 
of every kind of social prediction; on the contrary, it is perfectly compatible with 
the possibility of testing social theories … by way of predicting that certain 
developments will take place under certain conditions. It only refutes the 
possibility of predicting historical developments to the extent to which they may 
be influenced by the growth of our knowledge. (Popper, 1961 (1957)).  
 
Basing himself firmly on Popper’s epistemology, Van Vught concluded ‘(t)he future 
can only be predicted scientifically if we have at our disposal preferably strictly tested 
and not yet falsified theories. Even then predictions are only tentative and provisional, 
as our theories may be refuted tomorrow’ (Van Vught, 1985). He did not focus on the 
additional condition, namely that the environment in which the theory ‘operates’ is 
predictable as well in terms of the same theory or another support-theory. Some major 
problems in the area of applied social sciences, including higher education studies, are 
that such well-performing theories are lacking and the environment of the complex, 
wider social developments are unpredictable with the theories at our disposal.  
 
We could stop at this point, acknowledging it is impossible to say anything from a 
scientifically valid point of view about the future of higher education in Europe, or we 
could look for alternatives. The most promising of which in our view is to have a 
second look at the task itself. Do we want to predict the future at all? No. Van Vught at 
the end of his inaugural lecture on futures studies (1985) called for humility. Keeping 
options open was the wisest approach one could take, realising how little we knew and 
how fragile scientific knowledge is. Moreover, we should understand the function of 
research about the future is not its relation to the future itself. Rather, it relates to 
human action in the present. Human action is future-oriented to the extent that it is 
goal-oriented. For that reason our expectations and visions of the future are relevant to 
our current thinking, understanding and deciding (Masini, 1993). Therefore our aim is 
to contribute to a discussion about higher education’s future amongst this book’s 
readers: managers of higher education institutions, policy-makers in higher education 
ministries or agencies, researchers of higher education, stakeholders, interested 
citizens, etc. It will be up to them to use the insights provided to plan or influence the 
future – or react to it. After all, science fiction author Frank Herbert is quoted as 
saying: ‘The function of science fiction is not always to predict the future but 
sometimes to prevent it.’  
                                                        
1
 Yet ‘(a)lthough Watson is well known for his alleged 1943 statement…there is no evidence he ever 
made it.’ (Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_J._Watson, accessed 3.6.2005). 
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Therefore all we have to do, as suggested in the first paragraph of this chapter, is 
provide models on which the reader’s thoughts and plans can be ‘exercised’; they have 
to be of possible futures and perhaps desirable ones. The latter provides an indication 
of the directions in which some of the actors may be trying to influence higher 
education’s future. For this more humble purpose, the availability of well-established 
scientific theories would be highly useful, but even as researchers looking for 
systematic approaches to knowledge, we are not left empty-handed without them. For 
we can then turn to subjective approaches – somewhere between science and fiction. In 
fact we relied on collecting the opinions of higher education experts (as explained 
below). From a methodological point of view, that is sub-optimal, because 
‘…subjective methods are characterised by strong trust in the judgemental capacity of 
individuals, especially of experts’ (Van Vught, 1985) and their ‘judgemental capacity’ 
is not the same as a scientifically controllable explicit theory. Still, their ideas on 
possibilities and desirabilities for the future may make others think, especially when 
presented in an appealing manner. Hence our connection of two methods, a Delphi 
questionnaire to gain insight into experts’ views and scenario-writing to present these 
(and other!) views to a wider audience.  
 
We end this section by again quoting the author with whom we started, Ringland, who 
wrote that: 
 
The originators of the work were clear in their aims (which were not always 
understood by others): they were not predicting the future, they were developing a 
model which would help people to understand aspects of the nature of (higher 
education) and help to open up the public debate (Ringland, 1998). 
 
In this spirit, let us now turn to the methods we employed in our balance between 
science and fiction. 
Tending to Science: The Delphi Method Questionnaire  
The establishment of the Delphi technique, named after the Greek oracle where 
necromancers foretold the future, heralded an era of modern future research.2 
According to Gordon (1994), one of the founding fathers of the Delphi technique: ‘the 
modern renaissance of futures research began with the Delphi technique at RAND’, the 
Californian think-tank in the early 1960s. In this period RAND researchers such as 
Helmer, Reschner, Dalkey and Gordon discovered that experts, particularly when they 
agree, are more likely than non-experts to be correct about questions in their field. The 
use of expert opinion is one of the key characteristics of the Delphi technique.   
                                                        
2
 The name started as a joke but it stuck, to the great dissatisfaction of, amongst others, its co-
inventors Helmer and Dalkey: ‘The resulting image of a priestess, sitting on a stool over a crack in 
the earth, inhaling sulfur fumes, and making vague and jumbled statements that could be interpreted 
in many different ways, did not exactly inspire confidence in the method.’ 
(http://eies.njit.edu/~turoff/Papers/delphi3.html#Introduction; accessed: 10.5.2005) 
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Moreover, there were signs that predictions made by a group of people are more likely 
to be right than predictions made by the same individuals working alone. This became 
known as the ‘MacGregor effect’ (see e.g. Loye, 1978 in Lang, 1995).  
 
It was originally designed as a forecasting technique for predicting the future of 
military technology (during the Cold War).3 Since the early 1960s it has been used 
thousands of times, for different purposes, in different fields and on different scales. In 
other words, the technique is not only used in technological fields, but also in areas 
such as health care, education, economy and commerce. It is one of the best-known 
forecasting techniques (and it can be used for other purposes as well).  
 
The modern Delphi method is designed to encourage a ‘controlled’ debate. It is an 
interactive communication structure between experts in a field, facilitated by the 
researchers doing the work. In this interaction anonymity, in the sense that no one 
knows who else is participating, is considered essential. RAND-experiments had 
shown that face-to-face interaction – bringing experts together in a conference room – 
had negative consequences for the accuracy of the group opinion. Another outcome of 
the early experiments was that feedback of results improved the outcomes.  
 
All in all the aspects of experts, anonymity and feedback, represent three irreducible 
elements of the Delphi technique. It ‘consists of a systematic interrogation of a group 
of anonymous experts through the use of questionnaires. The process is repeated 
through several cycles in order to promote convergence and identify consensus’ 
(Rogers, in Ringland, 1998). More often than not the group of experts moves towards 
consensus. But even if this is not the case, the arguments used that lead to different 
opinions are useful for policy and planning purposes (Gordon, 1994).4 The integrative 
nature of the expert discussions brings about additional value by generating consensus 
amongst participants and building a shared view on future visions (EurEnDel 2003). 
One of the main values of the technique rests with the ideas it generates, both those 
that evoke consensus and those that do not. 
 
The Delphi technique can be seen as an exercise in group communication among a 
panel of geographically dispersed experts.5 In the original Delphi process, the key 
elements are 1) structuring the information flow, 2) feedback to the participants 
through the ‘Delphi researchers’ and 3) anonymity of the participants. In terms of 
controlled feedback another characteristic may be the use of statistical measures. 
 
                                                        
3
 Gordon and Helmer published one of the first modern Delphi studies, Report on a Long-Range 
Forecast, in 1964. Gordon (1994) refers to this report as the all-time RAND best seller. It contained 
forecasts of scientific and technological breakthroughs through 2000 and beyond, based on the 
opinions of 82 experts. 
4
 In fact, as Turoff and Hiltz argue, the Delphi is a ‘communication structure aimed at producing 
detailed critical examination and discussion, not at forcing a quick compromise.’ 
(http://eies.njit.edu/~turoff/Papers/delphi3.html#Introduction, accessed: 10.5.2005). 
5
 An interesting website is http://www.wilderdom.com/delphi.html (‘Delphi study: Research by 
interactive, consultative inquiry’, accessed: 10.5.2005). 
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Although the Delphi technique has many supporters it has also incurred much 
criticism. Sackman (1975) and Armstrong (1978) in particular have been highly 
sceptical. In their view the technique is unscientific and not accurate in its forecasting. 
Makridakis and Wheelright (1978) summarise the criticisms as follows: 1) a low 
reliability level of judgements amongst experts and therefore dependency of forecasts 
on the particular judgements selected, 2) the sensitivity of results to ambiguity in the 
questionnaire used for data collection in each round and 3) the difficulty in assessing 
the degree of expertise incorporated into the forecast.6 
 
Given the key features of the Delphi technique it can be used for several purposes 
other than forecasting (see Maassen and Van Vught, 1984). For instance it can be a 
useful tool in developing policy goals and strategies. Or, highly relevant to the world 
of higher education, it can be used for the development of rating scales. A third 
alternative application concerns the use of the Delphi in cost benefit analyses. Finally, 
the Delphi is suitable for conflict resolution or problem solving. Here, however, we 
have used the technique as a forecasting tool; the outcomes (‘predictions’) were used 
as input for the scenario exercise.  
Our Application of the Delphi Study 
Ideally each individual should complete a questionnaire designed by the Delphi 
researchers and then receive feedback on all the outcomes. They would then fill out the 
questionnaire a second time with this information at hand. Essentially the same 
questionnaire should thus be completed several times by the set of experts.7 Those with 
views significantly divergent from a developing consensus are required to substantiate 
them, which serves as useful intelligence for others. The underlying idea is that the 
majority can thus weigh up dissenting views that are based on privileged or rare 
information. The following ten steps should be taken to conduct a Delphi study (cf. 
amongst others Fowles, 1978): 
 
1. Formation of a team to undertake and monitor a Delphi on a given subject;  
2. Selection of an expert panel to participate in the exercise; 
3. Development of the first round questionnaire; 
4. Testing the questionnaire (pilot phase); 
5. Sending the questionnaires to the experts; 
6. Analysis of first round results; 
7. Preparing the second round questionnaires, including the results of the first; 
                                                        
6
 In this respect we fully agree with Gordon’s point of view that the Delphi should be used for 
appropriate questions. For some issues other techniques are better. Factual questions should not be 
candidates for Delphi studies (Gordon 1994). Another way to increase the usefulness of the Delphi 
technique is to use it in combination with other techniques (e.g. the Cross Impact Analyses, the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process, or the Scenario technique, as in our case). 
7
 Many variants have been developed. In these variants one or more of the traditional characteristics 
of the Delphi method are more or less seriously violated. In most of these cases, we would argue such 
studies should not be seen as Delphi studies. 
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8. Sending the questionnaires to participating experts; 
9. Analysis of second round results (and then repeating steps 7 to 9 as long as 
desired); 
10. Presentation of results and drawing conclusions. 
 
The topic of the CHEPS Delphi study was ‘the European higher education and 
research landscape in 2020’. Will a uniform study structure be implemented across 
European higher education systems? Will a European research council be the most 
important funding organisation for basic research? Will academics still play an 
important role in university management? These and related questions were supposed 
to be answered through consulting experts all over Europe. Initially a team of CHEPS 
researchers was created who consulted their colleagues in order to tap information and 
review higher education literature so they could design a first round questionnaire. 
After the preliminary interviews within CHEPS, the first round questionnaire consisted 
of 49 statements on higher education and research in Europe.  
 
As will be explained in more detail in chapter 3, the statements were organised around 
six themes: 1) education, 2) research and innovation, 3) funding, 4) quality, 5) higher 
education, society and labour market and 6) institutional governance and management. 
The experts were asked to separately estimate the desirability and likelihood of all 49 
statements on a five-point scale. It makes sense to make a distinction between the 
desirability of a future state and the occurrence of future developments. First, because 
it provides additional information. Second, because ‘is’ and ‘ought’ can be related 
(‘wishful thinking’). Desired events are usually seen as more likely to happen, and by 
separating ‘will be’ from ‘ought to be’ we hoped to diminish the wishful thinking 
effect, or at least get a better view on it. Aside from desirability and likelihood the 
experts were asked to provide arguments to elucidate their views. These qualitative 
foundations of the experts’ views on Europe’s higher education future are regarded as 
highly valuable. In fact they are an indispensable aspect of a proper Delphi study and 
almost as vital as input for the scenarios.8 Finally, many of the 49 statements invited 
the experts to estimate their occurrence in their home country. Through this additional 
question we aimed to clarify the expected European diversity or homogeneity, and also 
to gain insight into the jump from the ‘familiar (the national situation) to the unfamiliar 
(the European level)’ from the experts’ point of view.9 
 
After analysing the first round results, the CHEPS research team selected the most 
challenging issues to develop a second round questionnaire. The first round experts 
were confronted for a second time, this time with 15 statements (out of the 49). The 15 
statements were accompanied by the first round results (scores and arguments), to 
                                                        
8
 It may be noted that usually a Delphi sample does not – and is not intended to – produce statistically 
significant results. The results provided do not predict the response of a larger population (or even of 
a different Delphi panel). ‘They represent the synthesis of opinion of the particular group, no more, 
no less.’ (Gordon, 1994). The particular group in our case were experts in the world of higher 
education. 
9
 The experts selected in their capacity as ‘international’ or ‘European’ experts were not asked to 
make this comparison between the European level and their home country. 
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enable the respondents to rethink their opinions. The outcomes of the second round 
were regarded as the outcomes of the Delphi study.10 These were then used as input for 
writing the scenarios on Europe’s higher education future. 
Tending to Fiction: Writing Scenarios 
Scenario Method, Its Potential and Limitations 
A scenario, as we understand, can be defined as ‘an internally consistent view of what 
the future might turn out to be – not a forecast, but a possible future outcome’ (Porter, 
1985). It functions as one of the ‘tools and technologies for managing the uncertainties 
of the future’ (Ringland, 1998). ‘Managing’ maybe goes too far for us, given our 
introduction to this chapter, but let us say a scenario is a tool for mapping ‘the 
uncertainties of the future’.  
 
The scenario method has been popular amongst strategic planners employed by 
companies since Shell revealed how its scenario exercise helped it to prepare for the 
1970s oil crisis. ‘By the late 1970s scenario planning was adopted by a significant 
fraction of the Fortune 1000 companies ... Roughly three-quarters of the firms had 
adopted the approach after the oil embargo provided such a deep shock to previously-
stable views of the future’ (Ringland, 1998). Later the method fell into a degree of 
disrepute, perhaps through ‘...an over-simplistic use of the technique, with a confusion 
between forecasts and scenarios’ (Ringland, 1998).  
 
The point about scenarios is they give a consistent elaboration (extrapolation) of a 
certain theme expected to play an important role in the future. In this sense they are 
akin to Weber’s ‘ideal type’ descriptions: not intended to be a description of the 
empirical phenomena, but an exaggeration to highlight an important principle or 
dimension. On this basis, the emphasis in Porter’s definition of a scenario should be on 
‘possible future outcome’, for it must be empirically possible, but does not have to be 
probable (as a forecast intends to be). 
 
Internally consistent scenarios can be constructed in several ways. Miller distinguished 
two popular ones, the Bear and the GBU methods. The Bear method ‘takes an initial 
starting point, for instance population or economic output, and then develops scenarios 
on the basis of a range of growth rates – low, medium and high. This method can be 
called the baby-bear, momma-bear and papa-bear approach (Bear for short).’ (Miller, 
2003). Besides this essentially quantitative approach of extrapolation, one could focus 
‘more on preferences and implicit expectations in order to sketch scenarios that capture 
what people consider to be the most desirable, the least desirable and the muddling 
through but most likely. This method can be dubbed the good, the bad and the ugly 
approach (GBU for short).’ (ibid.) Complicating things further, Miller advocates an 
approach that does not just look at trends and desirabilities, but considers all 
possibilities (in Popper’s terms: all that is not forbidden by theories), which he sees as 
                                                        
10
 Detailed results of the Delphi study are reported in the next chapter. 
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‘one way of being systematic and explicit about the hypothetical ‘what if’, in three 
steps: ‘The first step is to determine or define the key attribute (variable A) of the 
scenario's subject. The second step is to sketch a space, perhaps multidimensional, 
using the primary determinants of change (a, b, c) in variable A. And the third step is 
to identify distinct scenarios within the possibility space' (Miller, 2003). Yet how to 
identify those distinct scenarios was not stated by Miller. It probably needed a creative 
moment.   
Our Application of Scenarios 
To reduce our dependence on a creative moment, we referred back to our application 
of the Delphi method, which clearly distinguished between probable and desirable 
futures. This can be seen as an improved GBU approach for it gave us two dimensions 
rather than one: good – bad – ugly and probable – improbable. To some extent the 
desirable and probable coincided, according to the responses, but that was not always 
the case. The tension between the two could be used to give direction to our creativity. 
Moreover, we were aware subjective methods such as the Delphi suffer from what 
Ascher called ‘assumption drag’, i.e. the phenomenon that people maintain 
assumptions shown to be false (quoted in Van Vught, 1985). Combining the tension 
between desirability and probability with the ‘assumption drag’, we appointed persons 
to write counter-scenarios to the ‘majority scenario’, challenging the assumptions 
apparently underlying the experts’ responses. The creative moment remained as we 
had to decide which main assumptions we wanted to challenge.  
 
Here we touch upon another commonly-lamented limitation of any systematic method 
and therefore also of the methods we applied: what you get out is what you put in. This 
is only true to some extent. The true part – and the gravest – is that the dimensions, the 
space in which the respondents’ answers are interpreted by researchers, are predefined. 
They were given certain statements to react upon, which were included in the study 
due to the underlying variables they represented to the researchers. The 
multidimensional space was therefore limited by our research team’s theories.  
 
The untrue part of the statement ‘what you get out is what you put in’ is that setting up 
the space dimensions does not determine where in the space one ends up: the 
respondents were free to say what they thought was likely and desirable. This could 
make all the difference to the scenarios, of course. In a previous scenario exercise we 
engaged in (Huisman, De Boer & Westerheijden, 2001), there had been an 
unexpectedly high level of support from the Dutch higher education community for 
what we had set up as the ultra-liberal and ultra-globalised ‘counter-scenario’.  
 
As an additional impetus to ‘think outside the box’, we paid attention to the open 
questions in the first round Delphi questionnaire, where respondents could give their 
reasons behind agreeing or disagreeing with statements. That was another way to test 
whether our setting up of the possibility space had not been too narrow.  
 
 Scenarios as a Method 
 
21
In the current scenario exercise then, the main dimensions distinguishing our scenarios 
embodied: 
 
1. The dominant coordination mechanism: state vs. market vs. network;  
2. European integration and harmony; 
3. Economic and institutional developments (e.g. success of large vs. small 
organisations).  
 
The stable dimensions, exogenous developments that could not be influenced and 
which were kept constant across the scenarios, included amongst others: 
 
1. Demography: greying and ‘de-greening’ of the European population; 
2. Economy: no major effects of recession or boom; 
3. The degree of integration of research and higher education. 
 
Out of this, and out of pragmatic arguments such as the availability of scenario-writers, 
three scenarios resulted. One would reflect the (large) majority opinions of the Delphi 
respondents. State coordination, European integration, harmony and large-scale 
organisations were to be the hallmarks of this scenario, which became ‘Centralia’. 
Another would take the institutional and economic developments towards the network 
economy as its focal point. Presumably this development had been undervalued in the 
Delphi study. It also incorporated some majority opinions in the Delphi study, e.g. on 
the amount of control exercised by the academic community. From this came 
‘Octavia’. Finally the antithesis to the majority opinions of Centralia with regard to 
market coordination, small organisations and little higher-level control or integration 
characterised what became ‘Vitis Vinifera’. 
 
With the science tendency results of the previous section and the methodical 
considerations just presented, all ingredients were added and the fiction tendency of 
the process took over. The ingredients had to be combined into what we wanted to 
make three equally attractive pictures of higher education’s future in Europe.  
 
A serious choice concerned the metaphor for the scenarios. Since we intended the 
scenarios to appeal to a large audience a prima vista, yet not make one glaringly more 
appealing than the other, it was important to find an overarching metaphor with three 
equal ‘instances’. In the previous scenario exercise where we alluded to the future of 
Dutch higher education, different gardens had been the metaphor (see also: 
Westerheijden, Huisman & De Boer, 2004). In a variation on that theme, ideal-type 
fictional cities were chosen this time.  
 
The focus in the first part of the development of the scenarios had been on the factors 
influencing developments and one of the things the actual scenario-writing had to do 
was to bring in the actors and politics as policy, including of course higher education 
policy, as something created by human action. In setting up consistent scenarios we 
also had to make the human motivation, the principles underlying their actions, 
consistent. This was not so much of a problem for the ‘counter-scenarios’, as from the 
beginning they were intended to highlight some possible futures not in the consensual 
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majority of the Delphi study respondents. In those cases we could just posit a 
consistently applied principle of action; in the Vitis Vinifera scenario, for instance, it 
was a market-liberal ideology. For the scenario built on the majority opinions in the 
Delphi study Centralia, it required some interpretation to reconstruct what might have 
been a more or less consistent ideology from which that set of opinions made sense. As 
previously stated when discussing the ‘ideal-type’ character of scenarios, we did not 
want to suggest any single ‘real’ respondent held the beliefs which we constructed as 
that ideal-type ideology. The description in that scenario of a future ideology became 
the section on ‘New Arcadianism’. This ideology – as any empirically existent 
ideology – may not be completely internally consistent. Indeed we had to develop a 
differentiation between a surface of more arcadian or even outright romantic rhetoric 
and a hard core of dominance of values about economy and technology. The point 
about constructing ‘New Arcadianism’ was not its internal consistency per se, but that 
this (inconsistent) set of values and norms seemed to us necessary to make the human 
action in the Centralia scenario a fairly consistent application of a single ideology.  
 
Seeing a possible future as a resultant of intentional human action may give the 
impression that the resulting scenario must be a utopia, something ideal as everyone 
willingly contributes to it. First, this impression would hugely underestimate the effect 
of the factors (nature, the logic of the system) on the outcomes of human action. Good 
will in a hostile environment will not necessarily produce a utopia and even the 
interaction of several good-willing actors may produce outcomes they did not intend. 
 
Second, the question of what is a desirable future, or whether a scenario represents a 
utopia or a dystopia, depends on the reader’s preferences. We did not want to suggest 
that one of the three scenarios is more desirable than the other. As mentioned above, 
that is why we strove for a balanced metaphor in which each scenario could be seen as 
equally desirable. For that reason, in all three the developments have been described 
mostly in positive terms – as possible utopias rather than dystopias. Still, with a little 
reading between the lines the reader may find the negative tendencies inherent to the 
scenarios with ease.  
Presenting the Scenarios 
The Centralia scenario was built on majority opinions, both regarding probability and 
desirability. In that sense it should have been the utopia for most of our readers. 
Curiously, though, in scenario presentations across Europe, audiences made up of 
people with profiles similar to the respondents (actually even including some of our 
respondents) were largely in favour of the Octavia scenario, with usually only very 
small minorities voting for Centralia and even smaller ones (if any) for Vitis Vinifera. 
These tendencies were visible both when voting for the probability of the scenarios and 
when voting for their desirability, although more respondents thought the Centralia 
scenario was likely to happen than liked it to happen.  
 
This shows the value of constructing scenarios: taking majority and consensus 
opinions on individual statements and ‘straightening out’ these opinions into a fairly 
consistent scenario may well have explicitly uncovered relationships among opinions 
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and beliefs held by higher education experts of which they themselves were not yet 
aware. If through this we can contribute to the debate about the future of higher 
education in Europe, we will have achieved a great deal, although we realise that: 
 
…clearly, the whole process is iterative. In a sense this study is only the first 
iteration... Given that many of the factors and actors are changing rapidly it is 
inevitable that a second cycle will be necessary in the future. (M.D. Rogers in 
Ringland 1998). 
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Introduction 
Below we present the main findings from the research project European Higher 
Education and Research in 2020.  
 
The project was designed to gain insight into the expectations and desires of European 
higher education experts on the topic ‘higher education and research landscape in 
2020’. Will a uniform study structure be implemented across European higher 
education systems? Will a European Research Council be the most important funding 
organisation for basic research? Will academics still play an important role in 
university management?  
 
We formulated 49 statements on higher education in Europe in 2020, that were 
organised around six themes: 1) education, 2) research and innovation, 3) funding,  
4) quality, 5) higher education, society and labour market, and 6) institutional 
governance and management.  
 
Approximately 750 individuals from 24 countries and an additional 30 supranational 
experts were approached by e-mail to participate in the project by filling out a web-
based questionnaire. Participants were asked to estimate the desirability and likelihood 
of all 49 statements. In addition, they were asked to give arguments to support their 
views. For many of the statements participants were also invited to estimate the 
statement would be likely in their home country.  
 
Of the about 780 participants, 164 sent in answers before the deadline (21% response 
rate). For some countries and groups of individuals the response rates were rather low. 
Overall the different European regions (north, west, east, south) and participant groups  
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(national policy-makers; intermediary organisations; employers/employee 
organisations, students; institutional leaders; researchers) were well represented in the 
sample. 
 
We explored what we perceived to be the most challenging issues in a second round. 
The respondents of the first round were confronted (again) with fifteen of the initial 
forty-nine statements. But this time, they were informed about the results of the first 
round and the arguments used by other respondents. For a number of statements the 
results for the first and second round (84 respondents) differed significantly. 
 
The findings for each of the statements are presented in the appendix. These include 
the total number of respondents to the statement, the overall scores per category 
(including the number of individuals giving ‘no opinion’), the average score and the 
standard deviation. A scale ranging from ‘very probable/desirable’ to ‘highly 
improbable/desirable’ was converted a four-point scale, implying that an average of 
2.500 could be interpreted as the neutral middle position. The qualitative data (i.e. the 
argumentations of the respondents) are not presented in this report, but did however 
form important inputs for building the scenarios. 
Most Important Findings 
We found a number of important findings that are presented below, including: (a) the 
statements that were considered most likely/desirable; (b) the statements that were 
considered least likely/desirable; (c) the statements that led to the largest variety of 
responses; (d) the statements for which the difference between desirability and 
likelihood was largest; (e) statements that led to large differences between regions in 
Europe; and (f) statement that led to large differences between types of respondents. 
Most Probable or Desirable 
The statements reported to be most desirable: 
• In Europe 2020, more than 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is spent on 
research, technological development and innovation (average = 1.354). 
• In Europe 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common practice in 
higher education institutions (average = 1.525). 
• In Europe 2020, more than 50% of academic journals are e-journals, owned and 
controlled by academics themselves (average = 1.599). 
• In Europe 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors degree from 
a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country) (average = 
1.617). 
• In Europe 2020, regional (both intra-national and cross-border) authorities are 
responsible for regional innovation clusters (average = 1.648).  
• In Europe 2020, higher education management has developed into a recognisable 
professional career (average = 1.705). 
• In Europe 2020, consensus has been achieved on the Bachelor-Master structure: a 
uniform 3+2 structure is implemented in all countries and degrees are comparable 
across Europe (average = 1.769). 
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The statements reported to be most probable: 
• In my country in 2020, the Bachelor-Master structure has been implemented with 
a 3+2 structure and degrees are comparable to those across Europe (average = 
1.692). 
• In Europe 2020, vast differences in academic salaries still exist across countries 
(average = 1.778). 
• In my country in 2020, only a few ‘clusters of excellence’ are competitive on a 
global level in each (multi-)disciplinary research field (average = 1.795). 
• In Europe 2020, regional (both intra-national and cross-border) authorities are 
responsible for regional innovation clusters (average = 1.816). 
Least Probable or Desirable 
The statements reported to be least desirable: 
• In Europe 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent and 
critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of their 
mission (average = 3.365). 
• In 2020, the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world’s most dynamic 
knowledge economy has clearly failed. The most excellent research is still done 
elsewhere (e.g. United States, South East Asia, China) (average = 3.312). 
• In Europe 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand, 
resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale (average 
= 3.217). 
• In Europe 2020, the quality of academic research is highly skewed – research is 
much stronger in the North-West with Southern and Eastern countries lagging 
significantly behind (3.134). 
• In Europe 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for business 
and industry are far weaker than they were in 2000 (average = 3.099). 
• In Europe 2020, the effective marketing of ‘quality’ rather than the genuine quality 
of education and research attracts the brightest students (average = 3.082). 
 
The statements reported to be least probable:   
• In my country in 2020, there is a jungle of accreditation agencies, some linked to 
the ministry of education, others private and for-profit (average = 2.968). 
• In my country in 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent 
and critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of 
their mission (average = 2.901). 
• In Europe 2020, all (national as well as European) accreditation schemes have 
been abandoned (average = 2.883). 
• In my country in 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-
time equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions 
(average = 2.873). 
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The Statements with most Variation in the Responses 
• In Europe 2020, participation rates in higher education have increased 
considerably to some 70% of 18-22 year olds (probability in own country, 
standard deviation = .994). 
• In Europe 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees (desirability, 
standard deviation = .972). 
• In Europe 2020, the European Union has a single, centralised accreditation office 
for higher education, which is part of the EU apparatus (desirability, standard 
deviation = .971). 
• In Europe 2020, private higher education institutions that are accredited by 
recognised accreditation agencies are treated the same way in all respects as 
accredited public higher education institutions (desirability, standard deviation = 
.906). 
The Statements with Largest Discrepancies between Desirability and Probability 
Probable, but not or less desirable: 
• In 2020, the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world’s most dynamic 
knowledge economy has clearly failed. The most excellent research is still done 
elsewhere (e.g. United States, South East Asia, China) (difference between 
desirability and probability = 1.300). 
• In Europe 2020, the quality of academic research is highly skewed – research is 
much stronger in the North-West with Southern and Eastern countries lagging 
significantly behind (difference between desirability and probability = 1.190). 
 
Desirable, but not or less probable: 
• In Europe 2020, the quality of study programmes is fairly consistent across all 
countries – from North to South and from East to West (difference between 
desirability and probability = .843). 
• In Europe 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in another European 
country for the full duration of their programme (difference between desirability 
and probability = .795). 
 
Desirable, but not probable in own country: 
• In Europe/my country 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in 
another European country for the full duration of their programme (difference 
between desirability in Europe and probability in own country = .920). 
• In Europe 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors degree from 
a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country) (difference 
between desirability in Europe and probability in own country = .896). 
 
Less desirable, but probable in own country: 
• In 2020, my country has failed to make its full contribution to meeting the 
objectives of the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world’s most dynamic 
knowledge economy (difference between desirability in Europe and probability in 
own country = 1.085). 
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• In my country in 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for 
business and industry are far weaker than they were in 2000 (difference between 
desirability in Europe and probability in own country = .947). 
The Statements with most Variation in the Responses by Region/Type of Respondent 
The statements with large variety in responses by region: 
• In Europe/my country 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds 
societal demand, resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a 
large scale. 
 
Respondents from Western Europe judge this statement as (significantly) less probable 
in Europe 2020 and (significantly) less probable in their own country in 2020. 
Respondents from Southern Europe judge this statement as (significantly) more 
probable in their own country in 2020. 
 
• In Europe/my country 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees. 
 
Respondents from Western Europe judge this statement as (significantly) more 
probable in their own country in 2020, respondents from Northern Europe judge this 
statement as (significantly) less probable in their own country in 2020. 
 
• In Europe 2020/my country, participation rates in higher education have increased 
considerably to some 70% of 18-22 year olds.  
 
Respondents from Western Europe judge this statement as (significantly) less probable 
in Europe 2020 and in their own country in 2020. Respondents from Southern Europe 
judge this statement as (significantly) more desirable in their own country in 2020.   
 
The statements with a large variety in responses by type of respondent: 
• In Europe 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common practice in 
higher education institutions. 
 
Representatives of national governments (ministries) judge this statement as 
(significantly) less probable in Europe 2020. 
 
• In Europe 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees. 
 
Representatives of universities (central level administrators/leaders) judge this 
statement as (significantly) less probably in their own country. 
 
• In Europe 2020, the typical higher education institution is managed in a business-
like way, stressing efficiency and productivity. 
Higher education researchers judge this statement as (significantly) less desirable 
in Europe 2020. 
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Comparison First and Second Round (15 statements) 
Comparing the first and second round answers (second round 87 respondents), the 
most striking findings were: 
 
• Standard deviations: the second round standard deviations were all lower, hinting 
at an increasing homogenisation of views. This should be interpreted carefully for 
the size of the two groups was clearly different. Statistical tools could not be used 
to determine significant differences. 
• Average scores: almost all (24 out of 30) increased. Respondents in general were 
inclined to see the statements (even) more improbable and undesirable than in the 
first round. 
• The largest differences were found for the following statements: 
 
In Europe 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-time 
equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions (probability 
from 2.491 to 2.821; desirability from 2.578 to 3.171). 
 
In Europe 2020, the European Research Council funds more than 50% of the research 
projects in higher education institutions (probability from 2.689 to 3.163; desirability 
from 2.199 to 1.579). 
 
In Europe 2020, the European Union has a single, centralised accreditation office for 
higher education, which is part of the EU apparatus (probability from 2.700 to 3.072; 
desirability from 2.566 to 3.000). 
 
In Europe 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand, 
resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale (probability 
from 2.414 to 2.741; desirability from 3.217 to 3.598). 
 
In Europe 2020, the academic staff structure in higher education is standardised across 
all countries and all higher education and research institutions (probability from 2.654 
to 3.119; desirability from 2.321 to 2.713). 
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Appendix: Overview of the Results 
I. Education, Research and Innovation 
1a) In Europe 2020, consensus has been achieved on the Bachelor-Master structure: a 
uniform 3+2 structure is implemented in all countries and degrees are comparable 
across Europe. 
 
Note: The Bologna Declaration agreement on comparable degree structures has been 
realised. 
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1b) In my country in 2020, the Bachelor-Master structure has been implemented with a 
3+2 structure and degrees are comparable to those across Europe. 
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2a) In Europe 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common practice in 
higher education institutions. 
 
Note: The diversity of students entering higher education in terms of educational 
background and (work) experience has resulted in many students claiming credit for 
this ‘prior learning’. Institutions have developed procedures for doing this. 
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2b) In my country in 2020, recognition of prior learning has become a common 
practice in higher education institutions. 
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3a) In Europe 2020, universities’ research agendas are determined in close interaction 
with external stakeholders. 
 
Note: The distinction between basic/fundamental research on the one hand and 
applied research on the other has blurred. Most research is characterised by elements 
relating both to its fundamental nature (knowledge for the sake of knowledge) and to 
its practical application. As a consequence, the role of individual professors in setting 
the research agenda has diminished. 
 
N=162 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
45 
 
92 
 
22 
 
1 
 
1.846 (.656) 
 
2 
 
N=162 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
39 
 
73 
 
42 
 
5 
 
2.043 (.796) 
 
3 
 
 The Delphi Study 
 
33
3b) In my country in 2020, universities’ research` agendas are determined in close 
interaction with external stakeholders. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
26 
 
103 
 
22 
 
4 
 
2.000 (.645) 
 
2 
 
4a) In Europe 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-time 
equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions. 
 
Note: Business and industry are the main sectors performing basic research. 
 
N=161 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
13 
 
43 
 
82 
 
14 
 
2.491 (.782) 
 
9 
 
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
8 
 
37 
 
79 
 
24 
 
2.578 (.803) 
 
13 
 
Second round: 
N=84 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
1 
 
22 
 
52 
 
9 
 
2.821 (.624) 
 
0 
 
N=83 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
2 
 
6 
 
50 
 
24 
 
3.171 (.663) 
 
1 
 
4b) In my country in 2020, more than 60 per cent of basic research (in terms of full-
time equivalent researchers) is conducted outside higher education institutions. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
8 
 
30 
 
69 
 
44 
 
2.873 (.848) 
 
6 
 
Huisman et al. 
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5a) In Europe 2020, a striking feature of higher education is its strong functional 
stratification.  
 
Note: There is a striking division between highly selective top-universities employing 
the best academic staff and having a strong emphasis on research and post-graduate 
programmes, and a wide range of other higher education institutions. 
 
N=159 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
33 
 
101 
 
22 
 
0 
 
1.893 (.593) 
 
3 
 
N=158 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
20 
 
60 
 
57 
 
9 
 
2.196 (.818) 
 
12 
 
5b) In my country in 2020, a striking feature of higher education is its strong 
functional stratification. 
 
N=154 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
18 
 
75 
 
56 
 
2 
 
2.234 (.686) 
 
3 
 
6a) In Europe 2020, participation rates in higher education have increased considerably 
to some 70% of 18-22 year olds.  
 
Note: At present the participation rates in European countries range from around 30% 
to 55% of this age group. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
28 
 
56 
 
63 
 
9 
 
2.281 (.841) 
 
4 
 
N=158 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
38 
 
62 
 
43 
 
8 
 
2.044 (.862) 
 
7 
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Second round: 
N=83 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
6 
 
45 
 
30 
 
2 
 
2.337 (.649) 
 
0 
 
N=82 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
16 
 
44 
 
19 
 
1 
 
2.063 (.700) 
 
2 
 
6b) In my country in 2020, participation rates in higher education have increased 
considerably to some 70% of 18-22 year olds. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
30 
 
49 
 
48 
 
26 
 
2.410 (.994) 
 
3 
 
7a) In Europe 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for business and 
industry are far weaker than they were in 2000.  
 
Note: Their relative position has weakened when compared to other (economically 
relevant) research fields in terms of public funding levels, numbers of PhD students 
and career opportunities for academic staff 
 
N=162 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
28 
 
93 
 
35 
 
2 
 
2.019 (.671) 
 
4 
 
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
0 
 
24 
 
85 
 
49 
 
3.099 (.666) 
 
3 
 
7b) In my country in 2020, research fields that are economically less relevant for 
business and industry are far weaker than they were in 2000. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
18 
 
86 
 
44 
 
4 
 
2.153 (.686) 
 
5 
 
Huisman et al. 
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8a) In Europe 2020, more than 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is spent on 
research, technological development and innovation.  
 
Note: The European Council (Barcelona 2002) goal of Europe spending 3% of GDP 
on R&D (two-thirds from business and industry and one-third from public sources) 
has been reached. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
28 
 
87 
 
36 
 
4 
 
2.038 (.716) 
 
5 
       
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
101 
 
54 
 
3 
 
0 
 
1.354 (.525) 
 
3 
 
Second round: 
N=83 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
11 
 
52 
 
19 
 
0 
 
2.098 (.601) 
 
1 
 
N=82 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
48 
 
33 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1.427 (.522) 
 
0 
 
8b) In my country in 2020, more than 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is spent 
on research, technological development and innovation. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
31 
 
59 
 
53 
 
10 
 
2.217 (.862) 
 
4 
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9a) In Europe 2020, regional (both intra-national and cross-border) authorities are 
responsible for regional innovation clusters.  
 
Note: In regional innovation clusters, companies, municipalities, universities and 
public research organisations successfully interact in research and innovation. 
 
N=163 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
23 
 
100 
 
22 
 
1 
 
1.816 (.617) 
 
14 
 
N=162 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
41 
 
93 
 
12 
 
1 
 
1.648 (.620) 
 
15 
 
9b) In my country in 2020, regional authorities are responsible for regional innovation 
clusters. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
22 
 
85 
 
38 
 
3 
 
2.039 (.693) 
 
8 
 
10a) In Europe 2020, only a few ‘clusters of excellence’ are competitive on a global 
level in each (multi-)disciplinary research field. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
34 
 
88 
 
29 
 
0 
 
1.856 (.657) 
 
8 
 
N=158 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
7 
 
47 
 
76 
 
12 
 
2.386 (.755) 
 
16 
 
10b) In my country in 2020, only a few ‘clusters of excellence’ are competitive on a 
global level in each (multi-)disciplinary research field. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
46 
 
76 
 
26 
 
1 
 
1.795 (.711) 
 
7 
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11a) In Europe 2020, standardised course modules developed by leading European 
scholars are widely used (and available online) in many basic disciplines. 
 
N=162 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
27 
 
71 
 
52 
 
5 
 
2.130 (.775) 
 
7 
 
N=162 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
15 
 
76 
 
49 
 
11 
 
2.210 (.780) 
 
11 
 
11b) In my country in 2020, standardised course modules developed by leading 
European scholars are widely used (and available online) in many basic disciplines. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this  
situation is  
 
12 
 
67 
 
61 
 
10 
 
2.365 (.745) 
 
6 
 
12a) In Europe 2020, more than 10% of students are registered with institutions that 
have their seat outside Europe. 
 
Note: Prestigious institutions from outside Europe (for example, the USA and 
Australia) have established a significant number of campuses within Europe. 
 
N=159 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
17 
 
73 
 
57 
 
4 
 
2.201 (.716) 
 
8 
       
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
52 
 
59 
 
11 
 
2.075 (.886) 
 
30 
 
12b) In my country in 2020, more than 10% of students are registered with institutions 
that have their seat outside Europe. 
 
N=155 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
11 
 
53 
 
65 
 
20 
 
2.529 (.815) 
 
6 
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13a) In Europe 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in another 
European country for the full duration of their programme. 
 
N=161 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
5 
 
37 
 
106 
 
10 
 
2.714 (.612) 
 
3 
 
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
21 
 
90 
 
36 
 
0 
 
1.919 (.643) 
 
14 
 
13b) In my country in 2020, more than 25% of first-degree students study in another 
European country for the full duration of their programme. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
25 
 
85 
 
32 
 
2.840 (.800) 
 
4 
II. Funding 
14a) In Europe 2020, the European Research Council funds more than 50% of the 
research projects in higher education institutions. 
 
N=161 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
4 
 
22 
 
107 
 
16 
 
2.689 (.635) 
 
12 
 
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
17 
 
55 
 
61 
 
11 
 
2.199 (.842) 
 
17 
 
Second round: 
N=83 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
0 
 
7 
 
53 
 
20 
 
3.163 (.561) 
 
3 
 
N=83 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
5 
 
28 
 
37 
 
6 
 
2.579 (.735) 
 
7 
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14b) In my country in 2020, the European Research Council funds more than 50% of 
the research projects in higher education institutions. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
4 
 
21 
 
90 
 
29 
 
2.752 (.724) 
 
13 
 
15a) In Europe 2020, all national research-funding organisations have opened their 
competitive grants to applicants from all over Europe. 
 
N=161 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
67 
 
64 
 
10 
 
2.335 (.736) 
 
10 
 
N=162 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
30 
 
79 
 
37 
 
4 
 
1.944 (.756) 
 
12 
 
15b) In my country in 2020, all research-funding organisations have opened their 
competitive grants to applicants from all over Europe. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
10 56 66 17 2.471 (.790) 8 
 
16a) In Europe 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
34 
 
84 
 
34 
 
5 
 
2.025 (.749) 
 
3 
 
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
23 
 
61 
 
39 
 
26 
 
2.273 (.972) 
 
12 
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Second round: 
N=83 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
56 
 
12 
 
0 
 
1.976 (.566) 
 
1 
 
N=83 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
33 
 
21 
 
15 
 
2.519 (.945) 
 
4 
 
16b) In my country in 2020, all higher education students pay tuition fees. 
 
N=155 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
43 
 
69 
 
36 
 
7 
 
2.045 (.832) 
 
0 
 
17a) In Europe 2020, individual higher education institutions set their own tuition fees. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
30 
 
99 
 
25 
 
2 
 
1.944 (.639) 
 
4 
 
N=161 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
24 
 
54 
 
58 
 
15 
 
2.273 (.888) 
 
10 
 
Second round: 
N=82 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
61 
 
7 
 
0 
 
1.915 (.502) 
 
0 
 
N=83 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
6 
 
35 
 
29 
 
10 
 
2.538 (.810) 
 
3 
 
17b) In my country in 2020, individual higher education institutions set their own 
tuition fees. 
 
N=155 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
27 
 
70 
 
44 
 
9 
 
2.161 (.818) 
 
5 
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18a) In Europe 2020, tuition fees are set on the basis of graduate salaries in each 
discipline. 
 
N=161 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
41 
 
76 
 
15 
 
2.360 (.822) 
 
19 
 
N=155 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
29 
 
79 
 
23 
 
2.555 (.824) 
 
15 
 
18b) In my country in 2020, tuition fees are set on the basis of graduate salaries in each 
discipline. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
4 
 
32 
 
78 
 
30 
 
2.705 (.769) 
 
12 
 
19a) In Europe 2020, the level of publicly funded financial support for students under 
21 years old is dependent on parental income. 
 
Note: Governments have limited grants and scholarships to students under 21 as a 
result of the growing number of students. Equity considerations have led to parents 
being expected to contribute to their children’s higher education in relation to their 
income. Mature students rely on loans and their own income. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
21 
 
97 
 
29 
 
5 
 
2.013 (.679) 
 
8 
 
N=160 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
27 
 
64 
 
45 
 
15 
 
2.188 (.892) 
 
9 
 
Second round: 
N=83 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
8 
 
67 
 
6 
 
0 
 
1.975 (.418) 
 
2 
 
N=84 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
7 
 
44 
 
20 
 
7 
 
2.346 (.770) 
 
6 
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19b) In my country in 2020, the level of publicly funded financial support for students 
under 21 years old is dependent on parental income. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
27 
 
73 
 
41 
 
11 
 
2.179 (.830) 
 
4 
 
20a) In Europe 2020, private higher education institutions that are accredited by 
recognised accreditation agencies are treated the same way in all respects as accredited 
public higher education institutions. 
 
Note: The differences between public and private providers have become blurred and 
there are no convincing arguments to treat private institutions differently from public 
institutions (in areas such as student financial support, the recognition of degrees, 
eligibility for public research grants and the public funding institutions receive per 
student). 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
44 
 
75 
 
33 
 
3 
 
1.906 (.762) 
 
5 
 
N=159 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
45 
 
65 
 
29 
 
12 
 
1.950 (.906) 
 
8 
 
Second round: 
N=83 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
8 
 
63 
 
11 
 
0 
 
2.037 (.483) 
 
1 
 
N=83 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
54 
 
12 
 
5 
 
2.148 (.709) 
 
2 
 
20b) In my country in 2020, accredited private higher education institutions are treated 
the same way in all respects as accredited public higher education institutions.  
 
N=155 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
33 
 
61 
 
48 
 
9 
 
2.161 (.857) 
 
4 
Huisman et al. 
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21) In Europe 2020, the funding of the research (basic, applied and contract) 
undertaken by higher education institutions will come from the following sources: 
 
       Likely share Desirable share Likely country 
 
EC/ERC     22.6%  25.0%  20.8%  
National government  31.5%  28.2%  40.0% 
Regional government  11.1%  10.6%  10.1% 
Business & industry  32.9%  35.1%  27.7% 
Other, please specify:    4.2%    4.4%    5.0% 
 
       N=124   N=122  N=123 
 
22a) In Europe 2020, the number of government-subsidised student places in public 
higher education institutions is demand-driven. 
 
Note: Student demand determines the number of funded places. Governments refrain 
from setting capacity limits. 
 
N=161 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
15 
 
85 
 
46 
 
7 
 
2.180 (.715) 
 
8 
 
N=159 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
21 
 
74 
 
46 
 
7 
 
2.107 (.775) 
 
11 
 
22b) In my country in 2020, the number of government-subsidised student places in 
public higher education institutions is demand-driven. 
 
N=154 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
18 
 
69 
 
45 
 
12 
 
2.201 (.821) 
 
10 
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III. Quality 
23a) In Europe 2020, the effective marketing of ‘quality’ rather than the genuine 
quality of education and research attracts the brightest students.  
 
Note: The marketing strategies of higher education institutions determine how students 
are informed (or misinformed) about the places where they might study. Trustworthy, 
independent and ‘hard’ indicators of the quality of education are not publicly 
available. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
16 
 
78 
 
56 
 
4 
 
2.225 (.696) 
 
6 
 
N=159 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
7 
 
10 
 
81 
 
55 
 
3.082 (.765) 
 
6 
 
23b) In my country in 2020, the effective marketing of ‘quality’ rather than the 
genuine quality of education and research attracts the brightest students. 
 
N=154 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
60 
 
61 
 
12 
 
2.370 (.788) 
 
7 
 
24a) In Europe 2020, all (national as well as European) accreditation schemes have 
been abandoned. 
 
Note. Accreditation schemes have ceased to exist for a number of reasons including 
that they did not deliver information useful for students or employers. 
 
N=159 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
3 
 
22 
 
79 
 
42 
 
2.843 (.761) 
 
13 
 
N=160 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
5 
 
28 
 
71 
 
40 
 
2.713 (.841) 
 
16 
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24b) In my country in 2020, no accreditation schemes are operational. 
 
N=154 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
4 
 
23 
 
70 
 
46 
 
2.883 (.798) 
 
11 
 
25a) In Europe 2020, there is a jungle of accreditation agencies, some linked to 
national ministries of education, others private and for-profit. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
13 
 
75 
 
59 
 
5 
 
2.250 (.698) 
 
8 
 
N=158 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
4 
 
17 
 
77 
 
46 
 
2.867 (.781) 
 
14 
 
25b) In my country in 2020, there is a jungle of accreditation agencies, some linked to 
the ministry of education, others private and for-profit. 
 
N=154 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
5 
 
29 
 
70 
 
46 
 
2.968 (.801) 
 
4 
 
26) In Europe 2020, the European Union has a single, centralised accreditation office 
for higher education, which is part of the EU apparatus. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
35 
 
91 
 
20 
 
2.700 (.744) 
 
5 
 
N=159 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
18 
 
35 
 
60 
 
35 
 
2.566 (.971) 
 
11 
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Second round: 
N=84 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
3 
 
6 
 
56 
 
18 
 
3.072 (.659) 
 
1 
 
N=82 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
3 
 
13 
 
46 
 
19 
 
3.000 (.742) 
 
1 
 
27a) In Europe 2020, most students collect ECTS-credits in a ‘supermarket mode’ of 
continuous, life-long education. 
 
Note: The degree or study programme has come to play a less important role - in 2020 
the specific courses completed are the most important elements in a graduate 
curriculum vitae. 
 
N=159 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
71 
 
62 
 
3 
 
2.226 (.691) 
 
9 
 
N=159 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
69 
 
61 
 
3 
 
2.258 (.726) 
 
9 
 
27b) In my country in 2020, most students collect ECTS-credits in a ‘supermarket 
mode’ of continuous, life-long education. 
 
N=153 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
59 
 
64 
 
13 
 
2.425 (.756) 
 
8 
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28a) In Europe 2020, there is a single European qualification structure that includes all 
higher education programmes. 
 
Note: The qualification structure describes competencies and levels of educational 
attainment. The development of a single European qualification structure required 
international agreement about the structure of labour markets. 
 
N=159 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
12 
 
53 
 
79 
 
9 
 
2.459 (.731) 
 
6 
 
N=158 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
19 
 
73 
 
47 
 
8 
 
2.139 (.779) 
 
11 
 
28b) In my country in 2020, there is a single qualification structure that includes all 
higher education programmes. 
 
N=152 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
25 
 
62 
 
52 
 
7 
 
2.191 (.808) 
 
6 
 
29a) In Europe 2020, the employability of graduates is used as the main indicator of 
the quality of study programmes. 
 
N=160 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
12 
 
73 
 
66 
 
6 
 
2.375 (.691) 
 
3 
 
N=159 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
55 
 
75 
 
14 
 
2.522 (.749) 
 
5 
 
29b) In my country in 2020, the employability of graduates is used as the main 
indicator of the quality of study programmes. 
 
N=154 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
11 
 
69 
 
64 
 
8 
 
2.422 (.709) 
 
2 
 
 The Delphi Study 
 
49
30) In Europe 2020, the quality of study programmes is fairly consistent across all 
countries – from North to South and from East to West. 
 
N=158 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
6 
 
41 
 
84 
 
24 
 
2.760 (.739) 
 
3 
 
N=155 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
36 
 
83 
 
29 
 
2 
 
1.916 (.703) 
 
5 
 
31) In Europe 2020, the quality of academic research is highly skewed – research is 
much stronger in the North-West with Southern and Eastern countries lagging 
significantly behind. 
 
N=159 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
27 
 
87 
 
36 
 
0 
 
1.943 (.658) 
 
9 
       
N=157 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
2 
 
4 
 
94 
 
50 
 
3.134 (.599) 
 
7 
IV. Higher Education, Society and Labour Market 
32a) In Europe 2020, the most excellent academics work outside the public 
universities. 
 
Note: It is much more rewarding for excellent researchers and teachers to work for 
private higher education institutions, consultancy firms and/or business and industry. 
In addition to higher salaries, they have access to better research facilities. 
 
N=158 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
60 
 
80 
 
5 
 
2.462 (.662) 
 
4 
 
N=156 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
5 
 
11 
 
89 
 
39 
 
2.885 (.729) 
 
12 
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32b) In my country in 2020, the most excellent academics work outside the public 
universities. 
 
N=153 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
6 
 
36 
 
89 
 
18 
 
2.725 (.701) 
 
4 
 
33a) In Europe 2020, the proportion of academic staff in higher education with long-
term or tenured positions is significantly lower than it was in 2000. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
24 
 
87 
 
38 
 
1 
 
2.013 (.664) 
 
7 
       
N=154 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
15 
 
60 
 
49 
 
16 
 
2.247 (.865) 
 
14 
 
Second round: 
N=84 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
62 
 
9 
 
1 
 
2.025 (.524) 
 
3 
 
N=82 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
7 
 
25 
 
44 
 
6 
 
2.598 (.751) 
 
2 
 
33b) In my country in 2020, the proportion of academic staff in higher education with 
long-term or tenured positions is significantly lower than it was in 2000. 
 
N=149 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
19 
 
62 
 
58 
 
7 
 
2.315 (.771) 
 
3 
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34a) In Europe 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal demand, 
resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
12 
 
54 
 
73 
 
10 
 
2.414 (.751) 
 
8 
 
N=157 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
1 
 
7 
 
82 
 
61 
 
3.217 (.614) 
 
6 
 
Second round: 
N=84 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
3 
 
24 
 
45 
 
9 
 
2.741 (.703) 
 
1 
 
N=82 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
0 
 
2 
 
29 
 
51 
 
3.598 (.541) 
 
2 
 
34b) In my country in 2020, the rapid growth in graduate supply far exceeds societal 
demand resulting in graduate unemployment and over-schooling on a large scale. 
 
N=151 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
48 
 
69 
 
15 
 
2.497 (.808) 
 
5 
 
35a) In Europe 2020, the academic staff structure in higher education is standardised 
across all countries and all higher education and research institutions. 
 
Note: The differences in the categories of academic staff across Europe have 
disappeared – there is now a common classification with agreed-upon job titles 
(Europrofessor A, Europrofessor B, etc.), but not necessarily equal salary scales. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
4 
 
40 
 
86 
 
18 
 
2.654 (.695) 
 
8 
 
N=156 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
60 
 
55 
 
17 
 
2.321 (.825) 
 
15 
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Second round: 
N=84 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
0 
 
7 
 
60 
 
17 
 
3.119 (.524) 
 
0 
 
N=83 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
5 
 
19 
 
50 
 
6 
 
2.713 (.697) 
 
3 
 
35b) In my country in 2020, the academic staff structure in higher education is 
standardised across all higher education and research institutions. 
 
N=149 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
23 
 
55 
 
56 
 
10 
 
2.289 (.838) 
 
5 
 
36) In Europe 2020, vast differences in academic salaries still exist across countries. 
 
N=158 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
49 
 
90 
 
16 
 
1 
 
1.778 (.637) 
 
2 
 
N=156 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
4 
 
36 
 
89 
 
13 
 
2.532 (.690) 
 
14 
 
37a) In Europe 2020, it is common practice in all countries for higher education 
institutions to select their students at both bachelors and masters levels. 
 
N=158 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
34 
 
76 
 
33 
 
2 
 
1.854 (.740) 
 
13 
 
N=158 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
27 
 
80 
 
29 
 
4 
 
1.835 (.754) 
 
18 
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Second round: 
N=84 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
57 
 
10 
 
0 
 
1.951 (.545) 
 
3 
 
N=84 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
16 
 
53 
 
6 
 
5 
 
2.000 (.729) 
 
4 
 
37b) In my country in 2020, it is common practice for higher education institutions to 
select their students at both bachelors and masters levels. 
 
N=152 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
32 
 
65 
 
37 
 
7 
 
1.980 (.836) 
 
11 
 
38a) In 2020, the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world’s most dynamic 
knowledge economy has clearly failed. The most excellent research is still done 
elsewhere (e.g. United States, South East Asia, China). 
 
N=158 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
20 
 
79 
 
40 
 
5 
 
2.013 (.745) 
 
14 
 
N=157 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
2 
 
2 
 
70 
 
76 
 
3.312 (.618) 
 
7 
 
38b) In 2020, my country has failed to make its full contribution to meeting the 
objectives of the Lisbon-2000 agenda to make Europe the world’s most dynamic 
knowledge economy. 
 
N=154 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
63 
 
53 
 
11 
 
2.227 (.804) 
 
13 
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39a) In Europe 2020, the emphasis in undergraduate studies is much more on broad 
education (‘Bildung’) than on the transmission of pragmatic job-relevant knowledge 
and skills. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
12 
 
68 
 
63 
 
2 
 
2.212 (.678) 
 
11 
 
N=155 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
15 
 
67 
 
55 
 
6 
 
2.181 (.750) 
 
12 
 
39b) In my country in 2020, the emphasis in undergraduate studies is much more on 
broad education (‘Bildung’) than on the transmission of pragmatic job-relevant 
knowledge and skills. 
 
N=151 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
14 
 
63 
 
61 
 
5 
 
2.272 (.725) 
 
8 
 
40a) In Europe 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors degree from 
a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country). 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
13 
 
65 
 
66 
 
3 
 
2.263 (.693) 
 
9 
       
N=154 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
34 
 
88 
 
13 
 
0 
 
1.617 (.615) 
 
19 
 
40b) In my country in 2020, more than 40% of masters students hold a bachelors 
degree from a different institution (possibly but not necessarily in another country). 
 
N=152 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
55 
 
70 
 
13 
 
2.513 (.750) 
 
4 
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41a) In Europe 2020, technological breakthroughs have made ‘anytime, anyplace 
learning’ the dominant learning mode. 
 
Note: Lecture hall complexes have become less important although institutions still use 
laboratories for skills training, and seminar rooms for face-to-face contact in a 
‘blended learning mode’. 
 
N=158 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
13 
 
53 
 
74 
 
10 
 
2.411 (.759) 
 
8 
 
N=152 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
10 
 
51 
 
70 
 
9 
 
2.355 (.750) 
 
12 
 
41b) In my country in 2020, technological breakthroughs have made ‘anytime, 
anyplace learning’ the dominant learning mode. 
 
N=152 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
7 
 
52 
 
73 
 
14 
 
2.539 (.729) 
 
6 
 
42) In Europe 2020, more than 50% of academic journals are e-journals, owned and 
controlled by academics themselves. 
 
Note: Academics have won the battle with the publisher – the e-journals are 
prestigious and subscribers pay only a modest subscription. 
 
N=158 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
27 
 
71 
 
42 
 
2 
 
1.918 (.758) 
 
16 
 
N=157 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
46 
 
70 
 
19 
 
2 
 
1.599 (.750) 
 
20 
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43a) In Europe 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent and 
critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of their 
mission. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
6 
 
35 
 
86 
 
24 
 
2.739 (.736) 
 
6 
 
N=156 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
3 
 
6 
 
66 
 
78 
 
3.365 (.670) 
 
3 
 
Second round: 
N=84 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
2 
 
19 
 
39 
 
22 
 
2.988 (.778) 
 
2 
       
N=83 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
2 
 
3 
 
26 
 
50 
 
3.531 (.691) 
 
2 
 
43b) In my country in 2020, only a few universities consider making an independent 
and critical contribution to intellectual and cultural life to be an important part of their 
mission. 
 
N=151 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
8 
 
32 
 
74 
 
36 
 
2.901 (.816) 
 
1 
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V. Institutional Governance and Management 
44a) In the European university of 2020, there is a clear split between teaching, 
research and community service functions – this split is reflected in organisational 
structures, sources of revenue and staffing policies. 
 
Note: The tasks of the university have become more complex and distinct, forcing 
institutions to set up different organisational structures for different tasks. This has 
also had consequences for salaries and other conditions of employment. 
 
N=155 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
17 
 
71 
 
53 
 
3 
 
2.219 (.717) 
 
11 
 
N=157 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
42 
 
67 
 
23 
 
2.459 (.855) 
 
16 
 
44b) In my country’s universities in 2020, there is a clear split between teaching, 
research and community service functions – this split is reflected in organisational 
structures, sources of revenue and staffing policies. 
 
N=150 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
9 
 
64 
 
57 
 
11 
 
2.347 (.748) 
 
9 
 
45a) In Europe 2020, the typical higher education institution is managed in a business-
like way, stressing efficiency and productivity. 
 
Note: Methods of strategic, financial and human resources management are by and 
large similar to those encountered in the for-profit sector. This does not necessarily 
mean that higher education is seen or run as a (for-profit) business. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
29 
 
97 
 
26 
 
1 
 
1.943 (.625) 
 
4 
 
N=156 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
18 
 
83 
 
38 
 
8 
 
2.115 (.748) 
 
9 
 
Huisman et al. 
 
58 
45b) In my country in 2020, the typical higher education institution is managed in a 
business-like way, stressing efficiency and productivity. 
 
N=152 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
18 
 
85 
 
44 
 
5 
 
2.237 (.698) 
 
0 
 
46a) In Europe 2020, control over educational courses and programmes has shifted to 
institutional executives and managers and to external stakeholders. 
 
Note: In 2020, the determining influence of professionals (academics) over the content 
of educational courses and programmes has diminished. 
 
N=157 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
2 
 
54 
 
84 
 
7 
 
2.484 (.617) 
 
10 
 
N=155 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
3 
 
25 
 
79 
 
33 
 
2.723 (.768) 
 
15 
 
46b) In my country in 2020, control over educational courses and programmes has 
shifted to institutional executives and managers and to external stakeholders. 
 
N=152 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
3 
 
38 
 
89 
 
16 
 
2.697 (.656) 
 
6 
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47a) In Europe 2020, higher education management has developed into a recognisable 
professional career. 
 
Note: This ‘professionalisation’ is evidenced by the fact that it is common practice for 
institutional executives and managers to move from one institution to another over the 
course of their careers, that there is an extensive range of educational programmes to 
prepare higher education managers and to enhance their skills, and that executives 
and managers are well-paid. 
 
N=156 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
probable 
Highly 
improbable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
28 
 
97 
 
21 
 
1 
 
1.853 (.612) 
 
9 
 
N=156 Very 
desirable 
Desirable Not 
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
Average 
(standdev) 
No 
opinion 
I think this 
situation is  
 
42 
 
81 
 
14 
 
5 
 
1.705 (.743) 
 
14 
 
47b) In my country in 2020, higher education management has developed into a 
recognisable professional career. 
 
N=152 Very 
probable 
Probable Not 
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48a) In Europe 2020, well over one-third of all higher education executives are drawn 
from backgrounds outside higher education. 
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48b) In my country in 2020, well over one-third of all higher education executives are 
drawn from backgrounds outside higher education. 
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49a) In Europe 2020, a majority of higher education institutions are amalgamations or 
federations of previously independent entities. 
 
Note: Mergers and other forms of organisational integration – nationally or cross 
border– are widespread (‘big is beautiful’). 
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49b) In my country in 2020, a majority of higher education institutions are 
amalgamations or federations of previously independent entities. 
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4 Centralia, the City of the Sun 
Don F. Westerheijden, Jasmin Beverwijk, Harry F. de Boer and Marc Kaulisch 
 
The greater part of the city is built upon a high hill, which rises from an extensive 
plain, but several of its circles extend for some distance beyond the base of the 
hill, which is of such a size that the diameter of the city is upward of two miles, so 
that its circumference becomes about seven. On account of the humped shape of 
the mountain, however, the diameter of the city is really more than if it were built 
on a plain. 
 
It is divided into seven rings or huge circles named from the seven planets, and 
the way from one to the other of these is by four streets and through four gates, 
that look toward the four points of the compass. 
   
Tomasso Campanella, The City of the Sun (1623) 
 
 
Jolly Old World  
Europe in 2020 is the Jolly Old World. There is a greying but rich population with 
much leisure, living in a patchwork of small and large countries with long histories and 
many different languages and institutions, even though many of the countries (37 since 
the accession of Moldova and Belarus in 2018) are united in an increasingly strong 
European Union. Time travellers from 2004 would easily recognise Europe and most 
of its higher education and research infrastructure, though perhaps not the names above 
the entrances. The majority of universities and public research centres have remained 
as public centres of discovery and knowledge dissemination, but often as sites or 
campuses that are part of large (national) institutions. The big institutions regularly 
cooperate in international associations or consortia – often under the friendly but firm 
guidance of EU civil servants from Brussels.  
Students and Structure in a Multi-Level Government Structure 
Student numbers have declined in the last years before 2020 due to the demographic 
shifts already in motion at the end of the 20th century. The reduction only became 
noticeable in the last couple of years as the participation rate of young people in higher 
education simultaneously rose to over 60%. The positive trend of the first 15 years of 
the 21st century was reinforced by the remarkable growth in mature students, since life-
long learning became the actual standard in Europe’s dynamic knowledge economy. 
Yet that source of growth also proved to have limits, even though with ‘life-long’ we 
now mean learning until two to three years before retirement, which is 71 to 73 in most 
EU countries, except Italy that is still trying to catch up and stands at 68 at the 
moment. Yet at the same time, the working week is reduced to 32 hours for every 
employee above 51–56 (depending on the collective agreements in the different 
industries). It is this fair share of leisure that makes Old Europe so jolly. Universities 
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have jumped in with study programmes not only for career-related teaching (usually in 
cost-covering contracts with employers), but also as social service to ‘third age’ 
citizens seeking to use their leisure time intellectually and creatively. In this way the 
European linguistic and cultural diversity was promoted in this mostly innocent sphere 
of life, which acted as an outlet for ‘neo-arcadianism’ (explained below), while most 
EU support went to economically more relevant areas of study. However, in Jolly Old 
Europe, that means not only technology and the like, but also ‘quality of life’ industry 
(health, (cultural) entertainment, tourism, etc.).  
 
The reduction in student numbers took place notwithstanding the growing demand 
from students in Southeast Asia, but in the global risk society (a popular euphemism 
for the never-abating fear for terrorism) the EU has implemented a restrictive visa 
policy: only accepting students wanting to migrate to Europe permanently in order to 
fill in jobs in branches of industry where labour shortages are most pressing and cannot 
be alleviated by further ‘technologisation’ to increase productivity, but discouraging 
mobility only for study. Some countries in the North and West (UK, Ireland, Sweden, 
the Netherlands) are slightly more open, as they have entered Vocational and Higher 
Education on their EU-list of official state-export products. But that does not show in 
the aggregate EU statistics. Registration has become necessary in the post-GATS, 
public, controlled-trade world. Globalisation as such has not ended, of course, but in 
the global risk society, free movement of persons across ‘world blocs’ has almost 
come to a standstill at least to the most integrated ‘blocs’, i.e. the USA and the EU. 
Movement of goods and especially information is where the bulk of globalisation since 
2000 is to be found – those movements that can be strictly controlled without 
infringement on the habeas corpus principle.  
 
Study programmes are organised in Bachelor, Master and Doctorate levels (B, M and 
D). After some debate in the first decade of the century, 3+2+3 became the standard 
structure, although officially it is expressed as 180+120+180 ECTS. The Commission 
of the European Union as the ultimate authority standardised this structure, but in a 
brilliant dialectic move (or was it a political compromise?) made the whole x+y+z 
discussion obsolete at the same time: it is the graduate’s competence as shown in the 
European Graduate Competence Test of the appropriate level (EGCT-B, -M, -D) that 
determines whether students get the right to be awarded an officially recognised 
degree. European-wide acceptance by all ministries of education of the EGCT was the 
main achievement of the Bologna-II process 2010-2015, which was led by the staff of 
the European Union Commissioner of Knowledge & Innovation Society. The EGCT 
itself has become another successful ‘export product’ of the Brussels Directorate-
General Knowledge & Innovation Society (DG-KIS) to EU-associated countries such 
as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Northern Africa from Egypt to Morocco. The DG-KIS is 
an outstanding example of the new type of government organisation that has emerged: 
a clear and strong role for government and its programming and planning instruments 
along with the associated budget mechanisms, regulation and coordination among the 
many levels of government from the EU down to countries, regions/states and 
municipalities. But the DG-KIS is also apt to work in partnership with the private 
sector. Of course, in public-private partnerships the DG-KIS tend to take the leading 
role even when working with global companies, but they adapt easily to the market 
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mores and regularly use well-designed price mechanisms as a governance instrument 
as well. Moreover, as the EGCT example shows, they are quite confident about the 
quality of their policies and engage in policy export to parties outside the EU.  
 
Most teaching takes place on-campus and face-to-face, although ‘blended mode 
learning’ with a strong ICT component is widely used in about half of the EU thanks to 
the Terabyte Public European Subscription Network that (though not free!) reaches 
almost every home in the Northern and Western parts of the Union. Students are 
carefully guided through the programmes. This is not just a consequence of careful 
module design resulting from prior experience with online course design. With the 
ever-smaller age cohorts, the European knowledge economy cannot afford to lose any 
talent and The EU’s Talent Programme has stimulated universities in this respect. 
Moreover, in the standard public-private partnership mode (‘standard’ meaning with a 
leading role of the public partner), the EU has enlisted the cooperation of the private 
sector. Companies can and do give (tax deductible) stipends to promising students. 
This happens anonymously to ensure fairness. Students are selected for stipends 
through the national and European Talent banks – online databases of all students’ 
study results, making their study a continuous competition for these generous stipends. 
Next to the tax deductibility, acceptance of such stipends means that the graduates 
promise to work for at least three years after graduation with one of the companies in 
the Talent Stipend Fund. The EU’s civil service is one of the main contributors to this 
Fund, and one of the most popular destinations for the Talent Programme graduates, 
because of its high salaries, cooperative work atmosphere, and important role in the 
European society (‘you really make a difference to Europe’s society’, as respondents in 
the annual EU Graduate Labour Monitor often say).  
 
In some EU countries, which, persisting in their national traditions have few legal 
barriers against foreign direct investment and foreign university campuses, there are 
some campuses of non-EU higher education institutions.1 In these countries, 
significant portions of students (ca. 15%) take their higher education degrees in foreign 
operated institutions. Many of those students, once they have graduated from the more 
prestigious international higher education institutions, start dazzling careers in 
international businesses. Graduates from public universities more often enter civil 
service or tertiary industry (private service industry) for the European market – still not 
bad for a career; a higher education degree and subsequent life-long learning trajectory 
remains the best gateway to a good career. A minor observation – it is so self- 
evident: – practically all graduates make a career. In the European knowledge 
economy everyone finds jobs where their competences come to good use (in other 
words: there are no problem of unemployment or over-schooling. The career situation 
is less bright only for those who have fallen for the shrewd marketing of less-reputable 
                                                        
1
 The term ‘higher education institution’ is only used for foreign institutions of which the university 
status may be in some doubt. In Europe, all types of higher education institution have been re-
baptized ‘universities’, but as will be shown below, there are significant differences between the 
classes of B-, M- and D-universities. 
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non-European private higher education institutions,2 especially active in the South and 
East of the EU. While diploma mills have been almost weeded out through strict fraud 
control and accreditation, some prospective students apparently do not read the official 
online database. After all, not everyone has access to the Terabyte Network, however 
much the EU has tried to make it affordable for all even in the poorer regions of its 
area.  
 
The obligatory semester in another EU country aside,3 more than 85% of students take 
their B degree and 70% their M degree in their home country.4 At the D level, the 
European Research Council clearinghouse ensures that the best candidates get to the 
best places all over the EU and that they get appropriate grants or stipends. 
 
Which brings us to the matter of fees. The dazzling international careers of private 
university graduates make up for the tuition fees that are usually much higher in the 
foreign private universities than in the public ones – on average. In the EU countries, 
universities are free to set their own fee levels – within governmentally defined limits. 
Ranges are rather large in Northern (coming quite a long way since Sweden’s 1977 
reforms and Network Norway days) and Southern Europe, but narrow remarkably in 
the Rhinelander democracies of western continental Europe and in the East. Limits to 
fee ranges are argued on the ground of social justice (no barriers for entry) and to keep 
the governmental universal student support systems, which were introduced in all 
countries to facilitate EU-wide ‘portability’ within limits (the higher the average fee, 
the higher the average support per student).5 In 2006, the European Cartel Agency 
decided that fee levels in any one study programme within a university must be the 
same for all students: same product, same price principle. European Court cases 
against fee differences between universities, built on the argument that uniform 
accreditation means uniform products, hence uniform prices, have however been 
rejected as they would support collusion. There seems to be a fragile balance between 
university autonomy, anti-cartel rules and the different governments’ roles in 
upholding social justice. On the other hand, no means-tested exceptions were allowed 
by the Cartel Agency; the European Court is expected to decide on that in a test case 
late in 2020. Chances for the plaintiff, a young student of physiotherapy from new EU 
member country Albania, are expected to be slim but one never knows with the 
intricate multi-level European legal system.  
                                                        
2
 The reader may have missed private universities from the EU, but this is such a negligible quantity 
that it can be ignored here. Their already small number has dropped especially since in the Bologna-
II process the principle that higher education is a public good has been taken seriously and national 
governments, with EU subsidies, have bought out most owners and integrated them in their public 
systems. 
3
 Obligatory for EAA accreditation. It is rumoured that the EU Commission required this quality 
criterion when it agreed to take over 55% of the funding of the EAA (40% being funded by the 
national governments involved, the remaining 5% coming from industry sources). 
4
 What should not be forgotten: although it falls short of the EU target of 50% mobility, it is a 
tremendous advance over figures at the turn of the century, when in most European countries one 
counted foreign B and M graduates in fractions of a percent. 
5
 Student support portability facilitated greatly the obligatory Semester Abroad Programme. 
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Quality Issues  
Until now, the uniform degree structure did not mean uniform higher education 
quality. Generally, there is a gradient with high level (D) teaching and most basic 
research taking place in the North and West of Europe, while universities in the South 
and East are more frequently limited to B-level teaching. Some universities in this 
latter region, however, are in higher education tiers; often those situated in national 
capitals. This is clear from the data of the EU’s Aalto-classification.6  
 
Many development and innovation laboratories are, however, located in the South and 
East, because of the cheaper mid-level researchers there; their high-level colleagues in 
the North and West are daily video-conferencing with their team members through the 
Terabyte Network and regularly take the (cheap) plane or high-speed train there. Some 
companies have shifted their R&D capacity to the South and East completely, using 
the lower costs of living and the pleasant climate to attract even the high-level 
researchers. For this reason, in recent years the Constantia-Varna Strip on the Black 
Sea coast of Romania and Bulgaria has become a popular high-tech area.7  
 
Formally, the European higher education system has an elite D-university8 sector with 
strict academic selection criteria next to an officially equally selective but in practice 
open higher education sector (B- and M-universities). 9  
 
The European Accreditation Agency (EAA) tries to impose common standards on its 
national or regional subsidiaries, focused on employability competences as quality 
criteria, but with a 20% time for ‘Bildung’ requirement in the B-phase (in practice 
mainly taken up by the training for the obligatory language test for graduates10), going 
down to 12% in M and 8% in D-phases.  
 
But the practice is sometimes harder than the principle. A big group of D-universities 
from the North and West have petitioned with the Commissioner of Knowledge & 
Innovation Society – and lobbied in Brussels together with their national governments, 
which were eager to gain academic prestige for their country in the friendly yet serious 
                                                        
6
 Aalto stands for Academic Accreditation List & Tertiary education Observatory, but it also is the 
name of a Finnish designer and (university) architect. His name may not be quite as famous as the 
American Carnegie, but the name for Europe’s university classification signals Europe’s pride of its 
culture. 
7
 We could have mentioned this example also below, in the paragraph on successful (Eu)regional 
innovation areas. 
8
 A ‘D-university’ is a university actually teaching at the Doctorate level in at least three disciplines. 
D-universities have preferential access to European Research Council (ERC) funds. 
9
 Compared with D-universities, they use ‘equal but different’ criteria of selection, more on practical 
or professional competences of candidates. But in practice this sector is rather open for access as the 
younger age cohorts have dwindled and the pool of mature students has been fully used since ca. 
2017. 
10
 Two major European languages (usually English, and German or Spanish – the latter also useful in 
contacts with the rapidly growing economies of Latin American), next to obligatory introductory 
courses in Putonghua (Chinese). Only countries with strong foreign language teaching in secondary 
schools are able to use the ‘Bildung’-compartment for ‘general education’. 
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intra-European competition – for a separate, higher, status, saying that the EU-quality 
standards ‘were not a challenge’ for them. They achieved such status in 2014. On the 
other hand, regional and national authorities in less-privileged areas of the EU and 
associated countries keep lobbying for local quality criteria to be accepted rather than 
the strict application of the immense set of EAA criteria. Luckily, only eight of the 
new-generation DVDs can store all the qualimetric11 information, which otherwise 
would take a truckload of paper reports – or almost a whole night of online sending 
even through the Terabyte Public European Subscription Network (most universities 
prefer to use the 4thG-DVDs, as the universities’ institutional managements are very 
strict on economy, while data-intensive corporate use of the Terabyte Network is 
expensive.12 Interestingly, private accreditation agencies have not made much of an 
inroad in Eastern Europe, but have been able to gain market share in the more 
profitable up-end of the market in Western Europe, where they can give highly-
esteemed (and highly-priced) additional accreditations to Europe-wide recruiting D-
universities, who see the collection of multiple accreditations as a successful strategy 
in the race for worldwide academic prestige.  
 
Most universities are satisfied with the current state of accrediting all programmes, but 
only at eight years’ intervals. A long cycle proved to be necessary for accreditation 
agencies to reduce their workload. Originally they advocated an 18-year cycle, but this 
could be dramatically reduced by the qualimetric revolution and associated semi-
automatic renewal of accreditation based on computerised data analysis. Site visits are 
only added for new programmes and in smartly sampled cases.  
After all these years, there still is no clear correlation between accreditation status and 
student demand for places in individual universities. In the dwindling student market, 
large sums are therefore spent on marketing universities especially through Personal 
Communication Aides,13 the Internet, on Euro-satellite TV and, in some less 
‘knowledge-economy intensive’ regions, even in old-fashioned radio and newspapers.  
This may seem contradictory in the public sector, but in most national higher education 
systems, government funding is connected directly or indirectly to student numbers 
and/or graduates to keep them teaching-focused (not easy with the prospect of 
dwindling student numbers and the exciting earning opportunities in knowledge-
economic research). EU basic grants (not the earmarked project funds, of course) in 
turn often match national funding algorithms. Marketing is therefore an instrument in 
governmental budget maximisation games. 
 
                                                        
11
 As everyone knows, qualimetry was the great contribution of Professor Tatur & associates when 
the Russian presidency of the Bologna process finally settled the criteria & measurement conflict in 
ENQA, in 2009. Since the introduction of these HE-specific datasets and procedures, the discussion 
about ISO9000-2006 in higher education has petered out. 
12
 For private use, it is not expensive, through an EU-controlled pricing system. However, the 
Terabyte Network still is not available in all newer EU countries; works on the dedicated antennae 
are going on though slowly. 
13
 PCAs, integrating mobile phones, personal digital assistants, personal TVs, laptop PCs and the 
like. As one can personalise them to such an extent, the ‘e’ in ‘aide’ was added intentionally. 
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A little more needs to be said about student access. Next to the access of young 
students with secondary education diplomas (which have superseded entrance 
examinations, as they give higher value to social justice), access based on recognition 
of previously acquired competences has become very important to all universities 
throughout Europe; again resulting from the smaller pool of young students but also 
because life-long learning has become such a standard practice. Brussels has organised 
recognition of prior competences through its European Universal Qualifications 
Framework (EUQaF). The EUQaF is in 2020 still experimental, as it proved to be 
extremely complicated to find a common denominator amongst the more than thirty 
national frameworks. The EU has been working on the EUQaF since 2005, the 
moment such qualification frameworks had to be introduced nationally according to 
the Bologna process.  
 
For exchange of individual modules there is a radical extension of ECTS for the 
integrated sectors of Vocational and Higher Education (ECTS-VHE).14 This lies at the 
basis of the obligatory Semester Abroad, mentioned before, but also helped students to 
‘mix & match’ course modules from different universities all across the EU. This now 
is a widespread practice, and almost 76% of B-students take one or more modules 
from universities abroad (1.12 on average), even though, again as mentioned already, 
most degrees are finally taken in the home country. In total 89% take some modules at 
other universities, including other universities in the home country. Note that in the 
dominant blended learning mode, taking a module at a foreign university means only a 
limited time abroad and much work from behind the PCA at home; local particularist 
value sets are only slightly influenced in this practice. Still, the increased mobility of 
students (and especially graduates!) clearly has helped the social cohesion within the 
EU (strengthening the ‘neo-arcadian’ trend).  
 
But let us get back to education. In quite a few cases, B-universities in the South and 
East have been successful in reaching EAA accreditation standards by using 
standardised course modules produced by prestigious public D-universities in the 
North and West, which are distributed by equally prestigious commercial publishing 
houses from the same countries. Typically, content is made in Germany; language 
editing takes place in Ireland; design in Italy; software is made in Bangalore, India; 
then all is printed in Hong Kong, packed in Vietnam and transported back to Europe 
by the All-Korean merchant fleet). Still, graduates from these universities do not 
perform well in the European civil service concourses. These biannual concourses are 
the de facto quality standard in most disciplines, on top of the European Graduate 
Competence Test, as candidates’ concourse results are used not only for access to the 
EU civil service, but also for other semi-independent European agencies, universities, 
and even by many private companies to determine eligibility for jobs. Recent 
educational research (Hendriks et al., 2018) suggests that the face-to-face teaching still 
in use in those parts of Europe cannot transmit the same type of information-age 
competences that are being tested in these European concourses (which of course take 
                                                        
14
 A result of the fusion of the Bologna-II and the Copenhagen processes. (The Copenhagen process 
aimed at enhanced cooperation in vocational education and training.) 
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place online, through the Terabyte connection). TV journalists when interviewing 
Hendriks maintained that the large unexplained variance in her research was explained 
very easily by the corruption in entrance processes and examinations. Hendriks 
riposted that corruption to gain entrance or degrees, if any, must be on the way out 
now that higher education is becoming a buyers’ market in the new demographic 
conditions. Some politicians nevertheless have picked up on these research results but 
been unable to gain political support to investigate corruption due to the combined 
opposition in the European Parliament of the last remaining populists and the ‘new-
arcadian parties’ that have been on the rise in recent elections. 
Interlude: The Neo-Arcadian Political Context  
Jolly Old Europe has seen some important political changes in the years before 2020. 
As the Japanese News Network (JNN) recently said in a documentary about Europe, it 
is an area that is inward looking and friendly, but difficult to access for outsiders. The 
‘Neo-arcadian parties’ is the label given to the collection of parties (comprising many 
different ones, from right to left) who have a paternalistic (or maternalistic) view on 
politics for European societies: focusing on common values, solidarity within Europe, 
an important steering role for the government, and downplaying the role of global 
competition (while paying lip service to the belief that competition is good to raise 
quality of service). ‘Neo-arcadian’ politics are the next step after harsh populism. 
Sociologically speaking, it depicts Europe as a Gemeinschaft rather than as a 
Gesellschaft. Yet only insiders know that this is mainly rhetoric. Behind the gentle 
public political façade the 2007-2011 technocrat take-over in Brussels led to silent 
competition with the USA. But as usual, if two dogs fight for a bone, the third runs 
away with it, and East Asia is really the economic and knowledge world power by its 
force in numbers, however much progress the EU has made in top-level quality for the 
knowledge society. 
 
In higher education and research ‘neo-arcadian’ politics especially means a focus on 
the public good character15 of education and basic research, equal access for all income 
classes and all EU member state citizens, and barriers for foreigners on the European 
market. The ‘neo-arcadian’ trend expresses itself in university management especially 
in the regular overhaul of universities’ mission statements. They all emphasise the 
critical role of the university in society, but according to the 25th anniversary web site 
of the EUA Institutional Evaluation Programme (web site accessed in October 2019), 
its institutional evaluation teams found the phrases were neither connected to the actual 
EAA quality criteria that define the study programmes, nor to the research programmes  
                                                        
15
 After all these years, economist Professor Jongbloed still has not managed to make clear to any but 
fellow-economists that only ‘collective good’ is a well-defined term; ‘public good’ remains a  
– popular – rhetoric mess. 
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in the faculties governing basic research, nor to the University Ethics Committees’16 
control over teaching and research contracts with industry. And behind the scenes strict 
economy remains the bottom line of institutional management.  
 
The EU has continued its slow but inexorable rise to importance. Around the turn of 
the century, about 50% of regulations were already influenced by the EU. In 2020 this 
has risen to more than 75%. The legitimacy in the eyes of the general public of 
‘Brussels’ has risen much after the four-year European Governance Crisis – and rightly 
so – although quite fitting with the ‘neo-arcadian’ trend there is simultaneously a 
strong emotional binding with local values, languages and institutions. This 
governance crisis was caused by the accession of five Southeastern European countries 
in 2007 and led to a stalemate in all political forums (the councils of ministers, 
especially, did not succeed in making a single decision all that time). The crisis ended 
with the signing of the Dubrovnik Treaty, also called the Croatian European 
Constitution, because a constitution delineating powers and responsibilities in the EU 
is what it was, in fact. In the four years of this crisis, the DGs and their civil servants in 
Brussels actually gained a lot of room to manoeuvre, and they have not given up this 
power position in or after Dubrovnik. It was all for the benefit of Europe, as the 
highly-talented civil servants could move much faster when they were not hindered by 
the political decision-makers who were too busy disagreeing, vetoing, and placating 
their respective national audiences. Since then, the Bologna and Bologna-II processes 
picked up speed, the EAA was established, etc. 
Organisation of Higher Education and Research Institutions 
Most higher education and research organisations have grown much in size since the 
beginning of the century, such as through mergers – either voluntary or ‘stimulated’ by 
national and European governments. Smaller countries now have a single national 
multi-campus university. In larger countries, regional governments have reached 
similar solutions (the federal University of Wales became an unexpectedly popular 
study object, but in most cases the governments preferred more centralised 
universities). Mergers made economies of scale possible in administration and some in 
the primary processes of research and teaching, but especially in development of 
teaching materials, which has become much more elaborate because of the careful 
blended learning concepts needed for the Talent Programme. The latter move has even 
gone further, as mentioned before, making some universities specialise in developing 
materials that are now used all over Europe. Another advantage of merging was that it 
gave a safer position (larger ‘cushion’), which could be useful for global players in the 
North and West. We mentioned that in some EU countries, higher education and  
                                                        
16
 University Ethics Committees (EUCs) are a structure recommended by the EUA; most universities 
follow these guidelines. Hard-liners saw in these UECs another sign of ‘neo-arcadian’ politics, others 
attacked them for infringing academic freedom, but the majority of academics, students and 
politicians see them as defenders of academic freedom and institutional autonomy against 
commercialisation, just like in the 1970s. 
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research are official export products. For this reason, the Oxbridge merger finally took 
place in 2013, making the two oldest British universities a powerhouse in research that 
could take on any competitor from the USA or Asia. 
 
At the same time, their safe inclusion in the public sphere keeps the universities and 
research institutions relatively simple: enough so to be centrally managed successfully. 
Relations with external stakeholders are important but the border of the organisation is 
clear: management is on the inside and stakeholders remain on the outside. 
Institutional management has developed into a career path, mainly for academics that 
have taken an additional M degree in higher education management (most from Bath, 
Kassel or Valencia). Some positions in university management are given to 
representatives of external stakeholders (industry, but especially governmental 
agencies from Brussels). The continued emphasis of institutional governance by 
academics (albeit academics with a management-career outlook) did much to keep 
academic freedom a major value in the universities. Another development showing the 
same value orientation was EU subsidies and intellectual freedom regulations (not only 
education but also knowledge is a public good). The majority of scholarly journals 
published in Europe have been wrestled out of the control of globalised publishing 
houses and come back into academic ownership. 
 
Personnel policy has grown in importance for the universities even though civil service 
status (‘tenure’) remains the dominant mode of employment. Staff mobility is 
considerable owing to big salary differences across countries and across universities 
(D-universities of course pay much more than M-universities, which are still better 
employers than the poor B-universities in any country), together with the transparent 
(since 33 of 37 EU member countries use the Euro currency) and barrier-free European 
labour market.17  
 
The bottom-line nevertheless remains the economic viability of the laboratory or 
university. Public enterprises cannot afford to go bankrupt – Brussels is very strict on 
that after some hard lessons. Therefore, many institute directors and university 
presidents are economists, accountants, public administrators, or from similar bottom-
line minded backgrounds.  
Research  
There is a clear distinction between the public-good type research (‘basic research’, a 
term back in fashion in the post-Mode-2 research era) in the public research facilities 
including D- and M-universities on the one hand and private R&D on the other. 
Private R&D is of an applied nature and focused on the interest of the company. In the 
last twenty years, patents and other commercial-type indicators have not increased 
much for university researchers. External stakeholders, the same companies that help 
                                                        
17
 The third factor is language: with every university graduate, let alone university teacher/researcher 
speaking at least two ‘major’ European languages and the official right to teach in higher education in 
a ‘major’ language, a dialectic synthesis has been reached: language diversity is preserved but 
overcome at the same time. 
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set research agendas in public higher education and research institutions, feel 
somewhat frustrated because EU regulations and (prestigious!) ERC grants, such as 
those of the 13th Framework Programme-A (Academic; as opposed to Programme-B 
for Business, in public-private partnership mode) keep higher education and research 
institutions mostly focused on basic research. The results of this rather strict separation 
between the public and private spheres have been quite successful in developing some 
of the most advanced innovations of recent years. Both (merged) universities such as 
the Technical Universities of Niederdeutschland and the Netherlands (TUNN) and 
company laboratories such as (in the same countries) the one of Philips-Siemens have 
made important contributions. ‘Every institution its own trade’ has proven to be a 
successful adagio. The example also shows the importance of regional (Niedersachsen 
and Northrhine-Westphalia, in this case) and national (the Netherlands) governments 
overcoming state boundaries: cross-national mergers had not been successful before 
2011. As in many cases since that time, the direct intervention of Brussels (through re-
invigorated Euregios) has been a key factor in this success.  
 
The Lisbon agenda, operationalised in the 3%-target of 2002, was partially successful. 
The target was reached in the EU-25 in 2012 (the newer members were not counted in 
the statistics for this process, but they are on a rapid catch-up track well-funded by 
Brussels). The European economies have become quite knowledge-intensive; the 
societies caught up soon after by reducing the cohesion gaps between regions and 
classes. An important instrument in reaching the 3%-target has been the European 
Research Council (ERC), which disburses large subsidies for international research 
projects, networks and institutions. The subordinated national research councils 
provide mid- and small-size subsidies for research at the national level. These national 
research council subsidies are only open to foreign researchers in consortia with 
national universities. National and sub-national governments still pay the highest share 
of public research (in all kinds of public research institutions), some 45% of the total 
research budget. The total ERC and EU contribution is about 25%. Industry contracts 
make up for the remainder (30%), which is a constant source of tension as industries 
claim they pay too much. They also have to contribute to research through the 
substantial taxes they pay to national and European governments. 
 
The positive picture sketched just now should not hide the fact that much R&D has 
gone out of Europe to cheap academic labour countries. These countries are in Asia, of 
course, but Latin America is not to be forgotten. The Southern African Development 
Council area is said to harbour the ‘tigers of the 2020s’. The Lisbon-2000 aim to make 
Europe the most competitive knowledge economy proved to be too ambitious. 
Accordingly, since 2011 attention has been geared more to minimising the information 
gap within Europe than on remaining competitive in the ‘mass innovation’ areas. 
Investing in the ‘quality of life’ areas proved to be a more successful strategy, 
especially given the amount of leisure of the most wealthy age cohorts in the European 
population. After all, we are talking about Jolly Old Europe, here. 
 
 5 Octavia, the Spider-Web City 
Jürgen Enders, Frans Kaiser, Henno Theisens and Hans Vossensteyn 
 
Now I will tell how Octavia, the spider-web city, is made. There is a precipice 
between two steep mountains: the city is over the void, bound to the two crests 
with ropes and chains and catwalks. You walk on the little wooden ties, careful 
not to set your foot in the open spaces, or you cling to the hempen strands. Below 
there is nothing for hundreds and hundreds of feet: a few clouds glide past; farther 
down you can glimpse the chasm's bed. This is the foundation of the city: a net 
which serves as passage and as support. All the rest, instead of rising up, is hung 
below: rope ladders, hammocks, houses made like sacks, clothes hangers, terraces 
like gondolas, skins of water, gas jets, spits, baskets on strings, dumb-waiters, 
showers, trapezes and rings for children's games, cable cars, chandeliers, pots 
with trailing plants. Suspended over the abyss, the life of Octavia's inhabitants is 
less uncertain than in other cities. They know the net will last only so long. 
 
Italo Calvino: The Invisible Cities (1972) 
 
 
In 2020, the idea of the University (with a capital U) as a single concept has 
diminished in the face of multiple missions and visions of higher education and 
research that have stimulated further institutional differentiation and diffusion. This 
unbinding of the university has strengthened the many tangible hands of networks that 
have become the main modes of coordination within universities as well as between 
institutions and other providers and consumers. True, the visible hand of the state and 
the invisible hand of the market have their role to play but ‘networking’ is now the 
name of the game. Today’s society is not characterised by the triumph of one 
rationality over others – whether it is the ‘market’ that has metaphorically diffused 
everywhere, the ‘welfare state’ that has lost control while gaining in 
interconnectedness, scientific rationality or socio-technological relevance that are 
increasingly interwoven with each other and with society. What typifies society is the 
blurring of the boundaries between previously functionally differentiated subsystems 
that now search for new forms of horizontal and vertical integration via the web.  
 
Simply speaking, universities are as much driven by these co-evolutionary processes1 
as they are drivers of them. These processes are themselves interwoven with the 
globalisation of the economy and the individualisation of the life course. It is this  
complex social dynamic that pushes universities to seek and create nodes that will link 
them with each other and with society in manifold ‘elasticities’. 
                                                        
1
 The concept of ‘co-evolution’ precisely refers to a set of simultaneous developments where it is 
unclear which is the cause and which the effect, or if they are causally linked at all. 
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The European Policy Landscape 
The EC (European Consortium) of 2020 consists of 37 member countries (including 
new members Belarus, Moldavia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) and 10 associate 
world-wide partners (including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Mozambique and 
South Africa).2 Political responsibility for higher education and research is integrated 
into the overall policy networks for socio-economic development and innovation, and 
spread over a multi-layered web of local, (inter-)regional and (multi-)national 
institutions. This integrated approach to open coordination helped enormously in 
overcoming traditional sectoral departmentalism and the fragmentation of education, 
research, science and technology policies. Numerous ways of involving experts and 
stakeholders in a more systematic and participatory manner added to the legitimacy of 
these policy networks. However, the sheer number and shifting composition of the 
various networks, task forces and working groups for Strategic Development and 
Innovation (SDI) and Socio-Technological Inventions (STI)3 make it difficult for the 
observer (and the actors involved) to identify where authority and responsibility are 
actually located.4  
The Skyline of the Knowledge Economy 
On first sight, the skyline of the knowledge economy seems to be more simply 
structured than in earlier decades with the few big towers of global companies clearly 
dominant. These companies show little commitment to national or regional affairs in 
higher education and research. Closer to the ground the nodes and links between SMEs 
and the local and regional working units of global companies form the back-bone of 
knowledge-intensive production, service and consumption – and of the labour market 
for knowledge workers. The globalisation of knowledge formation and transfer and the 
individualisation of the life course (with shifting and multi-faceted group identities) 
have had a profound impact on labour markets and on forms of work. ‘Standard 
employment’ has eroded to such an extent that yesterday’s exception (part-time, 
temporary and self- employment; movement between sectors, employers, and types of 
work) is today’s rule. Network technologies such as the Internet under-pinned the 
construction of information and social webs across companies and countries. On this 
labour market for knowledge workers the ‘credentials’ of ‘graduates’ are just the first 
step in the validation of competencies in the workplace. What really counts (and  
 
                                                        
2
 The end of the Pan-European approach came as a relief to many, especially to those critical of the 
inward-looking character of inter-European cooperation (establishing cooperation amongst 
neighbours to counteract pressure from other parts of the world). 
3
 Socio-technological inventions as used here are not matters of simple probabilities, rationally 
calculated by experts with the cold arithmetic of cost-benefit analysis. Rather they are woven into the 
very fabric of innovation within a world society that is inevitably ‘at risk’. 
4
 This concern is found mainly amongst political analysts. Most people are quite satisfied with the 
recent statement of the European Commissioner for Innovation (who is responsible for education and 
research): ‘We do not know exactly how it works, but it works’. 
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differentiates members of network elites from the mass of net-workers) is social 
capital, cognitive mobility, qualifications for network sustainability and symbolic 
production.5  
The Institutional Landscape 
In such conditions of hyper-complexity, successful universities capitalise on the 
traditional capacities of academic and scientific networks as well as on inter- and intra-
organisational networks that are based on reciprocity, trust, and long-term 
commitment. ‘Small units, thick information and multiple webs’ is a popular slogan 
originally coined by the University of Trullala. This metropolitan comprehensive 
university has de-departmentalised its structures into a holding-like matrix that 
comprises public, semi-public and private entities for teaching, research and service. 
Some (jealous) observers call it ‘the spider in the web’. For example, its undergraduate 
teaching is integrated into the European Open University (EOU), a non-profit 
consortium of on-line providers from 12 countries spread all over Europe.  EOU is 
affiliated with on-line providers on other continents with whom it shares on-campus 
facilities for international students. Trullala offers courseware and tutorials within the 
dual-mode approach of the EOU. This combines information and communication 
technology capacities with elements of face-to-face interaction between teachers and 
their (probably) more than 400,000 students.6 The three big science & technology 
research units of Trullala are affiliated with the Ford-Renault Institute of Technology, 
a private for-profit institution that works with different basic research units to promote 
knowledge and technology up-take. The Institute for Metropolitan Innovation at 
Trullala connects a shifting number of its faculty to regional business and other public 
and private stakeholders interested in socio-technological inventions. 
 
Cooperation can also lead to new institutional forms within bigger but strongly 
differentiated organisations. Some universities have disappeared from the landscape 
altogether following mergers with other universities and/or private R&D organisations. 
The Technical University of the Netherlands and the Bio-Medical Alps University are 
two examples of the conglomeration of a number of once ‘stand-alone’ universities 
with the private laboratories of multi-national companies. In this construction 
companies were able to outsource their R&D function without loosening their ties to 
related innovation capacities. In contrast other universities have decided to organise 
themselves around more selected disciplinary or professional clusters. The Budapest 
School of Governance, the Springer-Lingua University and the Institute of Cognitive 
Science are among the more-well known examples for such multi-disciplinary 
specialisations in postgraduate training and research. 
                                                        
5
 Symbolic knowledge workers manipulate words, numbers, images and sounds in order to broker 
and analyse information and to provide meaning to information so that it can unfold its symbolic-
analytical problem-solving capacities. 
6
 It is now common wisdom that on-line ‘stand alone’ courses with all their e-learning facilities are 
best placed to cater for the diversified needs of a diversified international student body. By blending 
this approach with face-to-face interaction with teachers and (even more important) other students the 
EOU and others have realised further learning advantages that flow from social exchange. 
Enders et al. 
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In the teaching industry much attention has been given to the rise of the virtual mega-
universities such as the EOU, the Anglo-Asian Academy (AAA) and the Delphi-
Phoenix Program (DEPP) that operate on a global level with virtual multi-language 
programmes.7 The AAA has major home bases in the UK, Australia, China and India 
and serves more than 600,000 students while DEPP with some 500,000 students has its 
largest sites in the US, Greece and Egypt.8 Recent figures confirm, however, that 
across Europe most undergraduate students still study in national or regional 
universities. These too offer mixed-programmes based on face-to-face teaching with 
some ICT-support based on interactive learning and communication. Their major 
competitive advantage lies in experience-based learning programmes for 
contextualised knowledge applications that are strongly linked to the local 
embeddedness of the global knowledge economy. Inter-university alliances between 
these universities and the many local low cost providers of tertiary education are a 
widespread phenomenon. Such agreements regulate the cooperation and division of 
work between the institutions; student, staff and programme exchange; as well as 
contractual relationships with companies who recruit staff on the university’s turf and 
send employees for further training on a regular basis.  
 
In 2020, the themes of ‘change’ and ‘diversity’ dominate any analysis of the 
horizontally (division of work) and vertically (reputation) stratified European 
university landscape with its approximately 3,500 universities. A core of more visible 
and prestigious institutions that see themselves as European Universities are 
surrounded by a growing number of usually smaller more localised ‘Universities in 
Europe’. Stratification was inevitable. Driven by quantitative (massification and 
internationalisation) and qualitative (complexity and interconnectedness) growth, it led 
to increased levels of volatility and fuzziness in the system. The fuzziness encouraged 
much finer-grain and flexible differentiation of institutions than those of the age of 
higher education institutional ‘types’. Nowadays universities bundle and un-bundle 
their tasks in teaching, research and service, their (multi-)disciplinary profile, their 
geographical outreach and their embeddedness in a web of shifting organisational 
configurations within and beyond the institution.  
 
Obviously, academic leadership and institutional management mean different things 
and assume different forms according to specific organisational profiles and context. 
The development and dissemination of professional and ethical standards as well as 
basic principles and tools for university leadership and management are two of the 
                                                        
7
 All courses and material are made available in English, Spanish, Chinese and Hindi – the latter 
language was introduced over the protest of Indian academics who argued that English fitted 
perfectly well with their goals. Many students make use of the Intelligent Interpretation Generator 
which provides electronic tools for all the possible translation permutations between over 400 major 
languages and dialects.  
8
 The biggest ‘university’ in the world is probably the Boundaryless Institute of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (BINGO) although its exact size is uncertain. Its virtual campus and several regional 
knowledge sites around the globe offer no credit courses or degrees but provide an enormous amount 
of up-to-date knowledge and know-how. (Many academics who argue that BINGO quality control is 
quite dubious are known to make use of it themselves).  
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functions of FLUXUS, the global network of university managers.9 ‘Leadership for 
change’ and ‘management of flows’ (knowledge and capital) are the names of the 
governance game in higher education and research – the art of sailing a ship under 
permanent reconstruction. Consequently, leaders and managers find themselves more 
involved with people than with structures that will change anyway and are perceived 
more as temporary enablers.10 In this context strategic leadership (following the 
principles of ‘distance, morality, responsibility and reform’), network management 
(‘bring the right people together’) and personnel policy (‘I know my people’) form the 
building blocks for universities’ advocacy coalitions and linkages. 
Learning-Working Pathways: Students and Structures 
Student numbers have not changed dramatically over the first two decades of the 21st 
century but the composition of the student body certainly has. In Europe’s greying 
societies, the number of younger traditional students has declined and is counter-
balanced by a growing number of international students (with the most dramatic 
increase in postgraduate training11), part-timers and life-long learners. Most 
undergraduate students gather their credits and credentials over the course of a cross-
organisational and cross-national learning journey – which makes it no simple task to 
count student numbers and to ascribe them to an institutional home-base.12 ICT-
networks between universities and other knowledge providers and every-day physical 
mobility around the globe allow students to mix face-to-face classes with online 
courses at universities across regions and countries. These patterns of multi-
organisational affiliation characterise large parts of the academic professions as well. 
Public-private researchers, for example, hold shifting contractual relationships with 
different organisations within the knowledge cycle and wandering academic gypsies 
(part-time teachers) are usually affiliated to a number of local and regional low cost 
(and low salary) institutions.13 
 
                                                        
9
 FLUXUS is financed mainly via its ‘brain hunting’ activities – recruiting academic leaders and 
mangers ‘across the board of knowledge networks’. 
10
 The fight between the two schools of thinking in FLUXUS – the Matthew school (‘To those who 
have will be given’) and the Robin Hood school (‘Take from the rich and give to the poor’) is more 
about the use of financial incentives in universities.  
11
 It is estimated that about one-quarter of Europe’s Masters-graduates and one-half of its PhD-
graduates come from a non-European home country. A first tide of Asian students was followed by a 
wave of Latin-American students and increasingly students from Africa and the US are adding to the 
flood. 
12
 The most reliable data and information on student numbers is found in the European Higher 
Education and Research Observatory founded by Professor Frans Kaiser. His data simulation model 
is based on the premise that you cannot know at the same time the exact numbers and the exact 
locations of students, graduates and staff.  
13
 All organisations, however, are required to follow the basic standards agreed upon between the 
European Trade Union of Knowledge Workers and the European Association of Knowledge 
Producers. 
Enders et al. 
 
80 
In 2020, some kind of Bachelor-Master structure has been implemented in all 
European countries and for all degrees – you cannot live without it. To enable mutual 
recognition, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements have been concluded to provide an 
overview of the bewildering variety of programmes and degrees that has developed 
within the Ba-Ma structure (3+2 years, 3+1+1 year, 4+1 year) and beyond. Short cycle 
programmes in under-graduate and post-graduate studies are widespread. Many of 
them are designed for graduates with work experience and other knowledge workers 
with a need for further training. Some serve a growing student body of ‘life-long 
learners’ whose interest goes beyond the more immediate purposes of the job market. 
Others are designed to give an innovative push to the labour market to create jobs and 
positions that do not yet exist but that are predicted to play an important role in the 
near future. Information and certification services to assist (potential) students to select 
their ‘menu à la carte’ and transform it into a readable degree have become a mature 
business in the learning industry. The recognition of prior learning and (work) 
experience is also common practice and is coordinated by the International Student 
Selection and Placement Partner Organisation. Further selection is organised by the 
universities themselves who adopt different strategies. Some universities have opted to 
be highly selective to retain their institutions ‘small and prestigious’ status while others 
have chosen a strategy of attracting as many students as possible – aiming to become 
‘big and prestigious’.  
 
At first glance the structures for the 2-year professional doctorate and the 4-year 
research PhD (usually organised in inter-university doctoral schools) look more 
straightforward. But the growing international and disciplinary mobility of doctoral 
students, students moving between professional and research tracks and between 
different research organisations, and the phenomenon of the so-called mid-career 
doctorate have all combined to create a much more colourful PhD journey.  
 
All in all, the universities of 2020 are diversified structurally and in terms of modes of 
study and courses provided. Greater attention is devoted to generic competencies, 
social skills, and the lifelong learning function. Modular programmes designed for 
better integration into learning-working pathways, and practical learning beyond the 
class room have tended to blur the distinction between initial and continuing degree 
studies as well as between young adult, mid-career, and post-working life training. 
This trend towards ‘life-span’ training also reflects the enormous immigration of 
younger knowledge workers from Asia, Latin-America and increasingly Africa and the 
US, and the growing demand for the validation of competences (rather than 
credentials) from the flourishing network economy. In general graduates do well on the 
European labour market – and increasingly in careers beyond Europe. The growing 
virtual and physical mobility of students within global university partnerships and 
networks facilitates not only greater workplace mobility between Europe and the other 
continents, but also mobility on more equal terms. 
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Quality Assurance 
‘Quality’ thus stands for supporting a diversified student body to acquire a mixture of 
skills and knowledge adaptable to new and changing configurations in the workplace 
and beyond. The European Accreditation Network (that is linked to its counterparts in 
other regions) works directly with the universities to assure common standards (some 
call them ‘the smallest common denominator’). These are supplemented by 
international private accreditation agencies (mainly active in business studies, law and 
medicine where they interact with international professional organisations) some of 
which employ more selective criteria and promise more prestigious rewards. Many 
observers believe that the rise of internal quality assessment procedures has had an 
even stronger influence on the ‘culture of quality’ within the universities. Periodic 
reviews by inter-departmental and inter-university bodies together with the widespread 
use of student assessments and post-graduate labour market surveys provide rich tools 
for ongoing internal discussions on how to maintain or improve the quality of 
education.  
 
A number of organisations provide guides with quality rankings based on information 
provided by the universities themselves or by expert assessors in other institutions. 
Among these are the bi-annual rankings of undergraduate programmes conducted and 
published by the magazine International Higher Education, and the ranking of 
doctoral schools every four years by the European Research Council. The most widely 
used information source is provided by students and academics themselves. The 
Virtual University Observer is facilitated and fuelled by international student and staff 
associations. This platform gathers and compares statistical information and university 
rankings provided by the various higher education and research portals. More 
importantly, it provides and systematises first hand information on the profile and 
quality of institutions, services and workplaces in terms of criteria beyond traditional 
‘academic excellence’.  
Funding of Learning 
The system of funding for universities has certainly encouraged the various 
developments in higher education sketched earlier. Government remains the dominant 
sponsor of higher education institutions but public money now derives from 
heterogeneous sources for equally heterogeneous purposes. Regional, national and 
European governmental entities and their arm’s length agencies provide some direct 
subsidies, in many cases designed as matching funds based on contractual 
relationships. The bulk of public money enters higher education via a European 
voucher system that covers the right of all citizens to a four- to five-year study 
period.14 The vouchers can be used in any EU member state for full cycles of 
                                                        
14
 This funding system came just in time for the (student and teaching intense) social sciences and 
humanities disciplines that found themselves in a precarious situation during the period when 
innovation was perceived to be a matter of science & technology only - with all the consequences this 
had for university funding.  
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Bachelor- or Master-programmes as well as for certain training modules across the full 
post-secondary spectrum.15 The ESB (European Student Bank affiliated with the 
European Central Bank) organises the money flow and provides further loans to those 
students who choose more costly study programmes or longer periods of post-
secondary training, and to the intake of international students. 
Research Funding and Structures 
Research is funded separately from teaching via the national research councils, the 
European Research Council (ERC, established in 2006) and various public-private 
sponsors and foundations. Most of the research funds are allocated to research 
programmes. The bargaining about research priorities is a major area of political 
debate between scientific elites, regional and national governments, research councils, 
the ERC and the European Commission. These programmes are intended ‘to support 
research projects in designated areas of strategic relevance for innovation and global 
competitiveness based on peer review for scientific relevance’ – a compromise 
formulated after the establishment of the ERC in order to integrate research money 
from ‘Brussels’ into its portfolio. The bulk of research funding for universities derives 
from national sources based on (another political compromise) ‘semi-open’ national 
systems of research funding. Foreign scholars from within the EU are eligible for 
funding provided a ‘home-based’ researcher functions as the principal investigator. 
Equally importantly, European and National Research Councils assess applications not 
only on scientific or technical merit but also on their wider social application – thus 
giving greater prominence to social utility.16 Another problem concerning research 
funding arose after the achievement of the so-called 3%-target (3% of GDP on R&D 
spending in the former EU by 2010). While the target had already been achieved by 
2009 it became clear that it was too modest to provide sufficient financial backbone for 
a ‘Europe of Knowledge’ to become the world’s leading player. Various policies were 
adopted to increase support from public sources but the key breakthrough was only 
achieved when major companies changed their practices (and perceptions of 
investment in R&D as being a ‘private loss’) and started to invest in international 
research consortia. As importantly, access to finance became easier for SMEs as 
increasing numbers of regional public-private innovation networks were established to 
link the various actors in their clusters. The increase in private investment has been of 
major benefit to the research-intense universities who had already started opening their 
doors (and budgets) to joint industry-university activities. 
 
Most have organised their research in inter-faculty and inter-university units that are 
comprised of flexible and semi-permanent teams in self-organised centres with control 
over, and responsibility for, costs and revenues. Face-to-face contact with partners 
                                                        
15
 Different agreements regulate if and to what extent former students will have to cover the costs of 
the used vouchers after graduation. Fellowship programmes for the special support of low income 
groups are fairly common adjuncts to vouchers. 
16
 Extended peer review involving not only scientists but also stakeholders affected by the use of 
science is now common practice and is integrated into overall accountability frameworks that extend 
beyond traditional quality control procedures. 
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interested in knowledge transfer forms the basis for cooperation with business and 
increasingly with other organisations and interest groups. Strategic alliances, the in-
sourcing of private R&D, and mixed university-company campuses are organisational 
responses to the new mix of funding opportunities, changing university research 
missions and novel research technologies. Academics themselves are the major players 
and drivers of these developments towards a greater overlap between the realms of 
academia and the commercial world. The major generation change within academe 
brought more faculty into universities who are able to balance the self-dynamics of 
scientific discovery with those of academic entrepreneurialism. Significantly, research-
active academics now gain a considerable part of their personal income from 
capitalising on their know-how. (The ‘money for value’ declaration of the 2012 
Warsaw conference of European Ministers of Innovation finally opened the door for 
this policy.) 
Nodes and Holes in Network Europe 
In this brave new world of network Europe, the struggle for hegemony has certainly 
not been abandoned – and it has many faces. Regional disparities across Europe are an 
enduring problem for institutions and policy-makers. Such disparities have only been 
partly overcome by the EU-subsidies for the further development of a more balanced 
landscape for European higher education and research. (Resources have been 
reallocated from the agricultural sector to knowledge-producing industries.) Major 
concern remains over the gap between the so-called ‘teaching intensive’ South and 
East of Europe and the ‘research-intensive’ North and West. This concern overlaps 
with the realisation that some small countries (such as Finland and the Netherlands) 
and some cross-national regional clusters (like the ‘golden triangle’ on the 
Belgian/Dutch/German border) still get far higher returns from R&D and knowledge 
industries than others. By starting earlier and investing in a flexible and cooperative 
way in infrastructure and networks for education and research these areas of Europe 
were able to leave some of the ‘big tanks’ in Europe behind. Finally, the potentials and 
limits of inter-university alliances are on the agenda as well. The recent decision of the 
European Cartel Office not to allow a consortium agreement between the Max Planck 
Institutes, the Centre National de Recherché Scientific, the Ford-Renault Institute of 
Technology and a consortium of leading research universities (led by Oxbridge) has 
been widely debated. Some accept the argument of the Office that such a consortium 
would constitute a ‘monopoly of excellence’ that would harm competition within 
Europe. Others argue that such cooperation is a prerequisite for competition with other 
consortia on a global level. 
 
In this debate, most academics who are not confined to local or national settings 
consider themselves cosmopolitan rather than European. Their main thrust in 
transcending the academic’s traditional national emphasis is global rather than 
European. The policies and infrastructures chosen by universities seldom make clear 
conceptual or pragmatic distinctions between the European on the one hand and the 
international or global on the other. In the many worlds of academe, happily 
networking scholars search for partners wherever the knowledge is to be found.  
 6 Vitis Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-Climates 
Jon File, Eric Beerkens, Liudvika Leišyt÷ and Carlo Salerno 
 
Vitis Vinifera is renowned for its trading and for the diversity of its products. 
Travellers come from miles around to purchase goods and services that are widely 
believed to enhance future prosperity and the quality of life. It has no central 
market as its producer-merchants prefer to trade from their homes across the city. 
Curiously, while bustling back and forth across Vitis Vinifera in search of the 
right product at the right price, the first-time visitor is only fleetingly struck by the 
notion of being in a city at all.  
 
There is little that seems to hold the city together as an entity – the roofs are made 
of tiles of different hues and textures; the cobbles paving the divergently 
dimensioned streets seem cut from geological formations from the four ends of 
the earth – so as one turns each corner it feels as if one has entered another city; 
gardens display a bewildering array of botanical growth and colour – from arid 
desert cactus to steamy jungle undergrowth; through open windows can be 
glimpsed rooms, decoration and furniture that could belong to one hundred 
different tribes and territories; the dwellings themselves (each with their own stall 
or shop-front) are built from such dissimilar materials and of such contradictory 
design –  polymer tent, log cabin, stone church, glass house, icy igloo, sand castle, 
steel tower, thatched hut – and of such varying dimensions – thirty metres high, 
barely above ground, stretching across a full city ‘block’, crammed next to each 
other on a postage stamp plot – that it is clear that Vitis (as it is known 
colloquially to its residents) has no city planning committee, nor a hegemonic 
architectural practice. 
 
On reflection, and after the initial disorientation of the first visit, the underlying 
reality begins to make itself clear. It seems that the diversity of the visual 
experience initially blunts the other senses – for as one walks through the city 
one’s body alternately freezes and bakes, is drenched in rain, blown off course, 
enters twilight and emerges steps later with the sun at high noon. Vitis is a city of 
micro-climates, a triumph of terroir, where each household produces and trades in 
a niche customised meticulously to its own environment. 
 
With stylistic debt to Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities (1972) 
 
Europe 2020 
Europe 2020 is not dramatically different to the Europe of 2004 – geographically and 
politically. The UK has not drifted continentally across the Atlantic,1 and the ongoing 
EU accession process has not altered the fundamental political dynamics of Europe: an 
uneasy cohabitation of national sovereignty and shared supra-national interests and 
coordination. In terms of economic strategy the optimism of the early years of the 
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 Although its relationship with the rest of Europe remains intriguing: the BBC still reports that the 
continent is cut off when thick fog descends over the channel. 
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century has been tempered by more realism about the limits to what can be achieved 
by joint pronouncement, about the fact that fundamental socio-economic change 
requires a long period of gestation, and the recognition that the lead established by 
Europe’s major competitors in the global economy would not be clawed back in a 
decade. Europe 2020 is not the world’s leading knowledge economy – it remains a 
very serious player but has not caught up with, let alone overtaken, the USA and Japan 
and the economic growth of China has surprised all three. 
 
The socio-political agenda has however changed significantly – while innovation and 
the knowledge economy remain important priorities they have lost some of their iconic 
and ‘only show in town’ status. The newer shows in the towns of Europe are more 
focused on the quality of life – longer (working) lives, travel and leisure, the 
environment, paramedical therapies, media and design, cross-cultural relationships, 
critical consumerism, urban social cohesion.2 The economic base (largely service and 
knowledge based, but with significant primary and secondary production in the far 
North, East and South) has proved robust enough – Europeans don’t wish to be 
wealthier than everybody else – those that do have moved to the more entrepreneurial 
shores of San Francisco, Sydney, Shanghai or Sao Paulo.  
Higher Education Policy Research 2020 
The market, moving like the Lord in mysterious ways, is better understood and its 
hand is sighted on the occasional clear day.  Path breaking social science theory and 
research in the early years of the century has led to a far more nuanced analytical 
appreciation of markets as well as different economic, social, regional and 
geographical dimensions to them.  
 
In a similar vein, a series of monographs produced in 2011 by CHEPPS3 of the 
Universiteit Eenentwintig4 helped many move away from some of the blunter 
analytical concepts in higher education policy analysis: CHEPPS staff and an 
increasing number of fellow thinkers no longer use terms like the university, the higher 
education sector, the market, and the academic profession let alone try to describe any 
characteristics these may have. While some may privately mourn the passing of an era 
when universities were universities, professors professed and students were seen and 
heard – it is now accepted that higher education in practice (if not always in policy) 
encompasses all post-school education and training. This is an enormously diverse 
field and most of what happens is driven by markets. Nevertheless educationalists, 
                                                        
2
 One illustrative indicator: in 2017 for the first time Bonsai trees outsold Personal Communication 
Aides (PCAs). 
3
 The Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies with two Ps - a famous Dutch author like Charles 
Dikkens with two Ks. (See Monty Python: The Bookshop Sketch). 
4
 The Technological and Social Science legs of the University of Twente split (painfully and 
irreparably) in 2009 with the social science part taking the next available name: the University of 
Twenty-One. 
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trainers, programme developers and researchers5 are seldom driven to market easily 
and even less frequently via the shortest route.6 It is not just these complex 
relationships between markets and the higher education sector that have made higher 
education policy studies such an interesting, challenging and respected field – for the 
key third triangular player, national and supranational authority, has in no sense 
retreated (defeated) from the field. 
 
What did happen however was that national governments and the European 
Commission became more realistic and more selective about what could be achieved 
in a highly diverse and complex field of social life where governments have limited 
steering capacity and a restricted set of steering instruments at their disposal7.   
Broad Trends in European Higher Education  
While there remains considerable variability across different European countries and 
different national higher education policy histories make fascinating reading, the trends 
are clear:  
 
• higher education programmes8 are now being offered more flexibly by a wider set 
of institutions to a broader range of learners (in terms of age and socio-economic 
background);  
• higher education programmes are more responsive to the needs of learners and 
different economic sectors;  
• institutions have more autonomy than they had 20 years ago particularly in terms 
of student selection, programme development and curriculum content (most 
national quality assurance and accreditation systems stepped back from 
programme level accreditation and licensing in the period 2007 – 2010);9 
• the share of higher education accounted for by private providers10 has increased 
significantly, as has the proportion of private funding within public institutions;  
                                                        
5
 These are four of the 27 (EUFO) job descriptions introduced across the EU in 2009 to enable a 
sensible discussion about what had hitherto been described as academic staff.  
6
 An experienced mid-western cattle farmer advises that the first and crucial stage in any attempt at 
herding buffalo is to make sure that you have a pretty darn good idea of where the buffalo wish to go. 
7
 Governments and the EC appear to have accepted CHEPPS first law: Higher education institutions 
are by definition smarter than Ministries and coordinating agencies so effective steering is always 
difficult, and its corollary: Where the first law does not apply, the capacity problems in higher 
education make steering a hopeless cause to begin with. 
8
 ‘Programme’ is used here in a very neutral way: most programmes are now flexible combinations of 
courses, modules and often work experience. Purists argue that most are not programmed at all. 
9
 Apart from buffalo characteristics and the first law of CHEPPS mentioned above, programme level 
accreditation was defeated by logistics (100,000 programmes) and by strong arguments from the 
market that it was incompatible with innovation, responsiveness, renewal and mass individualisation.  
10
 In most countries the line between public and private providers has become more permeable. One 
third of European governments now finance undergraduate studies in accredited private institutions. 
Ten countries have passed ‘Chalmers’ legislation allowing public institutions to step out of the public 
sector and become private foundations. On average 8 public universities declare bankruptcy each 
year with governments declining to bail them out - rather preferring to sell them off to the private 
sector, in some notable cases via management buy-outs. 
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• public (teaching) funding of higher education programmes at public institutions is 
increasingly based on (targeted and competitive) student enrolment at the 
undergraduate level – postgraduate programmes are predominantly funded only 
through tuition fees; 
• public research funding (including that for PhDs) is highly competitive and 
selective – benefiting research groups that are very good and/or strategically 
relevant.  The share of research funding distributed by national research councils 
has diminished as the role of the European Research Council has expanded; 
• in one way or another the great majority of students now pay tuition fees, and 
most, if not all, institutions have the ability to set their own differential fees 
(within limits that vary nationally in the amount of discretion they allow);  
• student support grants increasingly target the first degree level, are income 
contingent and only the very talented and the very poor have their full costs 
covered – student loans are an accepted reality across Europe and are offered by 
public, private and mixed ‘student banks’. 
Students and Study Programmes 
Student participation has grown remarkably over the past two decades but the effective 
broadening of ‘higher education’ to incorporate most of the further education sector 
and much of the training industry makes it difficult to precisely quantify the change.11 
In this broader definition most European countries now have participation rates 
exceeding 70% of the traditional age cohort but the most pronounced growth has been 
in ‘adult’, ‘mature’ or ‘life-long’ learners. 
 
The age range of students has also increased enormously – major groups include the 
immediate post-school cohort (for Certificate, Diploma and Bachelor programmes – 
typically publicly funded but with a high loan component), early and mid-career 
working people (for second Certificate, Diploma or Bachelor programmes or a Master 
– typically self or company funded) and increasing numbers of post 45-year-olds for 
interest or for second career purposes (self funded, but with some government 
retraining funding and increasingly tax credits). The recognition of prior learning is 
common place in the majority of HEIs other than the few ‘collegiate’ institutions that 
have retained the development of a critical and responsible citizenry (from 18-21 year 
old young adults) as a core part of their mission.   
 
Higher education institutions, Brussels and EU member states all recognised that a 
minimum level of shared understanding of qualifications was essential if a diverse 
higher education market place was to be effective in meeting the diverse higher 
education and training needs of a diverse Europe and its diverse markets. The Bologna 
process was expanded to include sub-degree qualifications. The Certificate, Diploma, 
Bachelor, Postgraduate Diploma, Master and (research and professional) Doctor 
structure of 1, 2, 3, 1, 2 and minimum 2 years duration, sub-divided into 60 ECTS 
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 Professor Kaiser of CHEPPS estimates the full-time equivalent growth in Bachelor registrations in 
EU member states at 18% over the period 2007 to 2017, and that for Masters candidates at 25%. 
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credits per year is now standard across the EU, and almost standard in other European 
and neighbouring countries. Training programmes of less than a year, but of at least 10 
credits, are also registered by the EU’s Higher Education and Training Authority 
(HETA). Although it is not mandatory for them to do so, it is estimated that 98% of 
public institutions and 80% of private and non-European providers register their 
qualifications voluntarily given the extensive use of the HETA database in the market 
places for ‘graduates’.12  
 
HETA is neither an accreditation nor a quality assurance agency. Rather it is a data-
warehouse for HE programmes with a limited audit capacity to verify the information 
provided via random checks (mainly on programme duration and entrance 
requirements). HETA is widely perceived in the HE industry as a body not to be 
messed with: the sanctions for fraudulent reporting are severe. Beyond this 
rudimentary system of registration, quality and relevance are widely believed to be 
matters best left to the markets to assess. A minority of member states have national 
accreditation procedures for public HE programmes but the dominant model is one of 
multiple accreditation possibilities that are chosen strategically by HE providers – 
often on the advice of highly paid marketing professionals.13 The diverse markets for 
Europe’s HE ‘graduate output’ have surprisingly sophisticated methods of assessing 
the skills and competencies of graduates, and the ‘quality’ of programmes – these vary 
enormously by economic sector, ‘profession’ and region.14   
 
There is however increasing public concern about declining and/or differential higher 
education standards across Europe. Political leaders and higher education executives 
have been fairly pragmatic about this – conceding that there is more variety in the 
system by design, arguing that more information is available to prospective students 
and pointing to comparative international research by the University of Malta that 
suggests the ‘aggregate quality range’ within European higher education has increased 
enormously but still remains less diverse than in the USA.  
Student Mobility and Internationalisation 
Despite all of the hopes of the Socrates and Erasmus programmes and some of the 
underlying motivation of the Bologna process, cross-border student mobility at the first 
degree level within Europe remains limited – some 10% of students complete a 
Bachelor’s degree in another European country and a further 10% take a semester 
                                                        
12
 The nice Anglo-Saxon distinction between graduates and holders of lesser qualifications has fallen 
into such disuse that diplomate can no longer be found in the Complete Oxford Dictionary. 
13
 Governments without their ‘own’ accreditation agencies decide which agencies they will accept for 
institutions to qualify for public funding. 
14
 See the guides published periodically by ‘WHICH’ – particularly instructive are it’s Where to find 
the best training in… Floristry (May 2009), Tourism from China (June 2009), Green Architecture 
(July 2009), Feng Shui (April 2010) and Polymer Engineering (Sept 2010). Note the emphasis given 
to inter-personal and life skills in each case. CHEPPS researchers have found that guides of this 
nature and Lonely Planet’s ‘Best European student cities’ are far more influential among prospective 
students than HEIs own marketing materials and the various ‘university rankings’ published annually 
by major European newspaper groups.  
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away. Most analysts attribute this to the persistence of mother tongue instruction at the 
undergraduate level and the unexpected social trend in the 2010s of late adolescents 
wanting to remain in their parental home. Mobility at the Masters level is far greater 
both within and across countries (almost half of Masters students take their degrees at 
a different university – and a third of these in a different country) reflecting the trend 
of more and more Masters programmes being taught in English and European parents 
drawing a line under extending hospitality to their offspring.  
 
Higher education has become one of Europe’s most important trading commodities. 
While the pattern varies across different countries, higher education is one of the top 
ten service sectors in many European economies. The UK, Netherlands, Sweden and 
(northern) Italy are the most successful, but the levels of flexibility and international 
responsiveness shown by sectors of the Polish, French and German university systems 
would have been unimaginable a decade ago. Europe continues to attract more and 
more international students and is cutting significantly into the market shares of both 
the USA and Australia.15 Within countries, internationalisation has become one of the 
most important dimensions of system diversity – some institutions have embraced it to 
the point of specialisation while others have deliberately excluded the international 
dimension from their niche. 
Institutional Landscape 
Most countries have abandoned institutional differentiation by type (university, college 
and polytechnic) and only philosophers and historians retain any real interest in the 
question of what a university is. Politicians, prospective students, the general public 
and markets are content with the pragmatic position that a university is what it does. 
Europe’s universities (and alternatively baptised HEIs) do very different things. 
Europe’s 6,000 higher education providers have considerably more than 100,000 
programmes registered with HETA. Of these providers fewer than 800 would be 
recognisable to a 1990s alumnus as traditional comprehensive universities, and fewer 
than 400 offer PhDs in more than five fields. The modal HEI offers 10 study 
programmes at the C, D, B and M levels in two or three broad fields of study. 
 
The diversity across Europe’s universities is as vast in terms of focus as it is in 
programme offerings. Most have opted to be (or have accepted a compelling business 
case to remain) a combination of national, regional and local institutions with close 
relationships to proximate stakeholders and their needs. Only a minority aim to be 
international and trans-European centres of (mainly English language) learning and 
scholarship. Research is increasingly concentrated in (Western and Northern) Europe’s 
elite universities – claimed to include four of the ten best in the world – but 
surprisingly these elite institutions seldom have their undergraduate programmes 
assessed as being the best. The most selective programmes (with the exception of 
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 Saatchi and Saatchi’s celebrated advertising campaign ‘We have culture, we have no flies and you 
can drink the world’s best beer and wine at 18!’ is seen by many to have been a decisive intervention. 
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Doctorates) tend to be at small specialised institutions, both public and private. The 
different niches that higher education institutions have chosen are reflected in their 
student bodies (age, national origin, full or part time, contact or distance mode), in the 
accreditation they seek, in their language policies, in the tuition fees they charge, in 
their mix of funding sources and in their staff profiles and reward systems (see below).  
 
One-third of higher education providers are private but most focus on shorter cycle 
certificate and Diploma programmes, often at the post-graduate level. Only a minority 
operate in the first Bachelor degree market. These are mainly in Eastern and Southern 
Europe. The trend has been for this minority to receive public financial support for 
Bachelor (and often Certificate and Diploma) students provided that they are nationally 
accredited. The private university sector has grown significantly particularly in the 
MBA and ICT fields, many new providers (and more and more traditional ones) offer 
educational services via broadband interactive web-streaming  technologies, while the 
market share of the European campuses of US and Australian universities has dropped 
significantly from its 2005 high of 2%.  
Funding   
The funding mix varies according to institutional profile and (decreasingly) its public 
or private status. Most public institutions are dependent primarily on government 
grants linked to student enrolments at the initial Certificate, Diploma and Bachelor 
levels and on tuition fees. Fewer and fewer governments fund institutions at the same 
level for all of the students they enrol. The most talented, those in areas perceived to be 
strategically important and under-represented groups tend to come with higher prices 
attached thus making targeted student recruitment a very competitive and potentially 
lucrative business. The average public university now receives 57% of its funding 
through direct grants from national government but the range is considerable. The 
entrepreneurial University of Warwick receives 15% from this source whereas many 
locally orientated non-technological universities continue to receive over 80% of their 
funding via this channel. In general terms, most governments now see their subsidies 
to institutions in ‘prices for services’ terms and not as ‘contributions towards actual 
costs incurred’. 
 
Tuition fees vary from 280 to 28000 Euro per year for a Bachelors degree.16 Higher 
education institutions decide for themselves what tuition fee levels to set for each 
programme but national framework legislation sometimes sets limits on this, as do 
national student financial aid policies which have maximum tuition fee levels for 
loan/grant recipients. CHEPPS research indicates that most institutions charge what 
they think the market will bear but that the popularity of the programme (some receive 
over 100 applicants for each available place) and the perceived level of competition 
with other programmes (and the fees charged) are important factors. Tuition fees are 
paid through a wide variety of sources – students, parents, employers and the 
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 The cheapest is a Norwegian Regional University near Tromso while Switzerland’s leading hotel 
school is the most expensive (The Economist, March 23, 2019).  
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government itself for some first degree students (the very talented, students in 
undersubscribed but important fields, and the very poor) in some countries. 
Less than one in ten HEIs receive public (basic) research funding (see below). More 
than 50% receive contract R&D and/or training and consultancy funding from public 
and/or private sources, including regional innovation and development agencies and 
(crucially) service sectors of the economy in which the HEI is active as a player in 
education and training. (Between 2007 and 2017 there was a significant reduction in 
the proportion of private and public sector17 training and R&D resources spent in 
house – this has been the major new source of income for the HEIs.) 
 
One interesting new development has been the launching of effective alumni 
associations and professional fund raising campaigns by a number of small prestigious 
universities. While it is too early to tell what degree of success will be achieved, there 
is far more talk and far more action in the area of donations and endowments for 
universities than there has ever been in Europe. 
Research 
On average Europe’s expenditure on research, technological development and 
innovation comfortably exceeds the 3% of GDP target set two decades ago. This can 
be partially explained by rising private sector expenditures (often contracted to higher 
education institutions) and partly because Europe’s shifting socio-economic priorities 
and its changing markets for goods and services have broadened the range of fields 
where these resources are spent. Innovation in particular is highly valued and is no 
longer a wholly owned subsidiary of the science and technology disciplines. Many of 
HE’s major research role models are not Nobel prize winners but innovators, and the 
programmes they contribute to are some of the most selective in Europe.  
 
As was indicated earlier fully half of Europe’s higher education institutions receive 
significant ‘third stream’ applied R&D funding and the sector is now responsible for 
much of the R&D activity previously undertaken by government, business and 
industry themselves. These developments have had a major impact on the ‘applied 
research landscape’ and on the mix of activities within the higher education sector.  
 
Research and (research) PhD funding is highly selective at the European level – some 
35% of Europe’s total public basic and strategic research funds are distributed by the 
European Research Council and at the national level (where national research councils 
have developed innovative ways to enhance national capacity and priorities in a 
context of competitive Europe-wide tendering). While each nation state possesses at 
least one research ‘flagship’ there is no doubt that a substantial research function is 
now the preserve of the few, and that the few are not evenly distributed across Europe 
– the Western and Northern European universities house most of Europe’s leading 
research centres. ‘Big science’ is increasingly undertaken by cross-national tailor-made 
consortia that draw on top university based researchers and their counterparts from the 
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public and private sectors. Despite a number of expensive ERC programmes to 
encourage European research networks, the self-perception and scientific practice of 
Europe’s leading centres continues to be unashamedly international. Exclusive 
European networks are seldom those at the cutting edge. 
 
Most national ministries have introduced targeted funding to help train, recruit and 
secure the next generations of university based researchers – but these are now 
recognised to constitute only a small proportion of the nation’s ‘academic profession’. 
The modal ‘academic’ is an expert in a particular field: a skilled teacher, 
entrepreneurial in outlook, a talented team member in joint projects with external 
stakeholders, not active in fundamental research and does not wish to be.18  
 
In retrospect it is clear that the research agenda of the past two decades has 
increasingly been developed in consultation with external stakeholders (who fund most 
of it). This has meant that research fields not relevant for business and industry are 
weaker than they were in 2005 although once again Europe’s changed socio-economic 
priorities have meant that business and industry’s own interests are far broader than 
they were.  
Higher Education Leadership and Management 
European higher education institutions operate in an environment far less stable than 
that of only a few decades ago. They enjoy more independence from government. 
Student selection, determining tuition fee levels, setting staff salary policies and 
deciding independently which programmes to offer are all now routine aspects of the 
inner business life of universities. The range of strategic choice and possible activities 
to focus on has broadened. Levels of competition for students, staff and contracts have 
increased fairly dramatically. More liberal operating regulations entail greater financial 
autonomy, wider opportunities and deeper risks. Flexibility and responsiveness are 
expected by a wider range of stakeholders.   
 
The typical higher education institution is managed in a business-like way, stressing 
efficiency and productivity. Methods of strategic, financial and human resource 
management are by and large similar to those encountered in the private sector. Higher 
education management in general and its ‘sub-disciplines’ in particular19 have 
developed into recognisable professional careers. This professionalisation is evidenced 
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 Many were liberated from the burden of unfulfilled research expectations by the major changes in 
HRM and salary policies that swept across the European higher education space in 2008 and 2009. 
Academic salaries continue to differ vastly across countries, but within countries a wider range of 
performance areas are rewarded. More and more staff see themselves primarily as members of the 
teaching profession – long holidays with no associated research requirement are attractive. Part-time 
studies by HEI staff in androgogics and project acquisition are both growth areas. 
19
 The European Association of Higher Education Managers has thirty professional tracks at its 
annual conferences grouped into twelve major fields: academic management, research management, 
HRM, marketing and corporate communications, scholarships and student recruitment, assets and 
real estate, law and contracts, governmental relations and lobbying, strategic planning and risk 
management, student life and Brussels scouts. 
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by the fact that it is common practice for institutional executives and managers to 
move from one institution to another over the course of their careers. There is an 
extensive range of educational programmes to prepare higher educational mangers and 
to enhance their skills. Moreover, executives and managers are well paid (at least in 
higher education terms).  As always there are distinct national flavours and differences 
relating to the nature of the institutional mission. Regional education, training and 
consultancy-focused institutions are more likely to have a chief executive drawn from 
outside the HE sector (there is far greater job movement in and out of higher 
education) while leading research institutions tend to have presidents with a traditional 
academic background but supported by highly professional management teams.  
 
After a period at the end of the last century when the higher education sector seemed 
gripped by merger fever some spectacular failures of mega-institutions around 2010 
have noticeably dampened enthusiasm for mergers and amalgamations. If big was once 
beautiful, European higher education in 2020 has real doubts about the 
manoeuvrability of university super tankers (let alone fleets of them) and many of the 
most successful institutions are small and specialised. 
Postscript: on the Loss of a Sector  
Like our imaginary Vitis Vinifera,20 European higher education 2020 has a coherence 
problem. It feels less and less like a sector and more and more like a loose collection of 
institutions with a shared common denominator no more significant than having one or 
more of the words teaching, learning, research and development in their mission 
statements. In terms of governance and of the big interrelations of state, market and 
academia this is more than a feeling. Sector-wide organisations are struggling to deal 
with higher educational diversity, Rectors Conferences are ridden by factionalism and 
competing interests, European consortia and clubs of similarly visioned institutions 
have proliferated, (a) higher education policy is becoming a contradiction in terms and 
the would-be developers of the European Carnegie classification have gone into early 
retirement muttering that some things are just unclassifiable.  
 
By 2030 historians will have demonstrated that the loss of sectoral coherence was a 
trend with origins extending way into the previous century when Europe took its first 
faltering steps down the road from elite to mass higher education. A seminal work by 
CHEPPS on the occasion of its 50th anniversary will conclude that the alternative 
scenario – a harmonised, homogenised higher education system with near universal 
access – would have been, like wooded chardonnay for all in a Europe rich in terroir, a 
future too ghastly to contemplate. 
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 This is the botanical name for the vine species, native to Europe and Central Asia, from which all 
of the world’s finest wines are made - including those of California and Australia. (Admittedly it had 
some help from Vitis Labrusca, the American vine, whose resistant rootstocks enabled Europe’s 
vines to recover from the phylloxera epidemic at the end of the 19th century.)  
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In this brief chapter, some of the most salient characteristics of each of the three 
scenarios are highlighted using four main themes: system diversity, governance, 
funding and quality.1 These were not necessarily the dimensions across which the 
scenarios were first designed. On the contrary, we aimed at a critical reflection on what 
came out of the scenario design exercise from independent points of view. We 
especially draw attention, therefore, to some inherent tensions and contradictions in 
each of the scenarios, as a counterbalance to the positive tone of the previous chapters 
in which the scenarios were presented. Let us remind the reader that the Centralia 
scenario largely evolved (though systematised and ‘enlarged’) from the majority 
opinions of our respondents to the Delphi study, whilst the two other scenarios 
contrasted with this by making use of patterns of opinions (in a few cases majorities) in 
the Delphi-study response. There was quite a bit of ‘science fiction’ in those chapters 
and some intentional polishing to make each scenario appear attractive in as many 
respects as possible. Therefore before turning to external comments, we wish to 
qualify that rosy picture.  
Diversity in the Higher Education Systems 
In the Centralia scenario the main emphasis was on organised diversity with regards to 
degree structures, with the emphasis on organised. The three-stage ‘Bachelor, Master 
and Doctor’ model was spreading across the continent and a fairly common 
interpretation of that structure had emerged, so there was a large degree of 
harmonisation, even uniformity, of higher education degrees across Europe. It was 
suggested that this uniformity had emerged spontaneously, pointing to the fact that in 
their desire to be ‘European’, actors at different levels and in different regions may go 
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composition, internationalisation of study careers, character of education and ‘post-mode-2’ research) 
but for brevity we will not address all of them in this chapter. 
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beyond the letter of European agreements – it does not always take the ‘muscles from 
Brussels’ to (over-)achieve European policy goals. The other two scenarios showed 
more diversity in this respect. Octavia spoke of organic diversity of degree types and 
lengths, emerging out of a host of temporary bilateral and multilateral agreements at 
different levels. Everything remained in flux. This made for a much higher degree of 
uncertainty than in the Centralia scenario, but on the other hand it added flexibility and 
adaptability to regional and temporal circumstances. In the Vitis Vinifera scenario the 
variety and uncertainty was taken to the extreme by stressing that higher education 
(seamlessly connected with further education and vocational training) was 
unclassifiable. The values of institutional autonomy and adaptability were given full 
play, in contrast to Centralia that gave more predictability to life (a condition for 
investing in long-term behaviour2) but was, perhaps much more rigid and resistant to 
(needed) change. 
 
Regarding institutional diversity, Centralia was characterised by its lack thereof; the 
typical higher education institution was large and predominantly publicly funded. 
Education in these institutions was blended mode learning with a strong emphasis on 
life-long learning. The latter was mostly due to the higher education institutions’ 
adaptation to the ‘greying’ demographic situation in Europe – an important assumption 
underlying all three scenarios.  
 
The argument of economies of scale was taken up in a case-by-case approach in 
Octavia, leading to different networks for different tasks rather than full-scale mergers, 
although mergers were not ruled out in the event of regular and intense cooperation 
among higher education institutions. Institutional types were not expected to be 
harmonised across Europe; the current multitude (‘jungle’?) would persist. The 
multitude of institutional forms would probably even increase rather than just persist, 
as the role of private partners of different types was expected to grow in the networked 
economy. The same effect was expected in Vitis Vinifera where the range from small 
niche players to mega-universities was clearly illustrated. Along with this, in Vitis 
Vinifera about one-third of higher education institutions were purely private. The 
assumption of that scenario was certainly not that governments would retreat from 
higher education and research completely but private market forces, ‘real’ as opposed 
to government-induced ‘quasi’ markets, were expected to play a much more prominent 
role than at the turn of the century, thus adding to the diversity of institutions and their 
motivations (some  being profit-driven).  
 
Institutional diversity also extended to the main tasks of the higher education 
institutions: education and research. In Centralia the large institutions were practically 
all engaged in both, albeit in different ways. With regards to research and teaching, one 
noted basic, curiosity-driven variants as well as application-oriented variants. In the 
other two scenarios there was much more diversity among higher education institutions 
on this dimension. In Vitis Vinifera the emphasis was on specialised institutions 
                                                        
2
 On the other hand, in Vitis Vinifera the (short-term) incentives for investment behaviour may be 
larger than in publicly-controlled Centralia. As a further consequence, this might lead to more rent-
seeking behaviour in Vitis Vinifera.  
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interacting with each other in markets, that is on a case by case and rather anonymous 
basis. In Octavia the interaction mechanism was again the network, with its 
underscoring of longer-term though still fluctuating relationships. 
 
Another remarkable difference between the three scenarios was institutional diversity 
on a European scale. Centralia saw higher education across Europe characterised by a 
clear stratification, with the more prestigious doctoral-level teaching mostly 
concentrated in the Northern and Western Europe, while institutions in the south and 
east were mainly limited to teaching at the bachelor-level. In Octavia, the same North-
West to South-East gradient of prestige appeared, but then with the South-East 
concentrating on ‘teaching-only’ higher education institutions and the North-West 
enjoying ‘research universities’. The Vitis Vinifera scenario emphasised that the 
diversity on different dimensions within each country was remarkably large, while 
diversity across Europe was much less striking. 
 
With regards to research, in Centralia it was suggested that the invention of the term 
‘post-mode-2’ research was in fact a return to a ‘pre-mode-2’ situation; (public) 
universities had gone back to basic research while the newly separated R&D function 
took place in the (public-private or private) company laboratories. In Octavia, on the 
contrary, mode-2 research had become all-pervasive in its public-private university-
industry networks. The political question not addressed was who in those networks 
really set the research agendas and accordingly who decided on the type of research, 
research subjects and who reaped the benefits (knowledge or products)? The answer to 
these questions was also not explicitly provided in the Vitis Vinifera scenario, although 
the answer was hinted at. The new role models for researchers were innovators, no 
longer the Nobelists. In this, Vitis Vinifera sketched a mirror image of Centralia and 
one might wonder if in such a scenario any solid mode-1 research would be left at all?  
Governance & Management 
When it comes to the governance of higher education systems and institutions, the 
situations and problems in the three scenarios can be illustrated by the 
(pseudo-)scientific law invented in Vitis Vinifera: 
 
• CHEPPS first law: Higher education institutions are by definition smarter than 
Ministries and co-ordinating agencies, so effective steering is always difficult. 
And its corollary: Where the first law does not apply, the capacity problems in 
higher education make steering a hopeless cause to begin with. 
 
System governance in Centralia depended heavily on European-level policy-making 
(colloquially terned strong ‘Brussels’). Europe ensured system coordination, it made 
the regulations and provided a large proportion of the higher education and research 
budget. The scenario relied heavily on technology, massive data transfer and decision-
support software in order to overcome the second law. The (bureau-)politics of 
interorganisational relationships, amongst other factors, prevented technology from 
being fully effective in that respect; under the surface there were span-of-control 
problems. Moreover the higher education institutions were characterised by 
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professional institutional management (supported by similar technological advances) 
thus re-applying the first law, only at a higher level of sophistication than at present. 
When institutional management3 is mentioned it should be emphasised that in the 
Centralia scenario it was forecast that even though more professionalised, control over 
higher education institutions would remain firmly in the academics’ hands.  
 
In Octavia system governance was more complicated, with full-scale application of 
multi-level governance ideas. Authority was divided over – and shared by – actors at 
supra-national, national as well as regional levels. It is doubtful that such a complex 
governance arrangement could be realised as it would exponentially increase the 
coordination problems among the different actors, even before the CHEPPS laws come 
into play. If the multi-level governance system could work, it would alleviate some 
capacity problems by limiting the range of control mostly to individual networks or 
regions within Europe (sometimes nations, sometimes federal states, and sometimes 
sub-state regions). With regard to institutional leadership, Octavia forecasted it would 
focus on leadership for change in ever-changing networks. The magic words were 
‘management of flows’ (knowledge and capital) rather than of facilities or personnel. 
This would seem to put high demands on institutional leadership.  
 
The demands on institutional leadership would be even higher in the extreme number 
of fluctuating extra-organisational relationships that characterised the Vitis Vinifera 
scenario, and in that sense it may be (even) less realistic than Octavia. On the positive 
side, as far as Vitis Vinifera is concerned, the first CHEPPS law was not much of a 
danger here, as there was very little large scale system governance. 
Funding, Competition and Markets 
The issue of resources was at the core of many differences between the three scenarios. 
   
The issue in Centralia was that the ‘public’ was put back into higher education, more 
so than at the turn of the century. This implied mainly public systems under (supra-
national) state regulation: the EU regulated competition and ensured protection in the 
public system. Public funding of higher education institutions (supply funding) was 
based on student numbers. Public regulation in Centralia also extended to private 
contributions: tuition fees (which had been introduced across Europe) were kept within 
government-imposed bounds though they were not uniformly prescribed. In response 
to the demographic decline in Europe in combination with the fees charged in public 
higher education institutions, measures were needed to ensure access to higher 
education for all income groups. Centralia accordingly introduced the EU ‘Talent 
Stipend Fund’.  
 
                                                        
3
 Interestingly, in the perhaps over-organised, bureaucratic discourse of the Centralia scenario the 
term consistently used is ‘management’ of higher education institutions. In the other two scenarios 
the term ‘leadership’ is used as well. 
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The core term in Octavia was public-private partnerships: funding sources were both 
public and private for different purposes (using differently-targeted incentive structures 
such as formulas). The public part of higher education funding – from different public 
agencies – focused on the teaching function, using vouchers for students (demand 
funding) that could be used flexibly by students for different course units at different 
moments in time and at different (higher) education institutions across Europe. 
Students in this scenario were ‘protected’ mainly by the multitude of access options 
they had – a trust in large numbers of market parties rather than in market regulation.  
 
The market as the main coordination mechanism emerged most clearly in the Vitis 
Vinifera scenario. This model emphasised the private parties and their business-like 
approach towards higher education. Higher education was seen here as a private good: 
a marketable commodity. This private character applied more to higher levels; it was 
accepted that undergraduate higher education still had sufficient externalities to 
warrant some public intervention. Accordingly, even in this scenario, in order not to 
depart too far from respondents’ opinions in the Delphi study, the public role was not 
completely eliminated. Public funding, such as there was, funded teaching on the basis 
of undergraduate enrolment. The legal status of institutions (public or private) was 
becoming unimportant for funding purposes. Tuition fees varied enormously across 
institutions within wide national bounds (if any). Public support for students was 
basically limited to the first degree level, with scholarships based on both need and 
merit.  
 
The Lisbon-related 3% target of funding for research and innovation was reached in 
the Centralia scenario in 2012 thanks to funding from Europe. In Octavia, the target 
was already reached by 2009, thanks to public-private partnership funding. In the Vitis 
Vinifera scenario the 3% aim was ‘comfortably’ exceeded by 2020 thanks to private 
investment in research and innovation.  
 
Another market-related theme included in all three scenarios was an enlargement of 
the set of providers and programmes in higher education. The offer of education was 
increasingly transparent thanks to registers and/or accreditation in the Centralia and 
Octavia scenarios. Only in Vitis Vinifera was a decrease in transparency forecast due 
to the proliferation of market niches. Consumer sovereignty was increased in all three 
scenarios thanks to the introduction of (differentiated) fees – there was more to choose 
from and the market signals for choice were clearer than at the turn of the century. At 
the same time producer sovereignty was influenced as well; in some respects in the 
same direction in all scenarios: higher education institutions would acquire more 
autonomy in  financing, programme supply and staffing (‘HRM’) policy and they 
would be much freer than at present to work in alliances or partnerships with other 
actors. One of the differences across the scenarios was the issue of market protection: 
in Centralia there were more barriers to entry for private and foreign providers than in 
the other two scenarios though not so many as to exclude them completely.  
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Quality Matters  
The topic of higher education and research quality remained high on the agenda in all 
three scenarios. But which aspects of quality were affected in the different scenarios? 
 
The degree structure, a framing element for quality, has already been mentioned in the 
discussion on diversity. In the Centralia scenario, a uniform 3+2+3 structure (defined 
in a more sophisticated manner in ECTS-modules was implemented. On the other 
hand, it was not the length of study but graduates’ competences that counted. 
Accordingly one might wonder what was the real determinant of graduating and if the 
uniform structure was as uniform as the labels seemed to say. In Octavia the theme of 
complexity and uncertainty regarding quality could be illustrated by the degree 
structure too, but that was topped by the Vitis Vinifera scenario with its statement that 
‘some things are just unclassifiable’. How could European society make sense of such 
a chaotic ‘jungle’? 
 
In the Centralia scenario, students were carefully guided to minimise talent loss. 
Taking a different view on this worthy quality principle that drop-out (‘wastage’) is to 
be avoided, academics might object that in this way students would be pampered too 
much rather than becoming well-educated adults. Also if you cannot fail students 
anymore at examinations, what is left of academic freedom? The main problem in the 
Octavia scenario was different, namely: How could the coherence of students’ learning 
experiences be checked when their study was best described as a cross-institutional, 
cross-national journey with diversified, modular programmes? This lack of coherence 
also surfaced in Octavia in the descriptions given of the concept of quality, namely 
‘supporting a diversified student body to acquire a mixture of skills and knowledge…’ 
Similarly, education was defined in a way that also implied hard times for coherent 
learning: ‘experience-based learning programmes for contextualised knowledge 
applications that are strongly linked to the local embeddedness of the global 
knowledge economy’. No wonder then that social actors could not take higher 
education degrees at face value and therefore installed their own continuous tests of 
graduate employees in the workplaces against ever-changing criteria due to changing 
relationships and needs making the uncertainty even bigger. Already in Centralia it 
appeared that to design a harmonious system responding to many stakeholders’ needs 
required a very complex system of quality assurance. Centralia sported accreditation 
plus Graduate Competence Tests plus EU Civil Service Concourses. The main 
difference with Octavia were that (public) tests carried value and trust to other actors 
and they did not have a ‘sell-by’ date.  
 
The coherence issue was relevant to the Vitis Vinifera scenario as well. Here,  
however, the cause lay mainly in the fragmentation of institutions and especially in the 
fact that at least the private higher education sector to a large extent relied on web-
based education. Web-based education is currently seen as rather complicated for 
quality control, but maybe that will have been solved by 2020.  
 
 A Tale of Three Cities 
 
101 
Standardised course modules were another feature of the Centralia scenario. Taking 
the division of academic labour a step further by using well-designed curriculum and 
study materials even if they were ‘not invented here’ might benefit the equal dispersion 
of curriculum quality across Europe. Yet a cultural bias was introduced at the same 
time as teaching modules were mostly designed in the North-Western part of Europe.  
 
Regarding external quality assurance, the range of solutions were numerous throughout 
the scenarios. At one extreme Centralia described a system with obligatory European 
accreditation. A technical and conceptual advance foreshadowed at the turn of the 
century by some countries, the emphasis in accreditation progressed from input and 
process factors to output, albeit in a utilitarian manner. Employability of graduates 
became the main accreditation criterion. The focus on competences should mean 
accreditation was a ‘light’ procedure, not focusing on input and process data.  Still, the 
data demands seemed to be very heavy; it was not a ‘slim audit’. Slimness was more 
visible in the re-accreditation that took place once every eight years and was semi-
automatic, based on monitoring data without heavy evaluation processes. However, in 
accreditation the cracks in the varnish of harmony appeared too: there were 
purportedly uniform European Accreditation Agency (EAA) quality standards but 
universities lobbied for exceptions. The upshot was quality standards were higher in 
the North-West than in the South-East of Europe. Again an issue of cultural bias 
surfaced.  
 
The opposite position was taken in the Vitis Vinifera scenario, where most national 
quality assurance or accreditation schemes had been abandoned. Vitis Vinifera gave up 
on assessing quality. Nearly all that was left at the supra-institutional level was the 
European Higher Education and Training Authority (HETA), which only registered 
study programmes from providers. Apparently this register gave a minimal assurance 
that programmes offered were ‘genuine’, for it had legitimacy in the marketplace and 
was therefore popular amongst most private and public higher education institutions. 
For the rest, the markets were trusted to assess quality. In our minds markets 
increasingly demand innovation, responsiveness, renewal and mass individualisation. 
The emphasis is on changing things quickly. This leaves no stability for developing 
quality or even assessing education effects that need time (often many years) to 
become visible. That the markets were not completely effective was hinted at in the 
Vitis Vinifera scenario where there was growing public concern about declining or at 
least differential quality. It was hardly reassuring to read that by 2020 the diversity of 
quality was not yet as large as in USA.  
 
It should not be forgotten, however, that in Vitis Vinifera there also existed some 
collegiate institutions educating for a ‘critical and responsible citizenry’.  This scenario 
left room for almost anything, as long as some people demanded it. Not all was bad 
there, which could be said of each scenario. The rosy picture provided by the three 
‘tales of a city’ in the previous chapters may have been overdone, but the criticisms in 
the tale of three cities in this chapter are an equally intentional overstatement of the 
bleak sides of those higher education cityscapes. 
 
 8 On Prophets and Metaphors: Devices for Coping in 
 Times of Change 
Guy Neave 
 
A prophet doesn’t have to have any brains. They are good to have, of course, for 
the ordinary exigencies of life, but they are no use in professional work. It is the 
restfulest vocation there is. When the spirit of prophecy comes upon you, you 
merely take your intellect off and lay it somewhere in a cool place for a rest, and 
unship your jaw and leave it alone; it will work by itself. The result is prophecy. 
 
Mark Twain (1835 – 1910) A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court. 
 
Introduction 
If we believe Mark Twain, prophecy is not a particularly arduous activity, nor an 
overly cerebral one. Yet, even if one disagrees with this opinion, no one – not even Mr. 
Clemens – would deny that prophecy involves a certain element of risk.1  Nor is it 
immune to professional hazard. Of all the professional hazards – and they are many, 
obloquy, incredulity and the crown of martyrdom not least – the greatest that stands in 
wait for the prophet is his – rather rarer, her – very own prophet’s version of Hubris. 
Hubris – the Fate that in the Antique world swiftly followed upon the sins of pride and 
above all presumption – comes less from being convinced by one’s own utterances so 
much as the complacency that comes with having made them in the first place. And 
then there is the terrible burden of knowing one possesses the Truth. This is the 
greatest risk of all because all too often it tempts others to furious heights in seeking to 
cut the prophet down to size. The upshot generates unexpected dialogue, which even if 
it ends in martyrdom for some, is beneficial for others. CHEPS does not claim to be in 
unique possession of the Truth. Prophets are not without honour save only in their own 
country, and since our utterances were made precisely on our own turf, clearly what 
we have done is to explore possibilities, rather than foretelling what will be. Our 
purpose was to stimulate debate. And in this no risk is too great. That CHEPS should 
mark its two decades of achievement by taking such a risk is, surely, what one would 
expect from a Centre, located in an establishment, itself singled out not so long ago by 
one of higher education’s leading spirits as a prototype of the ‘Entrepreneurial 
University’ (Clark, 1998).  
Prophecy as the Art of Risk-taking 
Nevertheless, the exploration of scenarios has some similarity with the art of prophecy, 
which is risky for other reasons and they are more substantial and substantive. The first 
of these is that those who indulge in divination’s noble art tend to work in the very 
                                                        
1
 Mr. Clemens’ view on the matter was ‘Prophecy is a good line of business, but it is full of risks.’ 
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long term. There are, not surprisingly, exceptions to this general rule. The Sport of 
Kings – betting on horses, and its more demotic edition, betting on dogs – is one. It is 
short-term and, from this perspective, may perhaps be seen as applied divination. Like 
most things that migrate from theory to application, the risk as one does so rises 
enormously. For this reason, the natural operative span of the prophet lies in the long-
term. If the original utterance is remembered, so much the better. But the passing of 
anno domini serves all too often to absolve the utterer of all responsibility. This it does 
in two ways. First, there is the Ultimate Absolution of Responsibility that follows upon 
the utterer’s passing on to spheres higher – or lower – depending on one’s personal 
theology and the chaos particular utterances brought about. This is the secret of 
economic forecasting, as John Maynard Keynes (1923) knew full well. Death is the 
saving grace of the economist, if not always of his ideas – alas. 
 
The second saving grace for the prophet comes from within the corporation of prophets 
itself. Others have come along in the meantime and by grabbing the aforementioned 
obloquy, incredulity and martyrdom for themselves, lift them from the shoulders of the 
giants who precede them. In the world of academe, this is called ‘advancing the 
theory’. And from the perspective of the corporation of prophets, it is vital to ensuring 
the prophetic equivalence of a ‘high audience rating’. Those brought up in an earlier 
age will remember Elijah’s handing over his cloak to Elisha, which in a less God-
fearing and more evaluation, assessment and quality-conscious time will doubtless be 
construed as the young prophet’s being accredited by due authority to ‘go forth and 
prophesy’.  
 
Still, there are many gambits available to those active in the ‘vision business’, methods 
which, in the argot of the horse-racing man, allow them to ‘hedge their bets’. One 
gambit is to be downright apocalyptic. This is sometimes known in the trade as the 
‘Patmos Strategy’ so named after Saint John of Patmos. It is sometimes known as the 
‘Tactic Divine’ for Saint John was that as well. The second gambit is to construct 
impossible – or in default of impossibility, inspiring – utopias. If the first two fail, 
there is always a third; that is, to take refuge in a language that is down right obscure 
and leave the burden of interpretation to the individual who has been so incautious as 
to lend his or her ears. This latter has a familiar ring to those of a Classical education. 
It is the old scam – the Antique World’s edition of the confidence trick – perfected 
over centuries by the Pythonesse at Delphi whose trademark and some would say, 
methodology have been loaned for the occasion.  
Prophecy as a Serious Business 
If prophecy is a risky business, it is also from the prophet’s view of the world a serious 
one. All too often, prophecy is driven by deep discontent and by a sense of outrage. 
The shape of things to come – whether one turns to Isiah as a classic example of the 
prophet in residence or H.G. Wells as a latter-day fellow-traveller – is not simply an 
exercise in projective techniques, though as scholars, statisticians, futurologists or even 
policy analysts we can call upon a far greater range in the armoury of sophistication 
and techniques than Isiah had at his disposal, just as we may go beyond those 
techniques – rhetorical in the main – that Mark Twain so cuttingly dismissed. What 
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distinguishes the type of prophecy undertaken in celebration of CHEPS’ 20th summer 
from the rantings Twain savaged is precisely that CHEPS ‘brings the brain back in’. 
But this does not explain why prophecies have been made and needed throughout the 
ages. Still less their purpose. 
 
Prophecies tend to be made in strange spots and, as the Book says, by ‘voices, crying 
in the wilderness’. But they have a purpose and they have a context. Prophecies fulfill 
a number of important tasks. The first and most obvious is to break out of the routine 
constraints of the present, to move beyond those limitations of historic contingency, 
path dependency (to revert to some of our jargon), to step beyond from the geological 
pace of adaptation that structures, procedures – and let it be said, democracy as well – 
place upon the pure vision or the ultimate end toward which our efforts should be 
tending. This is prophecy as clarification – a term itself largely anachronistic, it is true 
– but that is one of the drawbacks of sustained metaphor, namely having to work 
across two domains which in appearance have only a tenuous relationship between 
them. Prophecy acting as clarification – or as revelation which makes it part of the 
Patmos gambit – serves to strengthen resolve amongst the Faithful, to inspire them to 
labour more strenuously for the clear and inspiring rewards that must come if only the 
Faithful persist. In this setting, the purpose of revelation lies most assuredly in the 
present, not the future. Goals are sharpened, resolve strengthened and hopefully one 
pushes forward a little: 
  
Through the night of doubt and sorrow 
Onward goes the pilgrim band, 
Singing songs of expectation 
Onward to the Promised Land 
 
But the ‘revelatory tradition’ of prophecy has another side to it. Rallying the Faithful 
through inspiration – what psychologists would term ‘positive reinforcement’– is not 
its only dimension. There is another genre and it has to do with ‘negative 
reinforcement’, effectively amending the error of one’s ways by projecting into the 
future what will happen if one continues to persist with present praxis. The first face of 
the ‘revelatory tradition’ drives by inspiration, literally enthusiasm – that is, in the 
literal meaning of the original Greek, infusing the individual with the divine spirit, 
with the presence of the gods. The second drives by fear. This particular genre is 
somewhat rarer in higher education policy, though some may care to debate the point 
whether it might indeed be less rare than one might think as the basic psychological 
instrument in the culture of evaluation, for example. It is far from being rare in other 
domains: for instance, in environmental affairs, where negative reinforcement is 
largely the predominant discourse. One has only to think of climate warming, the 
greenhouse effect and the use of fossil fuels to grasp that this prophetic style – the 
secular edition of the ‘Hellfire Sermon’ – is very far from dead.  
 
Prophecy as negative reinforcement is to be seen in higher education policy from time 
to time, largely in the form of opinion that dissents from policy during the phase of 
negotiation and implementation. Statements about the deterioration in the conditions of 
academic work, lamentations about the loss of national competitiveness, and – to make 
the obvious jeu de mots – jeremiads about the ravages of managerialism tend to fall 
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into this category though the luridness of the consequences more often than not tends 
to be implicit rather than painting an explicit vision of what flows from them.  Such 
representations rest upon the imperative that policy should be amended to avoid the 
vision unspeakable. They are an interesting instance of prophecy acting in the short 
term. Indeed, the very shortness of the time intervening between the prediction and the 
realisation of the unspeakable is often seen by those having recourse to such arguments 
as justifying in the first place the call for the rapid amending of ways or changing of 
policy.  
Prophecy and Utopia 
There is, however, a third variant, which falls into the second of the three categories I 
outlined earlier. This has to do with ‘inspiring Utopias’. Now the essential feature of 
Utopias in higher education, as Sheldon Rothblatt has argued with his customary 
brilliance and sparkle (Rothblatt, 2002) is their function as a social critique. In general, 
utopias are set in far-away places, largely isolated from the outside world. They are 
also explorations less of the way the present social order could be reconstructed so 
much as a vehicle for criticizing those particular features of it that the writer – or the 
prophet – deems undesirable or insufficiently underscored in the present. Thus, for 
instance, in the original of the genre, Thomas More’s Utopia, one of the main sources 
of its inspiration, was More’s abiding dislike of the acquisitive behaviour that marked 
16th century England. Amongst the other critiques that higher education’s equivalent 
of Utopias have developed have been gender relations, manpower planning, social 
structure and genetics, the classic form of the latter being Aldus Huxley’s Brave New 
World, and that other theme, that runs across the centuries from Plato to Newman – 
namely, the role of learning in securing social stability (Rothblatt, 2002). Utopias have 
less to do with direct predictions or approximations as to what will or might happen. 
They are in the literal sense of the word, inconsequential: they have no outcome. 
Rather their purpose is to pose questions that have not yet been broached. In doing so, 
they posit a situation and a frame so alien that they are not to be attained, nor are they 
attainable. Rather they may be seen as ‘thought experiments’ that draw attention to 
particular issues. Whether these issues are taken up subsequently, whether they then 
become part of that eternal question of change ‘How to move from what is to what 
ought to be’, is no concern of the seer, though it may become so for those for whom 
the vision appeals. 
The Place of the Pythonesse and Delphi 
The final strain in the functions of prophecy – the Delphic School – by contrast, does 
involve decisions and choice, whereas the Patmos strategy does not. If one looks 
carefully at the Patmos strategy, irrespective of whether it is grounded in positive 
reinforcement or negative reinforcement, it is not about choice between different 
courses of action – or options – so much as making sure that the Faithful follow the 
line the prophet has revealed.   
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The Pythonesse of Delphi, however, was nothing if not subtle. Prophecy in this mode 
was essentially ambiguous. It could be interpreted in many ways. Accordingly, the 
onus of deciding which interpretation was valid, rested with the supplicant, once he 
had puzzled out the different meanings and reviewed his own situation. Man might not 
be master of his own Fate, for the gods were nothing if not capricious. But the 
application of intelligence, rather than obedience, might sometimes serve to double-
guess and out-smart the worst of their intentions.  The Pythonesse put a premium not 
just on self-awareness, but also on cunning. 
The Place of Celebration 
When one places CHEPS’ celebratory romp against this backdrop of the various 
schools of divination and their purposes, clearly the fit is not an easy one. The 
scenarios are very far from being utopic in the sense that Rothblatt suggested. They are 
located in time, situated in place and though inventive in their imagination and 
imaginings, they provide a plausible connection between where we are and the paths, 
decisions and marker points that lie along the roads to Centralia, the City of the Sun, to 
Octavia the Spider-web City and to Vitis Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-
Climates. Suggestions are made, though they are more explicit in the first scenario than 
in the second and third about how we reached Jolly Old Europe. In the literature of 
Utopias, as Rothblatt pointed out, how Paradise is constructed over time, remains a 
mystery. It is there. How it got there is immaterial. It is this difference that makes the 
CHEPS scenarios marginal to the Utopian tradition, though it does not wholly exclude 
them from it. There is a second element that places a distance between the two. The 
scenarios do not contain an explicit critique of our present condition. They are, to put 
matters bluntly, an extrapolation from an accepted situation. They are neither a critique 
nor a problematique. And though one could indeed pore over the text to extract a 
critique from the social values and political assumptions that are set out in each 
scenario, this would be to place an interpretation on the exercise that it neither bears 
nor was meant to bear. 
 
It is no coincidence that of the four prophetic schools I mentioned, the closest 
correspondence both in purpose as well as the name of the methodology employed in 
this exercise lies with the school of Delphi. CHEPS’ scenarios can have no claim – and 
it has to be said that they never made in it the first place – to be considered as having 
even remote ties with the Tactic Divine in its purest form, though there are purposes 
which it fulfils that have a certain kinship with it. There is a very good reason for 
placing a considerable distance between the Patmos strategy and the European Higher 
Education and Research Landscape. This is because in academia, there is no place for 
revealed knowledge. Even so, these visions – all three of them – in varying degrees do 
have Utopic under-currents in the sense that they are, if not removed from reality, then 
recognizable as an extreme extrapolation of it. Still, though projected forward, certain 
dimensions – modes of course delivery, stratification between different types of 
university, the central place of management and the somewhat fragmented – which is 
less brutal than battered – place of teaching staff, remain recognizable on the basis of 
what we know of current trends. Purists and those who do not look upon such 
developments with great gladness of heart, will point out of course that some of these 
Neave 
 
108 
projected developments are strictly speaking better qualified as ‘dystopic’ rather than 
‘utopic’; that is, they anticipate not a happy scene so much as a distressing one 
(Rothblatt, 2003). Each to his – or her – own opinion.  
The Significance of Scenarios 
There is much that is of value in such an exercise, even if as scholars and students of 
higher education we know all too well that the road even to relatively simple visions of 
a near future is never straight and rarely turns out as the prophet – or those having 
power – would have it.  And there we have a clue to the appeal that lies in drawing up 
what is best described as a series of ‘idealised alternatives’. For although the Delphi 
technique does not make a complete break with quantification – indeed, it is to some 
degree built on it – it is nevertheless a step beyond quantification. It has recourse to 
those elements of scholarship that, if not to the fore in the way we go about our work, 
are nevertheless present. Those elements are intuition, insight, the post-rational even. 
A number of arguments can be adduced for using this unusual approach. A particularly 
good case could be built which takes as its point of departure the speed of change 
itself. We have still to ascertain how well higher education institutions cope with 
change as a constant feature though the lesser prophets of the hour have predicted that 
if universities do not cope, they will not survive (Duderstadt, 1999). 
 
As a Centre, we have looked at the individual dimensions – governance, management, 
finance, student costs, academic work, institutional performance and output, to 
mention some of our feats of arms. But these have been studied largely in an 
immediate context either to enable others to narrow their options with a view toward 
acting later or to show what the consequences are or the outcome is, plotted against the 
original intent. As an alternative, we contribute to the instrumentality for scrutinizing 
the ability of institutions to meet change and weigh the sensitivity of these proposed 
indicators. We have yet to express any studied opinion about the effects these changes 
will have when they operate in conjunction. We tend to examine each aspect 
separately. And, furthermore, we also tend to leave aside the conditions of their 
sustainability when set against the sustained performance of the institution. We assume 
somehow that higher education will cope with change and that those which do not pay 
the price of an unidentified and generally presumed incompetence. Though it has to be 
said that the study of ‘failing institutions’ could well furnish interesting insights into 
the general issue of adaptation to change as our study of those successful – perhaps 
more so.  
Change, Prophecy and the Higher Education Community 
The logic of the acceleration of change – and leaving aside the acceleration of 
knowledge itself, poses a certain number of – shall we say, ‘existential problems’ – for 
the higher education research community. The first and obvious point is that as change 
speeds up so as scholars in the field we may know more about higher education, but 
what we know is more rapidly dated. Certainly, our techniques and analyses advance 
our knowledge and the knowledge of others who rely on us. And in that sense, both we 
– and they – progress in understanding. But the question remains whether such 
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advance serves to close the gap between what we analyse and what is taking place 
before our eyes. Or whether the pace of change serves to make the gap wider. In 
conditions such as these, forward projection – prophecy by another name – serves a 
number of purposes. First of all, it provides the opportunity of setting the ‘tyranny of 
the present’ in perspective. By projecting forward, we oblige ourselves to undertake a 
species of synthesis, which is very often denied when working within the conventions 
that accompany our various disciplines, domains or fields of expertise. In effect, when 
we embark on long-range scenario building, we stand the interplay between expertise, 
the corpus of our special knowledge and imagination on their heads. Working within 
the canons of a particular body of knowledge demands that we limit our imagination 
and hold it in reign to the techniques and methodologies of our particular personal 
discipline. Forward projection, by contrast, invites us to place those same techniques 
and methodologies at the service of our imagination.  That is the condition of the 
intuitive great leap forward. Thus, in reply to Mr. Clemens’ bromides, the CHEPS 
version of prophecy engages the brain very actively – and indeed many brains. It may 
not be the same part of the brain as those regions where analytic capacity is located. 
Imagination, some hold, dwells in the left hemisphere rather than the right. But the 
organ plays its part, even so. 
Benefits Bestowed by Building Scenarios 
There are also other benefits to be had.  In scenario-building, we set ourselves the task 
of creating a coherence into our different fields, juxtaposing them one against the 
other. The act of constructing both coherence and synthesis for the future has a ‘fall 
out’ on the present. We see how our different disciplines and fields contribute to the 
constitution of a whole vision, as opposed to our daily use of them to examine the 
individual facets it contains. By building ‘a whole vision’, we obtain some insight 
about the way different disciplinary perspectives may fit together or act in complement 
to one another. Creating a ‘rounded vision’ is arguably of especial importance, given 
the natural trend of ‘disciplines’ to fragment – a process that Walter Metzger (1987) 
termed ‘subject parturition’. Projecting coherence into the future is then of special 
significance to the domain that studies higher education.  It is important because that 
domain is already so deeply fragmented that exercises in cohesion – even if projected – 
provide a counterweight to the fragmentation that is our daily lot and on that account 
have an indispensable part in creating an awareness of the scope of the domain when 
different disciplines and perspectives are brought together.  Paradoxically, scenario-
building thus serves – and here I too am ‘hedging my bets’– to improve what the 
military call ‘situational awareness’ in the present.  Seen from this perspective – which 
attends less to the nature of the prophetic utterance or to the specific image or vision it 
entails than to the function it performs for those carrying it out – forward projection 
contributes to reaffirming both the significance of what one is doing as well as 
reinforcing the common identity of those doing it.  
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The Immediate Significance of the Three Cities 
In this sense therefore, the very creation of the three Cities of Learning itself fulfils a 
role not greatly dissimilar to that of the Tactic Divine, in its positive capacity. It 
reinforces both the collective determination as well as the place of the individual as a 
practitioner and exponent of a particular discipline or as actor in a particular domain. 
Forward projection is not simply about how we see the future. It is also a statement of 
how we view ourselves today, how we work together. The scenario of the future is at 
the same time a statement of present identity. 
 
This latent function of ‘vision-building’ in higher education is, or so I consider it, of 
very special importance for the fields of study that bear on higher education and on 
higher education policy. The reasons for this assertion are both structural and 
conjunctural. In the structural domain, the study of higher education stands as the 
supreme example of multi-disciplinarity. Fifteen years ago, Tony Becher (1992) 
identified some twenty ‘feeder’ fields. Others have evolved since. With such a wealth 
of perspectives on which to draw and, which are also characterised by the rapid 
development of new ones – evaluation studies, internationalisation, accreditation, to 
mention but a few – the sheer variety is often an obstacle to being able to claim a 
specific and recognised intellectual identity. The second reason is simply to re-state the 
same thing but drawing on a different area of representation and depiction to justify it. 
This second area has to do with the depth in the changes that are settling around the 
institution of higher education.  
Moving the Metaphor: or, Beyond Statistics 
It is the basic and constant belief of every generation in industrial society that it lives 
through changes more radical and far-reaching than its parents ever did. And much of 
the effort of scholarship in the social sciences has been directed towards devising ways 
of testing, plotting and substantiating that claim. Higher education is no exception. 
Today, many of the most powerful ways of registering change are based on 
quantification and they have varying degrees of appropriateness, sensitivity and 
relevance. There are, however, other indicative forms apart from statistical indicators. 
One of the most interesting, though very little used, is the shift in metaphor to illustrate 
changes in social perception. It is an approach rarely used in higher education for the 
obvious fact that if linguistic analysis is certainly part of those fields that may 
occasionally shed light on our quasi-penumbra, it is not in the mainstream of the social 
sciences and rarely is to be seen wandering around our neck of the woods in Academe.  
 
We are all aware of this shift in metaphor if only because we deal with it and are 
engaged in analysing the very changes that have brought it about and which, in its turn, 
it brings about. No-one in higher education can fail to be aware of ‘metaphor shift’ 
even though it tends to parade under different flags. Metaphor shift is seen in the re-
designation of Vice Chancellors and Rectors as Chief Executive Officers, of students 
as ‘consumers’, administrators as ‘managers’, with everyone from governments 
through to alumni and sponsors lumped together as ‘Stakeholders’. Perhaps most 
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wounding of all is the metamorphosis, fragmentation and forcible ejection of Faculty 
or academic staff from the heights of Donnish Dominion down into a general, quasi-
proletarian and definitely subterranean category described as ‘knowledge workers’, the 
whole accompanied by a mealy-mouthed jargon, variously culled from writings on 
‘Human Resources’, private business practice and management gobbledegook (Fuller, 
in press). The shift can be described in terms many and various: as part of that long-
drawn-out historical process that has been going on for the best part of two centuries or 
more in Europe – namely the désacralisation of knowledge and of its institutions; or in 
more immediate and contemporary terms, as the central process in the drive towards 
the so-called Knowledge Economy; alternatively, as one of the stages that mark higher 
education’s assimilation into ‘the market’ and the subsequent commodification of 
knowledge. You pays your money and you takes your perspective. 
Balancing Metaphors Ancient and Modern 
Given the power that changes in terminology have in shaping the way activities and 
functions are perceived and understood, the basic metaphor on which the three CHEPS 
scenarios have been erected, it is of more than passing interest.  The vision CHEPS 
builds is not simply a projection forward of current trends already rooted in the new 
imagining and in the new ‘human resources’ discourse. It is also grounded in a very 
traditional ‘framing metaphor’ – that of the City. The use of the City as a metaphor for 
the university – and, by extension, for the higher education system – is a very old and 
respectable literary conceit. In choosing it, CHEPS reminds us that the City – like the 
university itself – was from the earliest times the symbol of freedom. One has only to 
recall to mind the German proverb ‘Stadtluft macht frei’ for this particular association 
to be born out. The City was also the place where two contradictory forces in human 
affairs – continuity and change – were played out, shaped the polity and did so in ways 
occasionally urbane (Neave, 2005). 
 
Interesting debates can be had over the precise moment when the purpose of the 
university was re-defined less in terms of ‘continuity and change’ which contains a 
number of very specific presumptions about the university’s role in society, and the 
moment when that basic vision moved on to the no less subtle combination of 
‘continuity in the midst of change’ which has equally fundamental consequences for 
the purpose of both system and institution.2 What we can say with little fear of 
contradiction is that these self-same forces of continuity combined with change also 
brought the university down from its status as ‘the City on the Hill’ – itself a metaphor 
striking on account of its overt religious connotations – and, as Clark Kerr noted with 
insight and eloquence more than forty years ago, brought the university into the City 
and imposed on the university the industrialised form of the multi-versity (Kerr, 1964).  
                                                        
2
 I have explored the interplay between these two conditions in the seminar dedicated to celebrating 
the life work of our good friend, Maurice Kogan (Neave, 2005).  
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The Garden of Delight 
The City is not the only enduring metaphor. There is another. It too is variously woven 
into the three scenarios. It was singularly influential in shaping the 18th and 19th 
century university both in the United Kingdom and the United States. It is a theme that 
once again has been pursued with deftness and sensitivity by Sheldon Rothblatt (1998). 
This is the horticultural metaphor of the university and its functions. Indeed, the 
University as a Garden of Delight, which is what Eden signifies in the Hebrew, brings 
together both the most ancient images – prelapsarian – in both theology and in 
education (for Paradise Lost was nothing if not a supremely pedagogic experience, 
indeed it was the very first in an infinite trail of moral tales) which subsequently made 
its way into the history of the University (Ruegg and De Ridder Simoens, 1992). The 
horticultural metaphor played its particular part in shaping both the vision of higher 
learning and very often, its physical siting. The green field campus which is in effect a 
Lapalissade – an oxymoron – since campus in Latin means field – has been immensely 
influential shaping those systems of higher education where students are seen as 
adolescents – as young people in need of protection from the wiles and temptations of 
this world (Rothblatt, 1998). By the same token, those cultures in which students were 
held to be fully mature and self guided – in a word, autonomous – tended to place their 
universities in the heart of cities, on the contrary assumption that it was necessary for 
future leaders to be in direct contact with the society they would eventually lead.  
Whether by endorsement or denial, however, the horticultural metaphor – symbolic of 
an enclosed, organic, self-sustaining community – has long been used to describe ideal 
institutional and organisational forms from the Old Testament through to Hieronymus 
Bosche and beyond. 
 
As an aside, it is surely paradoxical to say the least that CHEPS’ should so resolutely 
woo the urban metaphor for in truth, the University of Twente is the only Dutch 
university to be set in a garden. We can then, like Falstaff, ‘babble of green fields’ and 
do so with considerable justification. And though these scenarios have been 
constructed around the urban metaphor, it is also a matter of record that an earlier 
episode in scenario-building on the future of higher education in the Netherlands saw 
CHEPS cultivating the horticultural metaphor with equal vigour (Huisman, 
Westerheijden & de Boer, 2001). 
Expropriating the Garden 
Whilst the garden remained a symbol of purity and innocence, it was also a symbol of 
detachment from the things of this world. The Garden beyond the City – or even the 
Garden within the City for that matter – has, to all intents and purposes, vanished as a 
symbol of the university in mainland Europe. It still retains its power, however, in 
what is perhaps erroneously called the ‘Anglo-Saxon world’ where today it plays a 
slightly different role – that of being a final expression confirming another version of 
institutional stratification. In a world where the relationship between University and 
Society is increasingly based on the principle of integration, of closer links between 
the two, the horticultural metaphor can apply only to certain establishments. Thus, the 
Garden becomes not a shared construct so much as a construct that sets those grounded 
in it, apart from the rest. It is no longer a shared ideal but a statement of difference. 
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More to the point, the metaphor is knowingly used to uphold that difference and very 
particularly so when it combines with an elite status. Thus, the outward constancy of 
the metaphor itself hides a shift in the associations, sous-entendus and connotations 
within it.  
 
The shift within the metaphor is most evident in precisely those systems where the 
‘marketisation’ of higher education stands at its most advanced – that is, in the Anglo- 
Saxon systems – the United States, the United Kingdom and above all, as an example 
of the offspring overtaking its ancestors – Australia. In a world where competition is 
fought out through images and symbols, that of the Campus as Garden assumes a new 
weight in projecting a specific elite appeal, setting those able to sustain it, off and apart 
from the urbanised and universal segments of the higher education system that the 
three scenarios anticipate, though developing along different paths. The symbol of the 
university qua Garden is then an interesting pointer to the changing function of a 
particular metaphor, which outwardly seems to derive from continuity between certain 
modern elite universities and the stereotype of a pre-industrial Arcadia, but in fact 
serves a very different purpose. Hence, whilst there are neo-Arcadians as a political 
party in Centralia, the City of bureaucracy triumphant, I am by no means sure that 
Arcadia as an image for ‘selling’ high quality learning will either desert Academia, 
still less be relegated to irrelevance. Quite the contrary. 
Leaning on the Ivory Tower 
Yet, the Garden metaphor is not the only one to suffer from ‘epistemic drift’. That 
trusty cliché – which is a metaphor worn down to the bleeding gums – of academia as 
an Ivory Tower has been subject to similar reworking since its first usage by Wilhelm 
von Humboldt (Nybom, 2003) as indeed, in certain quarters has the notion of the 
‘Humboldtian University’ (Varia, 2004). Rather than being conditions to ensure the 
impartial and sceptical nature of academic work – of distance and time placed between 
the individual academic and outside society – these very same expressions are today 
associated with overtones of detachment qua institutional irresponsibility, of individual 
self-indulgence, social futility, pedagogic irrelevance and undesirable on all those 
counts. Indeed, if we look very closely at the situation portrayed in all three of our 
scenarios, it is clear that we have, in a manner of speaking, come full cycle.  For just as 
the Ivory Tower no longer stands as an expression of the desirable – quite the contrary, 
it is more often than not highly pejorative in its current usage – so the city has changed 
its status. In all three of the CHEPS scenarios, the city and the university are 
inseparable. Effectively, in Vitis Vinifera, the former has wholly engulfed the latter. Its 
singularities have been absorbed and dispersed across an immense, ephemeral and 
basically anarchic social construct. The University is no longer the city come down 
from the hill. Rather, it has been ingested by the city. It has become symbiote of 
service to the city rather than an institution possessing a particular and definite 
identity. 
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Envoi 
It is precisely when long-accepted metaphors begin to acquire different overlays, to 
convey an image and a meaning at odds with what was previously conveyed that we 
need to have some idea where we may be going. Or at the very least to have some 
insight into the range of probable alternatives that deserve scrutiny. Precisely why 
higher education stands to benefit from this perhaps more than other domains, I have 
argued earlier. Presenting such alternatives – however idealised they are – serves 
another purpose and that is to show very precisely that policy ought not to rely on 
single track solutions – or to take refuge in the cry of the unimaginative that there is in 
essence, no alternative. We may not be clear about where we are going and even less 
sure about how we will get there. But the willingness to contemplate alternatives that 
could arise from our present condition makes us aware that accepting today’s orthodox 
account is in all probability neither necessary nor very wise. In short, it is precisely 
when metaphors begin to change their inner reference points that prophets come into 
their own. They force us to go beyond the routine of the moment. Even if their visions 
are apocalyptic, an exaggeration or even a pastiche of what we perceive as possible 
from our own appreciation of the condition in which we find ourselves, we find 
ourselves obliged to contemplate alternative possibilities. And that is indeed the 
serious business if not of prophesying then very certainly of scenario-building. 
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Scenarios for Policy 
How should scenario writers put down on paper their vision of the future for higher 
education to ensure policymakers are irresistibly tempted to incorporate this vision in 
their policy documents? This is the question we want to explore in this chapter. 
 
Compilers of future scenarios get a great deal of creative satisfaction from them. The 
way in which the events in Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera were presented at the 
CHEPS anniversary in September 2004 is a good example. It is an intellectual 
challenge to consider the consequences of developments, some of which you can 
already see happening and some of which are to be expected. The science of devising 
scenarios has developed considerably in the past decades. This is apparent if we re-
read past scenarios and compare them with current reality: 
 
• In 1965 the Rand Corporation asked the opinion of 150 experts as to expected 
scientific breakthroughs (Gorton & Helmer, 1965). Some of them have happened 
(such as the moon landings), whilst others failed to materialise (like the Mars 
landing in 1984 and operational nuclear fusion as a source of energy between 1980 
and 2000), and many long-term predictions now only serve to bring a smile to our 
lips.  
• In 1972 the Club of Rome published scenarios for raw materials, the environment 
and overpopulation, which suggested the world would be in a disastrous state by 
the year 2005 if current developments continued unhampered (Meadow, et al., 
1972). 
 
Scenario thinkers no longer work in this way. Generally they do not just present us 
with one particular future but a series of alternatives, all of which have a certain 
plausibility. This applies quite clearly to the CHEPS scenarios. Do such creative  
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products help us in formulating new policies? Does it suffice to say that, on the whole, 
all of the options are possible and current policy is already taking them into account 
these possibilities?  
Links for Policy  
A vision of the future which clearly offers something for policymakers to consider, in 
this case university administrators, can be found in an article entitled Dealing With the 
Future Now by Alan Guskin and Mary Marcy (2003). They work out a number of 
principles for a vital university campus in a climate of restricted financial resources. 
Their scenario is very simple: university budgets are under pressure and this is not a 
temporary problem. The economic boom around the turn of the century disguised this 
fact for a few years, but recession has again exposed the problems: society needs and 
will continue to need a lot of money for things other than higher education, such as 
health care, while tax revenue is diminishing. Universities can respond by muddling 
through, the motto being ‘this too will pass’. But universities can also realise that it is a 
long-term problem that needs a long-term solution and reform themselves accordingly. 
It is for those who realise this that Guskin and Marcy present three organisational 
principles and seven transformational actions for providing a first-rate education at less 
expense per student using new technology, abandoning the idea that education 
involves a teacher standing in front of a class. 
 
• Organising Principle I: Create a clear and coherent vision of the future 
 focused on student learning, quality of faculty work life and reduced cost per 
 student. 
• Organising Principle II: Transform the educational delivery system  consistent 
 with the vision of the future: 
o Transformative action 1: establish and assess institution-wide common 
student learning outcomes as a basis for the undergraduate degree 
o Transformative action 2: restructure the role of faculty to include faculty 
members and other campus professionals as partners in student learning, 
while integrating technology 
o Transformative action 3: recognise and integrate student learning from all 
sources 
o Transformative action 4: audit and restructure curricula to focus on essential 
academic programmes and curricular offering 
• Organising principle III: transform the organisational systems consistent with 
 the vision of the future: 
o Transformative action 5: utilize zero-based budgeting to audit and redesign 
the budget allocation process, involving faculty and staff as responsible 
partners 
o Transformative action 6: audit and restructure administrative and student 
services systems, using technology and integrated staffing arrangements to 
reduce costs 
o Transformative action 7: audit and redesign technological and staff 
infrastructure to support transformational change. 
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This is an example of a simple scenario with a high degree of probability which results 
in a number of specific recommendations for universities that do not wish to simply 
muddle through. A scenario for higher education which is of help to policymakers in 
their work will give tentative answers to the questions confronting them. Such a 
scenario might indicate adequate organisational principles and actions for a national 
government to undertake in order to develop a system of higher education that satisfies 
the need for a well-educated workforce, without additional strains being placed on 
public funds.  
Scenarios for Higher Education: a Small Tour 
A scenario is not a forecast but a description of how the world could look if certain 
already observable developments were to continue in a certain way. With the 
knowledge we already have, some scenarios can be regarded as being less likely than 
others, but that knowledge can become rapidly outdated. Some scenarios may be less 
desirable than others in the current political constellation, but this constellation could 
change within a few years.  
 
Literature and the internet are full of scenarios on how the world will look in general 
and on the role of universities in society. The power of scenarios lies in thinking 
through trends and providing footholds to thwart or reduce the effects of certain trends 
through policy. The weakness of scenarios lies in the near impossibility of anticipating 
trend-breaking developments. This is obvious when we re-read past scenarios 
(Dijkstra, 2002). Twenty years ago scenarios were already dominated by the 
repercussions of information technology. Even so, those scenarios failed to forecast the 
developments happening right now. The far-reaching possibilities of combining 
computers and telecommunications were not foreseen. People talked about IT, but not 
about ICT and despite many IT scenarios the development of the internet took the 
world completely by surprise within the space of five years.  
Intermezzo: Trends in the Naming of Scenarios 
Up to a few years ago there was often a clear connection between the name of a 
scenario and the principles on which it was based. Names such as ‘Divided Europe’, 
‘European coordination’ or ‘Global competition’ (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek & 
Centraal Planbureau, 1997) left no-one in any doubt. The scenarios encountered in 
current literature have more creative names, as the following list illustrates.  
 
Names of recent scenarios 
• Warehouse A&M (National Education Association, 2005) 
• MacCollege Inc. (National Education Association, 2005) 
• Cutting Edge University. (National Education Association,  2005) 
• Pax Americana (National Intelligence Council, 2004) 
• A new caliphate (National Intelligence Council, 2004) 
• Cycle of fear (National Intelligence Council, 2004) 
• Centralia, the City of the Sun (see chapter 4) 
• Octavia, the Spider-web City (see chapter 5) 
• Vitis Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-Climates (see chapter 6) 
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• Common Ground (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003) 
• Survival of the fittest (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003) 
• Tempestuous times (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003) 
• Worlds apart (Mowat, Purdy & Adams, 2003) 
• The golden Triangle (www.futurestudies.co.uk) 
• On the Edge (www.futurestudies.co.uk) 
• The last Castle (www.futurestudies.co.uk) 
• Drowning Spires (www.futurestudies.co.uk) 
 
The general scenarios for global development are above all concerned with the contrast 
between an open and liberalised world market on the one hand and protectionism and 
government regulation on the other. Other items of interest to scenario writers are 
technological progress, economic growth, the worldwide distribution of wealth and 
developments in the field of energy supply, climate and the environment.  
Higher Education 
Market forces mass participation, quality and excellence, and the impact of ICT 
currently dominate scenario studies on higher education. 
Market Forces  
Many scenarios are based on a development towards less public money for higher 
education, a lower share of the national income and government policy driven more by 
the philosophy of usefulness and legitimacy, so that higher education will become 
more dependent on other sources of finance. These are matters one reads about in 
scenarios dating back ten or twenty years. With the knowledge we now have these still 
maintain a high reality content. The growing costs of health care, safety and pensions 
mean higher education is encountering serious competition from other demands on the 
government budget. But let’s not exaggerate. The budget for higher education in the 
Netherlands in real terms has not fallen in the last twenty years as much as some think. 
In the current governing agreement one can even see an increase of investment in the 
knowledge infrastructure. It is also a distinct possibility future European governments 
will also see the importance of knowledge to the economies of their countries, 
especially now so much production has relocated to low wage countries.  
Mass Participation  
Governments in many different European countries are aiming to increase higher 
education participation. The Dutch Governments’ Higher Education and Research Plan 
2004, following in the wake of Sweden and the UK, aims at 50% participation by 
2010. This is the figure on which many scenarios are based. The combination of 
expected budgetary restrictions and quality improvement necessitated by global 
competition makes innovative improvements in education indispensable. ICT is the 
key to this.  
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Quality and Excellence 
Higher education in the Netherlands has traditionally been a landscape where one did 
not refer to institutions which stood out above the rest, if there were any. The 
probability of the development of leading institutions has consequently been relatively 
underestimated in scenario studies in the last twenty years and even now attempts to 
rank excellence in higher education provoke strong reactions in university circles.  
The Impact of ICT 
Most scenario writers and the respondents on whom they base their findings are 
convinced the nature of education and research will change dramatically now higher 
education is becoming less tied to time and place, resulting in universities becoming 
both physical and virtual campuses. Nevertheless, the desirability of this development 
is not always appreciated. Should universities remain the physical place where 
teaching staff and students meet, creating, in mutual interaction, the foundations for the 
knowledge society? 
Policymakers of Today and Higher Education in 2020 
There are enough scenarios for higher education in 2012 or 2020 but what can 
policymakers do with them?  
 
In the last section of this contribution we want to explore the obstacles they encounter 
in drafting long term policies. The main obstacles are the dominance of the short term 
(that is to say, the period for which a governing agreement applies) and the dominance 
of existing policy or ideas. The scenario maker who wants to exert an influence would 
do well to realise this and make recommendations policymakers can use within the 
term of a governing agreement, and which are so well-founded that given existing 
ideas they cannot be peremptorily disregarded.  
Dominance of the Short Term 
A governing agreement is drawn up for a period of four years after the elections have 
taken place. The outcome of the elections cannot be predicted several years in advance 
nor be directly influenced by policymakers. Consequently the governing agreement 
drafted after elections is not predictable either. The impact of policymakers on the 
governing agreement is very limited. In the months prior to forming a government civil 
servants make recommendations, files are compiled and priorities and lesser priorities 
are proposed, but the ultimate impact of these on a governing agreement is very much 
a moot point. So although a governing agreement only covers a period of four years it 
is expected that both the government and its policymakers look much further ahead, 
and this is in fact what happens. Virtually every government arranges a number of 
structural matters for higher education, the impact of which is felt much longer than 
the four years during which that government is in office. The implementation of the 
bachelor/master structure by the then Education minister Mr Hermans in 2002 was 
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intended to affect the structure of higher education for several decades and to link up 
with a broad development throughout Europe. The new Higher Education Act, on 
which the present government is working, will also determine higher education 
development for many years to come. A subsequent government may introduce further 
pieces of legislation but the main points are expected to become law in 2007.  
Dominance of Existing Policy and Existing Ideas 
There is a tendency to take a defensive attitude towards new information and come up 
with reasons why the information should not result in changes to existing policy. This 
can be done through showing the new information is not relevant to existing policy,  
disputing its quality or mentioning factors which have not been taken into account, 
through suggesting the research is based on obsolete data (on the assumption the world 
has changed completely), that methods are not described, justification is lacking, 
sources are not mentioned, etc. New information is always viewed against the 
background of information already known and on which current policy has been based. 
Information is only very rarely really new. Usually there is a great deal of information 
about related subjects and it is hardly ever identical and without controversy. 
Arguments for ignoring new information therefore are legion.  
Getting beyond the Issues of the Day 
We can see from the above that a government is indeed capable of having an impact on 
higher education for a period of time longer than its term of office. With a future 
vision, supported by scenarios based on thorough research which cannot be dismissed 
out of hand on the basis of existing ideas, a scenario writer can help the policymaker 
confront the longer term in a realistic way. A combination of the CHEPS approach to 
the scenarios and policy recommendations made by Guskin and Mary could very well 
be useful to our policymakers.  
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 10 A Response to the CHEPS Scenarios on Higher 
 Education and Research in 2020 
Guy Haug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have been invited to react to the three scenarios for European higher education and 
research in 2020 designed by CHEPS. I am pleased to do so, not officially on behalf of 
the European Commission, but more modestly as an expert who has been involved for 
some time in the process of prospective analysis and change planning in these areas 
and may therefore have some insight on the issue. 
 
Let me first thank CHEPS for offering us a new, different, specific and refreshing 
approach to the issues involved. I think we need these kind of studies, with a clearly 
prospective dimension, but without too prescriptive conclusions. CHEPS sketches 
three different ways into the medium term (2020) future, but leaves the choice between 
them rather open.  
The CHEPS Scenarios in Context 
There is one specific reason why the CHEPS scenarios are particularly interesting. I 
read them in combination with the outcomes of the consultation of stakeholders 
launched by the Commission’s Communication on ‘The role of universities in the 
Europe of knowledge’ (Communication of the European Commission, 2003) of last 
year. The more than 150 responses from European and national associations and 
institutions cover in essence the same questions as the CHEPS research but from a 
different perspective.  
 
It seems to me also interesting – and important – to read the CHEPS scenarios together 
with the EU policy agenda with respect to higher education and research – naturally in 
full compliance with the subsidiarity principle. In addition to the intergovernmental 
Bologna process, there is now also an agenda for change in higher education, research 
and innovation as part of the EU’s overall Lisbon Strategy. The decisive role of  
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universities has been acknowledged ever more clearly in recent years and we now have 
in the EU context, for the first time ever, a situation where national educational 
authorities are committed to make their policies converge towards a number of shared 
European goals. This is bound to shape the future scenarios – probably all of them – at 
least to a certain extent. 
Specific Comments on the Three Scenarios  
How Mutually Exclusive are the Three Scenarios? 
In my reading of the three scenarios, the first one is centred on the role of the state 
(with questions about the extent of the deregulation, which in many European 
countries is unlikely to go beyond certain limits), the second is mainly focused on 
higher education institutions (HEI) and stresses the balance between the forces of 
tradition and those of change, and the third is mainly shaped by the market. 
 
I appreciate that for the sake of identifying and differentiating scenarios this kind of 
‘trichotomy’ may intellectually be very tempting and illustrative. Yet, the most likely 
seems to me that the future will be shaped precisely by the power game between these 
three poles. This interaction will almost certainly be different in different countries or 
even regions in Europe, as well as over time (I can easily imagine that after a period of 
change in one of the three directions, there will be a reaction resulting in a move to one 
of the other poles). I also believe all scenarios will be influenced by the overall pace 
and direction of the process of European integration in the years ahead. I would have 
liked to see a clearer reference to this specifically European background – whereas the 
three basic scenarios as they stand could have been designed and could apply in any 
continent or country in the world. Another angle from which this could be expressed 
would be to say the transition from the current situation to any of those envisaged for 
2020 is likely to be a rather chaotic process, not a straight move in the direction of any 
of the three scenarios. 
The Scenarios have much in Common – even though these Common Trends or Factors 
would of course Apply in different Contexts and to Varying Degrees. 
Trend towards diversification/stratification:  
 
This trend is likely to be a common feature in all scenarios, even though it may be 
acknowledged or organised in many different ways. For example, the way in which 
quality assurance and/or accreditation are organised could push or inhibit this trend in 
each of the scenarios. Other factors that may shape differentiation are the role and 
status of the non-university (colleges/polytechnic) sector, language policies 
emphasising diversity or favouring English as a common denominator, and the more or 
less strong push and support for Bologna reforms in government and university circles. 
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HEI management:  
 
The importance of HEI management is another dimension common to all three 
scenarios; coping with state and market is an important function with an immediate 
impact on quality, relevance and responsiveness, differentiation in terms of  mission 
and priorities, management of change and of communication, development of talent 
and of leadership, etc. 
 
Multiple source funding:  
 
It seems to me very likely that whatever the dominant scenario over the next 10-15 
years becomes, the trend towards a much greater diversification of funding will be 
unavoidable; the current dependency on state funding of universities in many European 
countries is likely to become less and less viable, while at the same time the 
contribution of industry, foundations, families is likely to grow in all scenarios for 
economic as well as social and political reasons.   
 
Importance of networks:  
 
This is another factor likely to be common to all scenarios; networking in the European 
higher education area is – and will in all probability remain – key for quality and 
excellence as well as for integration in the mainstream of modernisation in European 
higher education. 
 
Internationalisation:  
 
The trends towards Europeanisation and internationalisation has been a dominant 
feature in European higher education over the last decade; it will not stop and should in 
my view have been taken into account more clearly in the definition of all three 
scenarios. 
 
Regional imbalance:  
 
The already quite concerning imbalance in the development and ‘level’ of higher 
education between countries and regions in Europe is almost certain to increase in the 
years ahead. Even strong political will and investment will find it difficult to 
counteract this deep-rooted trend. I also believe we will see stronger competition, not 
only between HEIs, but between systems and sub-systems of higher education.    
Comparison of the Scenarios with the outcomes of the Consultation 
I would like to briefly underline three quite conspicuous differences in emphasis of the 
scenarios and the stakeholders consultation. 
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Higher education as a ‘public good’, or in a smoother way as a ‘public responsibility’, 
is much more strongly emphasised in the consultation than the scenarios, including 
Centralia; this may be just a consequence of the limited importance paid in the 
scenarios to what is specifically European. 
Strong expectations from Europe: one of the strongest messages emerging from the 
consultation of stakeholders (as well as from more recent discussions at European 
level) is that universities expect a great deal from Europe; they call for more initiatives 
and support (in terms of policy and funding) from the EU, and this call is usually 
coupled with a demand for less inhibiting national regulations; such regulations tend to 
be seen more and more as holding universities back in their efforts to adapt to new 
circumstances and prepare for the future. I think it would have been interesting for the 
scenarios to pay attention to this, and maybe to distinguish in Centralia between the 
various ‘state’ circles (regions, countries, EU). In the same way, in the other two 
scenarios, this leads back to HEI governance as a key issue. 
In the opposite direction, I have the impression that competition with the US, which 
tends to be overstated in the consultation and maybe the Communication itself, is not 
present in any of the three scenarios; one explanation might be the scenarios do not 
really consider the specifically European dimension of the issues involved (global 
competition, brain drain, impact of universities on growth, etc); another that the global 
challenges are more diffused (with mounting challenges coming e.g. from Asia) than 
assumed in the Commission’s Communication of 2003. 
A Useful and Timely Prospective View 
The above comments are not meant to diminish the value or timeliness of the study 
carried out by CHEPS or of the conclusions that can be drawn from it. The scenarios 
cast light on some fundamental trends that will be at play in European higher education 
and research in the coming years and possibly decades that lie ahead. My main purpose 
is to comment on the interpretation of the scenarios and the possibilities to use them 
for policy making and shaping. From this perspective, I would like to emphasise that 
the CHEPS study and its three scenarios will provide a useful and timely input to the 
indispensable policy debate that needs to underpin the creation of the European Higher 
Education Area and the European Research Area. 
 
I mentioned in my introduction that policy making at European level would be well 
inspired to have a close look at the scenarios (all of them) in parallel with other 
prospective studies such as on the research and innovation function of universities 
(STRATA-ETAN Group, 2002; High Level Expert Group, 2003), on the development 
of ‘human capital’ for the knowledge society and the globalisation era, or on funding 
issues. 
 
I am quite convinced the scenarios will be useful for informing the ongoing 
discussions on such key issues as quality/attractiveness, HEI and system governance, 
the consequences of under-funding and the importance of mobilising new sources of 
funding (see European Commission, 2005). 
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For this exercise, as well as for similar analyses and policy considerations at national, 
regional and institutional level, the CHEPS research is likely to provide useful food for 
thought for quite some time to come. Paradoxically, the highest value may be found 
not so much in the three scenarios, which are by necessity an over-simplified 
representation of fundamental trends, but in the facts gathered to draw them up: in 
addition to the scenarios, the CHEPS study also served to identify and to illustrate a 
number of situations and developments which European universities find desirable, 
which they fear and which they expect. These observations are directly relevant to 
policy thinking and making. I was in particular fascinated by the analysis of those 
areas where there are huge differences between how desirable or threatening and how 
likely certain developments are seen by the higher education community (see chapter 
3).  
 
To conclude, let me express my appreciation and my gratitude to all those who 
contributed to the CHEPS scenarios. 
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 11 Two Rival Forms of Scenario 
Ronald Barnett 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constrained and Constraining 
What might be plausible scenarios for the European higher education and research 
landscapes in 2020? We should, of course, distinguish two kinds of scenario: those that 
fall within a horizon of expectations; and those that fall within a horizon of aspirations. 
These two horizons may or may not overlap. Our expectations and hopes may coincide 
to a large extent; or there may be clear water between them: what we expect to happen 
may offer us no succour for our ideals. But then a challenge opens up: can we so 
formulate our ideals that they may turn into feasible possibilities; so that they may 
even come into view within the horizon of our expectations? 
 
A related reflection here is that, if we are not careful, our scenarios may be unduly 
influenced by contemporary frames of thought and policy-making; to borrow a phrase, 
what MacIntyre termed in a somewhat different context ‘the self-images of our age’. 
Scenario formation in turn may not be a neutral exercise but work in support of 
bringing into being its own creations; scenarios may become a self-fulfilling set of 
prophecies. It is understandable, for instance, if scenario formation in higher education 
in today’s context, begins with dominant concepts and concerns of the relationships 
between state and institutions, the relationships between the institutions themselves, 
student fees, research selectivity, relationships between higher education and the 
business world, frameworks for validation and accreditation of courses, 
entrepreneurialism and lifelong learning. Even if different positions are identified on 
any of these dimensions so as to differentiate different scenarios, there will still be a 
large degree of correspondence between the scenarios. They will be variants on a set of 
themes.  Certainly, individual scenarios will be seen to welcome additional thematic 
visitors – such as higher education as leisure, or universities as networks or private 
organisations; but the sense of the scenarios fitting into a dominant set of 
presuppositions and thereby being unduly constrained will remain. 
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More than that, such a set of scenarios could be accused not merely of being unduly 
narrow but also of being ideological. Their ideological character would turn on their 
being vehicles for the furthering of a ‘modernising’ project. This involves links 
between institutions at all manner of levels, universities – through both their research 
and teaching functions – orienting themselves towards the world of work, knowledge 
itself having a performative character, the state playing a limited (though not 
insignificant) role in the financing of higher education and institutions taking on an 
increasing role in that respect, and students also taking on a significant level of 
responsibility for the financing of their education. 
 
Such a framework for comprehending higher education is a mix of ‘neo-liberalism’ 
and pan-Europeanism. If something like this is taken as a set of pre-suppositions for 
scenario planning, then the scenarios that emerge are going to be ideological in that 
they pretend to be different but are variants of a common model.  As such, they are 
liable to diminish debate and limit the range of thinking rather than open it up.  Such 
scenarios here are not only constrained; they will also constrain. 
 
It may even be felt in the course of an exercise of this kind that reflection on ‘the idea 
of a university’ is outmoded for, surely, the thinking would run there can be no single 
idea of a university that will carry us forward well into the twenty-first century.  In the 
future, we shall need to be as open as possible and not fetter ourselves with ideas as 
might emerge by reflection on the idea of the university. ‘Only philosophers and 
historians (will) retain any real interest in the question of what a university is.’  (Vitis 
Vinifera.) There is, of course, an irony here:  presumably, our scenario imaginings are 
supposed to set us free to think the impossible. Our scenarios have a rhetorical 
justification in that they may help us to see our present into the future, and so glimpse 
in the present quite new possibilities. Scenario creation is supposed to be 
emancipatory.  But, as it turns out in practice, scenarios that emerge in practice may 
‘cabin, crib and confine’ us. 
Scenarios of Difference 
Suppose that we were to set out to develop some scenarios of universities that were 
mutually distinct.  Here are a few embryonic scenarios, and scenarios that fall outside 
the dominant framework: 
Critical Conscience of Society 
This university understands that it is engaged with the wider society as such there is a 
relationship of mutual accountability. The university is accountable to society and the 
wider society is also accountable to the university. The wider society opens a space for 
such a university since it, the host society, understands that to have such an institution 
in its midst offers an added value to society. This is not an economic added value 
directly but a discursive added value. Through such a university presence in its midst, 
the wider society is aided in becoming an ever more open society. 
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What might such a university look like? A university that has in its mission a 
responsibility to be part of the critical conscience of society. Such a role could work in 
all of the main activities of the university. In its study programmes, students would be 
invited to critically reflect on the character of their chosen discipline or profession. 
They would inquire into its potential ideological leanings. In its research, academics 
would be sensitive to the potentially critical force of their projects and findings. In turn 
this means academics would take on the role of public intellectuals and engage, on the 
basis of their expertise, with the wider society, offering critical commentaries on 
contemporary institutions and practices in society and also suggesting alternative 
possibilities. In their income-generating activities, academics would not just 
competently fulfil the expectations of their clients but would also have an eye to the 
public good and seek at the same time to offer – however gently and subtlety, and even 
surreptitiously – a critical commentary on the client’s practices. 
 
Such a set of critical postures, we may note, could not be described as oppositional for 
they are essentially positive in character, seeking to identify plausible alternative 
understandings and practices. These critical postures, after all, are a consciousness 
within society: they remind the wider society of its own hopes and dreams; they work 
towards realistic but imaginary scenarios that may help to better realise the wider 
society’s own declared values. 
University for the Public Good 
In the university for the public good, there would be an element in every course of 
study in which students would be required to be active in the community. For 
professional courses such as law or design, such links would be organic, in which 
students could either offer – under strict professional control – their services to 
‘clients’ or could ‘peer tutor’ in schools; in other areas they could act as interns, 
supporting the work of professionals in say medicine or politics. 
 
The university for the public good would characteristically be an open university; and 
literally so. Its doors would be largely open: it would be a community resource, 
hosting and providing facilities for all manner of cultural and social events. Deals 
would be struck with local and regional community groups who would be able to use 
its resources at reduced rates. 
 
Such a university would also be open in other senses. It would identify and make 
available – even for a level of fees – the expertise of its staff. But it would not be 
content with listing such interests and expertise on its web pages to allow others to 
make overtures for those services; this university would be pro-active in projecting its 
intellectual resources and in being active in the community identifying where positive 
links might be made. 
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The university for the public good would require its staff to communicate their 
research to wide audiences, that they not only give public lectures but use all their 
ingenuity to project their ideas and findings to the wider society. Its staff, in other 
words, would be required to be public intellectuals and this would hold across all 
disciplines. 
A University for Human Good 
In the university for human good, students would be centre stage. Here, ‘higher 
education’ would be understood to be a formative and developmental process. In other 
words, Bildung would be taken seriously: it would be worked at deliberately and not 
just assumed to be present. In particular, pedagogy would be at least as important as 
curricula: the pedagogical relationship would be understood to be crucial to the 
student’s progress. The nurturing of the student’s being would be given attention; 
space would be accorded in curricula for each student to become herself and himself 
more fully. 
 
Higher education here would be a process of unfolding and increasing authenticity, in 
which students would be encouraged to formulate and advance their own ideas. But 
such a process of personal creativity and projection would be practised not just 
intellectually and epistemologically but as a matter of the development of self. This 
higher education would be a particularly ontological process. 
 
Curricula here would, as remarked, be less a matter of filling units with particular 
experiences and more a matter of the imaginative design of (structured) spaces. In this 
university, it will be understood that only by according students spaces, albeit 
structured spaces, can students gain the autonomy and, indeed, self-confidence for 
fully authentic achievements. Here, inspirational teaching will not be unusual but 
commonplace; for it will be understood the inspiring of students, the imparting of new 
life, new energies, new states of being, is a necessary condition of a higher education 
as a human good. 
 
This ethos will be carried over into the life of this university as a whole. Imaginative 
ways will be found of developing a sense of community. In a complex multi-faculty 
university, there will be many communities; but this university strives to enable all its 
members to feel they have a stake in it. Strategic review processes will attempt to be 
inclusive, such that everyone feels they are part of such processes and their views are 
not just welcomed but will count. Hierarchy will not be abolished but its most evident 
forms will be diminished.  
University for the Learning Society 
The university for the learning society will not just include a mention of ‘the learning 
society’ in its mission statement, but will define and structure itself around the idea.  
The preposition ‘for’ is critical here. The UK 1997 National Inquiry into higher 
education led to a report entitled ‘Higher Education in the Learning Society’, whereas  
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this university is for the learning society. That is, it understands its key mission is to 
help to bring about a learning society; it does not take for granted that the learning 
society is already extant. 
 
This university interprets its key task at different levels. Curricula are shaped so as to 
help students develop the potential not merely productively to survive in a complex 
world but to add to that world. Such students would have the will to go on learning 
throughout their lives and would be moulded into critical citizens who can assist the 
institutions in which they find themselves – and even the wider society – also to go on 
learning. Two desiderata flow immediately from this requirement as far as the 
students’ programmes of study are concerned. Firstly, their curricula would have to be 
multidisciplinary. This does not mean there should not be some central theme or 
‘subject’; what it does mean is any key theme or subject is set in a wider context. In 
that way, students might be furnished with the larger intellectual capacities to frame 
professional and societal issues in larger contexts that they are typically presented.  
Secondly, the pedagogical processes should be both open and (yet) prompting of 
criticality. Only through this are students going to acquire the fortitude and critical 
spirit necessary to be able to bring critical and yet positive stances to bear on their 
future professional and social experiences. 
 
The university that works for the learning society is also turned directly outwards. Its 
academics in their roles as researchers understand they have a responsibility to offer up 
to the wider society their thoughts and findings in such ways that they can be taken on 
board by wide audiences. In addition, its academics understand they themselves have a 
direct responsibility to be making informed contributions to public debates: every 
academic here is a public intellectual. In this way the university acts directly to help 
the wider society learn about itself and so advance its own self-steering mechanisms. 
This university assists the wider society to become more rational: it may be that the 
world is so complex that it cannot fully be brought under rational control, but at least 
the university for the learning society can play its part in assisting society to become 
more reflexive and enlightened about its options.  This university for the learning 
society helps society to learn about itself. 
Plausibility and Feasibility 
Against the background of these four sketches of possible scenarios, we can return to 
our opening question and put it even more sharply. What are scenarios?  Are they 
plausible projections of a situation in which we find ourselves today? Or might they be 
imaginative projections of new worlds, daring ideas, dreams even? The equivocation in 
the use of the term ‘projection’ will be apparent. On the one hand, projection stands for 
an elongation, a furthering of a present structure. Another floor is added to the building 
that is already standing. We contain ourselves, confine ourselves, within our present-
day structures. On the other hand, projection stands for a project, and an imaginative 
project at that. Here, we escape the confines of our present positionings, our present 
structures. This escape isn’t easily achieved. It calls for courage, persistence and 
struggle. 
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Both kinds of projection are worthwhile but their differences are huge.  In the first kind 
of projection, in projecting forward largely from where we are, we would be working 
within dominant contemporary assumptions – for example, as to the desirability of the 
continuing modernisation and integration of Europe and of the role of higher education 
in the construction of a knowledge economy. This kind of exercise has a dual value.  
Firstly, we may glimpse a range of options that open up. Even within our present 
assumptions there will be a range of variables open and that may play themselves out 
differently in the complex system that is higher education in the contemporary world. 
(Might there be more of a market? Could there be a trans-European credit 
accumulation system? Are teaching-led ‘universities’ a possible option? What might 
‘networks’ look like?) Secondly, and even more importantly, by observing the kinds of 
scenarios that could plausibly flow from today’s dominant assumptions, we shall be in 
a better position to critique such models and so open the way for the second form of 
projection building. 
 
In building the second form of projection, however, we would be deliberately setting 
up scenarios that would rival those produced in the first set of exercises. These new 
scenarios would, in themselves, provide a tacit critique of those issuing from the first 
assumption-led exercise. They would be counter-scenarios, where ‘counter’ stands for 
a political agenda with a small ‘p’. 
 
Such counter scenarios might, and indeed should, herald counter values, counter hopes, 
counter ideals. Projects of citizenship, or the public good, or students as human beings, 
or criticality, or universities for the learning society, may not be much on the public 
agenda and so fall outside the scenarios that flow from our contemporary structures 
and policies. Scenarios built on such projects would be scenarios that contend with the 
dominant self-images of our age. That is to say they purchase part of their force 
precisely by their playing in part an oppositional role. They would be counter 
scenarios. 
 
But their being counter scenarios should not mean they are entirely separated from 
contemporary understandings and structures. If they are to gain legitimacy, there 
should be a sense the counter scenarios have a degree of plausibility. That they are not 
within the range of dominant models and policies is part of their make-up. But unless 
some links can be seen to contemporary understandings, they will be devoid of 
legitimacy: they will face their own legitimation crisis before even getting off the 
ground. Counter scenarios, therefore, are positioned awkwardly. They refuse to kow-
tow to conventional wisdom but they cannot leave ‘the real world’ so far behind that 
they come to lack any credibility. They reach out into imaginary worlds, new worlds, 
even magical worlds; but there has to be a sense that some interpretations of the 
visions that they offer may just be within reach, with good will, effort and a little luck. 
 
The counter scenarios offered here, therefore, face a stern test. Are they plausible? 
Could they ever find a constituency for their implementation? Are they feasible? Could 
the scenarios conceivable ever be realised? 
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Plausibility and feasibility are, of course, themselves slippery concepts. Both lend 
themselves to systems and structures: do contemporary systems and structures offers 
spaces for such counter scenarios to be brought off? But both concepts – plausibility 
and feasibility – speak also to ideas, senses, values and even, to call up further 
awkward terms, culture and modes of being. We may distinguish the two terms: 
‘plausibility’ relates more to ideas and values and ‘feasibility’ more to systems and 
structures. But both take in each other’s washing to some extent; after all, ideas and 
values are located in systems and structures, and systems and structures reflect ideas 
and values. So both plausibility and feasibility, as demanding tests of acceptance of 
imaginative scenarios, fly in together. 
Conclusion 
Fortunately, I can duck the twin challenges – of plausibility and feasibility – here.  The 
counter scenarios I tentatively put up are just that: tentative offerings. they would 
require more work, more imaginative design work and more detailed filling out of 
those designs before they would deserve to be subjected to those two tests (of 
plausibility and feasibility). At least space must be accorded for that hard work, of 
creative imagination and appropriate infilling, to take place. Not too much infilling, 
though: imaginative and constructive scenarios are distinguished by the extent to 
which they deliberately leave matters open and themselves open up spaces for 
imaginative improvisation on the part of individuals. 
 
We can note here, by way of conclusion, two further sets of inter-related matters. 
 
Firstly, we may note, the phrase ‘public intellectual’ appears in no less than three of 
the four scenarios and is not far from the sense of the fourth (‘A university for human 
good’.) How might we make sense of that presence? It is that the dominant self-images 
of the university are surely hinged around a sense of a university that is self-centred. 
The university that is emerging will be looking out for itself, ensuring not just that it is 
solvent, but that it is generating a profit it can plough back into its own activities. Even 
if this university is engaged in collaborations with other partners – possibly across the 
world – this is a university intent on its own promotion and positioning.   
 
Old-fashioned academe could have been accused of being overly internal in its 
positioning: the academic community (if it existed) had its own boundaries with the 
world. At least the new university-in-the-academic-marketplace can proclaim its 
determination to engage with the wider world; but it does so in virtue of market 
relationships. What is lost from view is the idea of ‘responsibility’, especially the 
responsibility of academics to play their part in the growth of the public sphere. Unless 
the idea of ‘the public intellectual’ comes into our vocabulary and scenarios, our 
shaping of the universities in the future will surely be impoverished. 
 
Secondly, the ideals behind the scenarios offered here are embedded in the self-
understandings of higher education in the Western world. Those ideals connect with 
such terms as Bildung, emancipation, criticality, openness and freedom. The scenarios 
offered here, therefore, may run counter to the dominant discourses of our age but they 
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link with older discursive regimes. The question opens up, therefore, as to whether 
those older regimes and their associated concepts and ideas – and hopes and 
imaginings – are lost forever. What would it mean to say they are lost forever? That 
the contemporary structures and systems forbid them? That the contemporary power 
structures would oppose them? That they conflict with large current interests? Or that 
the energy and even imagination for their realisation has now gone for ever? Or that 
our willingness to seriously contest, in creative and politically sensitive ways, the 
dominant thinking of our age has dissipated? I do not think the time has yet come 
when we should or need to assume uncritically any of these forlorn eventualities. 
 
 12 European Higher Education in 2020: Freedom, between 
 the Necessity and Utopia 
Voldemar Tomusk 
 
 When everything is Power, Power is nothing 
 
 A Hungarian postmodern proverb  
 
 
 
 
In trying to understand the intentions of the current volume’s editors I developed a 
vague feeling that what is expected from me is to comment on the three CHEPS 
scenarios of European Higher Education in 2020 from the perspective of my part of 
Europe. That is the part that once gravitated around the Kremlin in Moscow and the 
big red star on the top of it. I do not, however, think that discussing such a perspective 
in 2005 is any longer meaningful and will be even less so by 2020. By that time it may 
well be the case that all that remains of the once great, though evil Bolshevik empire is 
the Great Duchy of Muscovia, ruled by Grand Duke Vladmir Vladimirovich III, the 
remainder, and its satellites, being divided in a friendly manner between the United 
States of Europe and the Peoples’ Republic of China. This of course is speculation and 
as the author is a former citizen of the former Soviet Union, not a most gracious one.  
 
Despite the respect I hold for the friends and colleagues who developed the scenarios, I 
still do not see much use in juxtaposing Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera, laying, 
as I guess the expectation may be, out my preference and arguments pro and contra. 
For a lazy person such as myself, this appears too technical a task, with too much time 
having to be spent on isolating the dimensions and comparing the details. For the 
reasons discussed below, I also have a few ethical and philosophical reservations 
approaching the task in such a manner. Therefore the largest part of this modest 
contribution focuses on the meta-level. I am not so much going to scrutinise the 
outcomes of the CHEPS’ colleagues’ thinking as to explore the foundations of it. I 
believe that my remaining memories of the state – its socialist past in Europe and the 
allegedly scientifically planned society – provide me with a particular edge to 
undertake such a task. Finally, I also suggest that taking just a slightly different angle 
from that of the CHEPS colleagues by looking at social and political functions of 
higher learning may display considerably less attractive possible worlds than we 
discuss in the current volume. This modest contribution raises one major question. In 
my view, the work CHEPS colleagues have accomplished seems to be based on the 
assumption they know what a university is for or that, for the purposes of such the 
tasks at hand, we do not need to waste too much time and resources discussing what is, 
if not entirely then at least almost obvious. I do not agree with such a position. As a 
person of a somewhat philosophical, if not melancholy, mind I find no big issue is ever 
fully understood. I try to elaborate in this on the pages that follow. 
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The Sin of Fortune-Telling 
It is always tempting to know the future. Although in most societies witches and 
sorcerers are no longer stoned or burned, exploring the future still constitutes a risky 
epistemological strategy. Each attempt is based on a number of often tacit premises 
that not everybody necessarily agrees with. It appears to me that in trying to tell the 
future one would assume relative independence in the course of history from our own 
will and acts. This, as 20th century history has shown, constitutes a somewhat 
dangerous position. In any case there would almost immediately emerge a number of 
prophets (mostly false), sorcerers, fortune tellers and scientists who claim to have 
understood the will of gods or the laws of nature, which structurally do not differ that 
much from each other. The next step is also known; shortly thereafter power mobilises 
the prophecy for its own purposes and the causal connection gets blurred. No longer 
can we be sure which comes first – prophecy or a political programme. Being bound 
by objective laws of history we are denied the political discourse on the world 
acceptable and unacceptable. Although the issue of free will is a complex one, giving it 
up would mean a fundamental revision of our understanding about who we are as 
humans. Moving the discussion to the grounds of statistics, arguing for example that 
with certain probability certain things will happen, does not reduce in any significant 
manner the deterministic nature of that thinking. It still subjects human freedom to 
shape our society to a certain objectively given course of history and thus any attempt 
to describe the future includes an element of restriction of free will and possibly its 
manipulation to the benefit of priests of one religion or another. After all, as we have 
been told, the best way to make the future happen is to convince a large enough 
number of individuals on the inevitability of certain course of events. Then they will 
make it happen. The prophecy will fulfil itself as humans see their freedom in terms of 
a perceived necessity, like the following may easily exemplify: 
  
Imagine a university without buildings or classrooms or even a library, 10,000 
miles away from its students, delivering online programmes or courses through 
franchise institutions overseas. Imagine a university without academic 
departments, without required courses or majors or grades, issuing degrees valid 
for only five years after graduation. Imagine a higher education system where 
institutions are ranked not by the quality of teaching, but by the intensity of 
electronic wiring and the degree of Internet connectivity. Imagine a country 
whose main export earnings come from the sale of higher education services 
(Salmi, 1999). 
 
While many of us agree it is likely that humans will still be around in the year 2020 
and many of the current institutions will continue their existence with more or less 
significant changes, one of the lessons former students of communism can teach the 
rest of the world is the need to be extremely cautious about developing any scientific 
scenarios of the future. There is always a threat present in somebody taking it too 
seriously. One may well agree with Appiah (2005) that, ‘theories of politics aren’t like 
theories of celestial mechanics: in the realm of the political, theories have a tendency 
to become a part of what they theorise’. Unlike the natural sciences, in the realm of the 
social sciences we do not have a clear difference between the formula and independent 
variables that go into it. Anything we create by means of thoughts, theories, stories and 
so on, shapes the world we inhabit. Although it would be entirely futile to mention 
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moral responsibility here, to argue that there is no moral responsibility involved in 
creating the world we live in sounds utterly ridiculous. First and foremost does that 
concern those who put in the public sphere knowledge products which Princeton 
philosopher Harry Frankfurt discusses in his recent book (Frankfurt 2005). 
 
As it looks to me, there are two ways to think of the future – scientific and utopian. 
Scientists would try to isolate from the infinite amount of information available to us 
the basic laws that regulate the social world, and based on that draw a picture on what 
the future may look like in 15, 25 or 50 years. There seems to be a rather significant 
school of thought suggesting that with the recent progress in science the ultimate 
theory of everything is almost within reach (see e.g. Barrow, 1991). That would allow 
us to see any future state as precisely as we wish. While still far from the final goal of 
precise prediction, the CHEPS exercise to envision European higher education in 2020 
for me constitutes an imperfect attempt at doing science in the way individuals like 
John Barrow, Roger Penrose or Frank Tipler understand it. Needless to say, there is no 
shortage of philosophers (see e.g. Newton-Smith, 2000) who have mobilised all of 
their wit to ridicule such use of science.  
 
A utopian does not care about science. He is developing a vision of the world as a 
perfect dwelling place of the perfect creature. A utopian project, as Kolnai suggests is 
about: 
 
heaping-up and insatiable gathering-in, and unbounded cumulation of advantages, 
which implies a reckless the counterpart of balancing and circumscribing 
drawbacks shut out, extruded from the field of consciousness (Kolnai, 
1960/1999). 
 
With this, the problem of a utopia is that:  
 
It is not that the utopian bliss cannot be satisfactorily put into practice: the trouble 
is that it cannot be thought out consistently in the theorist’s study (Kolnai, 
1960/1999).    
 
While one may think that there is an unbridgeable gap separating the scientific vision 
of future from the utopian, most often this is not the case. Immanuel Wallerstein 
knows the reason: 
 
The problem, of course, is that there is no such thing as a disinterested scholar; 
there cannot be. Our values are an integral component of our science; in this 
sense, science is always philosophy (Wallerstein, 2004). 
 
There are many ways scholars’ values, interests and expectations shape the results of 
their work, bridging the gap. The process works in both ways. The utopian vision may 
shape both the data as well as the analysis applied to it, or the process may reach such 
a level of complexity that almost any outcome can arbitrarily be attached to the 
analysis of any set of data. The CHEPS scenarios discussed in the current volume at 
least offer some evidence for the latter, though which of the scenarios are to be 
labelled as utopia and which as dystopia I would rather leave to the reader to decide. 
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Which is which depends on the ideological and political preferences of the discussants 
that are always present in such situations.  
 
Wolf Lepenies, (1992) offers a somewhat deeper explanation not entirely foreign to 
our times and regimes of knowledge production, for the intellectuals, that is people of 
a melancholic disposition once referred to as the free-floating intelligentsia but later 
absorbed by the expanding sector of higher learning, to switch the sides, suddenly 
starting producing utopia instead of lamenting the miserable state of human affairs: 
 
Utopia emerges from melancholy with the world and from the world’s inadequacy 
and ends with the impossibility of reflection, the prohibition of melancholy, and 
the redeeming promise of a stable happiness within a manageable space. 
 
This should, however, by no means prevent us from discussing the future and 
expressing what kind of a world we think would be desirable for us to have. Therefore 
a more positive and ethically acceptable approach to dealing with the future would in 
my view be to study carefully the current state of affairs, the mechanisms and 
processes in place shaping it and critically explore possible threats rising from this for 
the humanity as we understand it and our for fundamental values. The use of science 
will not be universal but remain limited to studying the current state of affairs and 
processes in place, while philosophy would lend us the means of discussing desirable 
and undesirable conditions of human existence and politics would allow debating over 
what kind of world we would like to live in. One of the major threats in the 
contemporary world is that the rising expectations for science to serve the goals of 
unhindered economic growth undermine both philosophy and politics. Bauman (2004) 
writes:  
 
On the repoliticisation of the economy, Lepenies insisted, depends the survival of 
democracy. In all probability, we may add, it is not only the survival of 
democracy, but also the continuing existence of the species that created it and 
found it good, … 
 
While agreeing with Bauman on the need to repoliticise the economy and society as a 
whole, an issue I have with him is that I find his suggestion to continue seeking the 
impossible and think of our future in terms of a utopia at least as dangerous as the 
scientists’ universalistic claims.  
 
While one may, on emotional grounds, sympathise with the desire to free mankind 
from insecurity by means of scientific predictability, closing the horizons of future by 
what science may or may not know, or even worse – what its shareholders may expect 
to hear from their paid prophets – constitutes more a threat than accepting the radical 
openness of human existence. If I remember correctly, it was Mikhail Bakhtin who 
said the words that translate into English language roughly as follows: The world is 
free and open. Everything is still ahead, everything is yet to come. Saying that certainly 
required a degree of courage in the Soviet Union. But it also requires courage in the 
world where people like Francis Fukuyama preach a doctrine not radically different 
from that of the communists – the world of after the end of history, where technocrats 
solve problems in a world that has rid itself of non-scientific desires and expectations, 
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that is – of politics. It is of little surprise then that both streams of thought trace back to 
the same source: Hegel. The theme itself however is much older and relates to humans’ 
longing for security, the price of which is always their freedom. 
The End of History and Doom of Politics 
Wiktor Stockowski (2002) demonstrates in his marvellous book how much in contrary 
to contemporary understanding of progress in science, physical anthropology is 
dominated by ideas that have been around ever since antiquity. Francis Fukuyama with 
his widely popular article ‘The End of History?’ that appeared in the summer 1989 
issue of the magazine ‘The National Interest’ and was three years later followed with a 
book bearing the same title, this time already without a question mark, fully confirms 
Stockowski’s thesis that mythology and folklore can often take the form of an 
apparently scientific discourse. What, however, makes Fukuyama’s prophecy special is 
the fact that he does not place the ‘ten thousand years of happiness’ that constitutes a 
compulsory element of many schools of religious and philosophical thought in both 
East and West beyond the reach of verification in the distant future but declares that 
together with the fall of communism it had just arrived. History had ended and 
mankind, having solved all the big issues and found an optimal way of co-existence, 
had entered the final phase of its existence – that of technical refinement and narrowly 
technological development. Fukuyama (1989) writes: 
 
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of 
a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the 
end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government. 
 
With the death of communism all major questions were solved. It turned out to be the 
case that the ‘second way’ was not really an alternative to the first one – ‘liberal 
capitalism’. To those looking for the ‘third way’ one should perhaps suggest that this is 
nothing else than the very same old ‘first way’, and that since the end of history there 
has been no viable alternative.  
 
It seems to be that in this age when the imperatives of scientific progress and economic 
development have assumed roles formerly occupied by unearthly gods and man-made 
idols, it is a particularly important task for intellectuals to stand against any possible 
attempt to close the discourse. One can possibly agree with Laclau (1996), who 
declares: 
 
Democratic society is not one in which the ‘best’ content dominates unchallenged 
but, rather, one in which nothing is definitely acquired and there is always a 
possibility of challenge.  
 
Fukuyama senses the obvious – that the only thing to wait for after final solution is 
death. That casts the shadow of irreversible loss over his ruminations:  
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The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the 
willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological 
struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be 
replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of the technical problems, 
environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. 
In the post historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the 
perpetual care taking of the museum of human history. 
 
Constructing his prophecy Fukuyama had not noticed that his own fellow countryman 
had a generation earlier, although in a less dramatic way, expressed the very same idea. 
In the inaugural 1965 issue of the journal ‘The Public Interest’ Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan presented the end of World War II as the turning point that led to the state 
similar to Fukuyama’s ‘end of the history’: 
 
it is the fact that for two decades now, since the end of World War II, the 
industrial democracies of the world have been able to operate their economies 
steadily expanding level of production and employment. Nothing like it has ever 
happened before in history (Moynihan, 1965).   
 
 Moynihan talked about the professionalisation of reform, a society where through the 
leadership of well-trained technocrats politics is rendered redundant. These are the 
technocrats who take care of production as well as the distribution of goods and 
political struggles find their shameful end:  
 
The day when mile-long petitions and mass rallies were required to persuade a 
government that a popular demand existed that things be done differently is 
clearly drawing to a close (ibid. p. 16). 
 
For a society to accept such technocratic rule it should, one may think, have developed 
an understanding of the meaning of  the ‘good life’ that is shared by the entire society. 
This then allows technocrats to enter and facilitate it by rational means, within the 
limits of available resources. This is nothing but exactly Fukuyama’s end of the history 
situation – no more big problems to be solved, no more struggles and idealism – 
nothing left but technocratic applications and technical refinement of the works of the 
last philosopher. Randall Collins (1998) argued that such a situation, when it occurs, 
not necessarily marks the peak of intellectual activity, but is a sign of intellectual 
stagnation. Hellström and Jacob (2000) argue that the position similar to Moynihan’s 
and others’ is not exactly what it pretends to be – scientification of politics – but 
merely ‘politics co-opting the language of science’, an aspect of politicisation of 
science. Perhaps using science to legitimise politics also qualifies as intellectual 
stagnation. If we cannot call politics by its right name, corruption certainly follows in 
many ways.  
 
The Intellectual history of the 20th century appears to be as rich in final solutions as it 
is rich in cataclysmic events. Nikolai Bukharin, the intellectual among the first 
generation of Bolsheviks was, six years before his own comrades killed him, as certain 
as Daniel P. Moynihan in 1965 and Francis Fukuyama in 1989 that history had ended. 
For him, however, it happened as a result of the 1917 communist revolution in Russia. 
Bukharin, in his paper presented at the International Conference of the History of 
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Science and Technology in London in 1931, mades it abundantly clear that Marxism 
offered the only and final philosophical source of science, fully proved by the practice: 
 
It is relevant here to record, first of all, that Marxism, weighed on the balance of 
history, has been verified therein in the most varied directions. Marxism foretold 
the war; Marxism foretold the period of revolutions and the whole character of the 
epoch we are going through; Marxism foretold the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and the rise of a Socialist order; even earlier had been brilliantly justified the 
theory of the concentration and centralisation of capital, etc. (Bukharin, 1931). 
 
What follows is a fully scientific, planned management of the society: 
 
But the plan of Socialist construction is not only a plan of economy: the process 
of the rationalisation of life, beginning with the suppression of irrationality in the 
economic sphere, wins away from it one position after another: the principle of 
planning invades the sphere of ‘mental production,’ the sphere of science, the 
sphere of theory. Thus there arises here a new and much more complex problem: 
the problem of the rationalisation not only of the material-economic basis of 
society, but also of the relations between the sphere of material labour and 
spiritual ‘labour,’ … (ibid. p. 30). 
      
Technocratic skills and technical competences, while vitally important for the 
establishment of modern economies, are not sufficient to avoid closing society, by or 
on behalf of the prophets of necessity, or any final social utopia. Touraine (2000) 
succinctly summarises the above concerns: 
 
Democracy is in danger whenever we feel that our personal and collective lives 
are dominated by necessity, irrespective of whether that necessity takes the form 
of the nature of things, human nature, a revealed law or reason, the international 
economic situation or the essence of national culture.  
Europe and her Higher Learning in 2020 
If Europe continues expanding as many anticipate it will until 2020, it will grow by 
that time much larger than it is today, including Turkey, Ukraine, Romania and several 
smaller countries in the Balkans, Moldova and perhaps even Belorus. An additional 
150 million people in comparison with her population today will, by that time, live 
under the rule of the united Europe. Geographical expansion of the European Union 
however is not our primary interest here. What is more important is the meaning 
attributed to the expansion of the European Union. I think that it is not entirely 
mistaken to argue that, for a significant segment of the Brussels’ technocrats, Europe’s 
expanding horizon signifies the horizon of the Fukuyamese end of history; the 
countries within it having entered the non-political life of technical refinement of the 
ten thousand years of happiness, while peoples beyond the horizon struggle against 
barbarian realities and the curses of history. Jean Monnet’s suggested way of gradual 
building Europe without having a politically negotiated blueprint for this but instead 
‘bringing together men and practical matters’ (Monnet, 1978) may justify such  
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argumentation on the low or non-importance of politics in Europe being built by 
practical men, that is technocrats, around practical matters. The same, as Olsen (2005) 
argues, applies to higher education: 
 
The (European) Commission also claims that the time of ‘heated debates’ over 
university organisation have come to an end (…), thereby framing reforms as 
technical questions of finding efficient organisational forms consistent with 
necessities and shared goals.  
 
It appears perfectly sensible to me to see the CHEPS scenarios of European higher 
education in 2020 in the context of the expanding horizon of history’s ending. While 
perfectly understandable, I still believe that such an approach is both substantively 
wrong and ethically unacceptable for the reasons discussed above. I believe that 
without a political dimension to each of the scenarios these are of little use, but instead 
constitute a potential source of harm, particularly in case a major international player 
such as the European Commission, the World Bank or even the Soros Foundation 
decides to support any of the envisioned scenarios for reasons sacred or profane.  
 
The scenarios assume that for the coming fifteen years or so the course of history in 
Europe will remain linear, as only linear history can be seen as the lack of it, with 
gradual progress by means of technical refinement. This may or may not be the case. It 
was linear for the past half a century across much of Europe and may remain like that 
for a while, but it will not certainly last forever. Sooner or later a turn will come, 
although this does not necessarily need to happen by another Franco-German war or 
Balkan upheaval. Europe’s expansion assumes a steady economic growth, both to 
satisfy the expectations of the newly joining nations as well as to maintain the liberal 
democratic order. Without economic growth many things dear to us, including liberal 
democracies will start collapsing. As Gellner (1994) suggests: 
 
Only in conditions of overall growth, when social life is a plus-sum, not a zero-
sum game, can a majority have an interest in conforming even without 
intimidation. 
 
Immanuel Wallerstein (2004), however, suggests, the time for the plus-sum game is 
running out, with the margin of profits extracted from poor countries diminishing. His 
forecast is that of continuity breaking in the coming 25-50 year period: 
 
I believe there exists today, as a result of long secular trends that have been 
moving away from the equilibrium, a massive policy squeeze that will block the 
continuation of an endless accumulation of capital, the motor of capitalist 
development. 
  
Welfare achieved in the western world is more fragile than often thought of and does 
not necessarily exist thanks to values we try to follow in our own societies. It may be 
approaching a breaking point and the chances that rationality will prevail remain 
limited. What is, however, ironic is the self-destructive nature of expanding liberal 
democracy. It has to expand to exist, and by expanding it erodes its own roots. 
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Higher education has an extremely important role to play in the world of the plus-sum 
game. Wide spread belief that the expansion of higher education relates to more 
knowledgeable societies remains a myth for me. There is a significant body of 
literature, starting with Ronald Dore and Randall Collins in 1970s, arguing that the 
diploma disease may not necessarily relate to more highly qualified jobs for graduates. 
There is a good reason to see expanding higher education as a part of expanding liberal 
democratic world. The possibility for upward social mobility is a fundamental 
condition of democratic order. The world of developing technologies offers a good 
pretext for establishing an order where people of higher qualifications move up and 
those of lower qualifications down. As long as total wealth continues growing, the 
plus-sum game assures that most people moving down will not get hurt too badly to 
threaten the order significantly, while those occupying lower positions maintain a hope 
in education’s emancipatory powers.   
 
Serving such an order, higher education systems in the western world have grown 
enormously during the past half century. While the training capacity has expanded, the 
number of available qualified student candidates has started diminishing. Universities 
continue manufacturing expectations for upward social mobility among expanding 
groups, though it is also obvious that when everybody moves up, nobody does. Higher 
education has become, as Kivinen and Ahola (1999) suggest, a risk capital. In a way 
higher education has become something like a pyramid investment scheme where the 
top can collect massive interests only as long as a growing number of investors 
surrender their life savings, expectations and hopes to the system at the bottom. As in 
the Western world, the local populations are already to the largest extent drawn into 
higher education for social mobility. Further expansion requires increasingly 
aggressive competition for foreign students, attracting them with expectations to stay 
in industrialised countries or to join local elites upon graduation. A more radical 
solution, however, as Salmi has suggested, would be voiding higher education 
qualifications within five years after graduation, as a matter of fact forcing everybody 
to consume educational services throughout their lives. This is what some see as life-
long learning. To me such a society is more like a camp of forced labor combined with 
a camp of forced consumption, than a liberal democracy. Be it as it may, it looks 
obvious to me that sooner or later the expectations of a significant number or degree 
holders will be frustrated and the pyramid will collapse as did the Albanian economy 
in 1997. If this happens, the days of peaceful refinement will be over, the politics will 
enter like it did when the expectations of many Albanian small investors to become 
very quickly very rich were not met and they withdrew from the system, leading the 
investment schemes to a total fall. The result was, as we know, politics by other means 
– war. 
Instead of a Conclusion 
In Europe, which is expected to enter at any moment the phase of its existence that 
could in medical terms be described as permanently vegetative, little space is left 
between necessity and utopia. The space of freedom is being occupied by both 
scientists manufacturing blueprints for the post-historical world salvaged by 
knowledge as well as by ideologists backing their grandiose, though interest-driven 
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visions with the laws of nature. A simple mortal finds himself increasingly lost in the 
world that, despite all of his degrees of higher learning, makes no sense to him and 
where the question ‘But what sense all of that makes?’ remains unheard and 
unanswered. What was once known as the public sphere is being filled with the 
salacious details of individuals with high or no prominence. Clouds, though, may 
already be gathering over the people who, having lost any idea what exactly they 
signify, become increasingly insignificant. I am afraid that the knowledge industry is 
going to let us down this time. As far as I am concerned, it does not really matter if one 
prefers Centralia, Octavia or Vitis Vinifera. The questions we should be discussing are 
of a quite different order. We should be talking in dynamic terms about a changing 
university in a changing society. Olsen (2005) asks: What kind of University for what 
kind of society? Expanding the university as a fount of social mobility is, together with 
stable economic growth, indispensable for maintaining the liberal democratic order. 
And while some like Bourdieu (1989) have been complaining about breaks societies 
have set on the limits of mobility between social strata, in a long term such 
imperfections may not necessarily be a bad thing. The ongoing deep revision to the 
idea of the university, if not the crisis of the institution of higher learning, caused by its 
over-extension in the context of slowing economic growth, may well indicate more 
trouble on the way.  But will it reach us by 2020, we do not know.  
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 13 Scenarios and Metaphors for (Un)thinking Change in 
 Higher Education 
Stephen R. Stoer and António M.  Magalhães 
 
I shall conclude these comments by turning to Geertz’ claim that ‘we have come 
to such a point in the moral history of the world that we are obliged to think about 
(cultural) diversity rather differently than we have been used to thinking about it’. 
He develops this point by saying that ‘we are living more and more in the midst 
of an enormous collage’, that ‘the world is coming at each of its local points to 
look more like a Kuwaiti bazaar than like an English gentlemen’s club’. These 
latter descriptions seem right to me… 
 
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (1995) 
 
 
On the CHEPS Scenarios 
Do the three scenarios presented by CHEPS in 2004 celebrate what Fukuyama (1992) 
has termed the ‘end of history’? This is the first thought that occurs to us as we begin 
writing our contribution. Why? Because the three scenarios presented appear to take 
for granted that present forms of political regulation and economic development will 
still be dominant as separate and independent configurations in 15 years time. That is, 
in the first scenario, the dominant form of regulation will reproduce the logic of the 
nation-state in the form of Centralia, City of the Sun, a European mega-nation. In a 
similar way the logic of the ‘network society’, whose emergence we are now 
witnessing, will reproduce itself at the European level as Octavia, the Spider-Web 
City. Finally, Vitis Vinifera appears as the crystallisation of market (de)regulation, 
whose ‘hand is sighted on the occasional clear day’. In other words, as heuristic 
models the three scenarios appear to echo more what is currently happening than that 
which will occur in the near future.  
 
At the same time, these scenarios appear to ignore other potential ways to conceive the 
regulation of the European space. For example, in recent work (Magalhães and Stoer, 
2003; Stoer and Magalhães, 2004), we pointed out the way in which with, against and 
through the nation-state, the network society and the market might develop. We have 
attempted to conceptualise this new form of regulation and its development by using 
the metaphor of the bazaar (hence the notion of Europe as a bazaar). Using this as a 
basis we will develop our thoughts on the CHEPS scenarios. 
 
The starting point for this requires reference to the fact that the nation-state, the 
network and the market are, at present, part of the process of the reconfiguration of 
capitalism. Up to the 1970s, capitalism was organised in strict accordance with state 
regulations. Some economists refer to this harmonious relationship between 
accumulation and regulation as a ‘virtuous circle’: mass production was articulated  
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with mass consumption, the latter being guaranteed by the welfare action of the state. 
As part of the ‘virtuous circle’, the state generously funded universities which, in turn, 
supplied the state, firms and industry with qualified human resources. 
 
The oil crisis of the 1970s was the first to dent this circle. Production ceased being 
resource-driven and became demand-driven, leading to the now famous forms of ‘just-
in-time’ and ‘just-for-you’ production. In turn welfare regulation, based on universal 
rights and duties, gave way to a form of regulation increasingly based on 
individualisation and the privatisation of social needs. Even citizenship, as it was 
known under modernity, suffered from these processes, leading to what one may term 
the ongoing reconfiguration of the social contract (Magalhães and Stoer, 2003). 
Individuals condemned to remain as such, have increasingly come to demand the 
return of the sovereignty that they exchanged for state protection. It is in this situation 
of both ‘hard’ (‘you are nothing but an individual’) and ‘soft’ (‘if I am nothing but an 
individual then I want my sovereignty back’) capitalism that economic determination 
simultaneously becomes more severe and more open to other forms of social action.1 It 
is crucial to understand this situation if one wishes to explain why, as the state rolls 
back, individuals and groups seek university education in order to write their own life 
stories (as suggested by Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994), rather than having the state or 
market write it for them. 
 
These are the developments in capitalism and state regulation that the CHEPS 
scenarios appear to underestimate. Indeed, the scenarios seem to separate things which 
are currently developing simultaneously: attributed citizenship, the process of 
individualisation/individuation and the process of identity construction of individuals 
and groups mediated through consumption. The Octavia scenario characterises society 
as ‘the blurring of boundaries between previously functionally differentiated 
subsystems’. However, this scenario does not appear to take seriously the implications 
of such blurring. It is as if the web were the centre of the social link, but in delegating 
the structuring elements of citizenship and the fluidity of identity construction to the 
other two scenarios, it empties this scenario of that which is most central to it, the idea 
that ‘society is not characterised by the triumph of one rationality over others’. 
 
Of course we recognise the scenario’s authors separated these characteristics in order 
to explore their heuristic value. However for the sake of our argument, it is vital to be 
able to distinguish the articulations, or lack there of, between the political (the 
reconfiguration of citizenship), the economic (the growth of the individualised and 
privatised society) and the cultural (identity affirmation and construction). In our 
argument, Europe develops through the web (in the words of Castells, (2001) ‘Europe 
as a network state’) in the context of the reconfiguration of production, distribution and 
consumption articulating, in the process, cultural identities, both individual and group. 
In other words, the impact of globalisation and the coinciding ‘revolution’ in 
information and communication technologies appears to be leading towards a situation 
                                                        
1
 It is this process of ‘individualisation’ and ‘individuation’ that is referred to by Beck in Risk Society 
(1992). 
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where political, economic and cultural processes intertwine to the extent that it is often 
difficult to distinguish between them (for example, can one separate today the act of 
consumption – e.g., buying a shirt – from the construction of identity – what kind of 
shirt should I buy?). It is for this reason that our logic, as opposed to the logic which 
led to the construction of the three CHEPS scenarios, places more emphasis on that 
which frames higher education and less on higher education itself. To us it is the 
framework within which higher education evolves that is central to understanding the 
nature of higher education itself, including its development and the implications this 
may have for individuals, groups and society as a whole. 
On the Kuwaiti bazaar 
With reference to the citation above we agree with both Rorty and Geertz that the 
world, let alone Europe, is increasingly resembling a Kuwaiti bazaar rather than an 
exclusive English club. The latter represents the ultimate incommensurability of local 
and cultural differences: the ‘Portugueseness’ of the Portuguese, the ‘Englishness’ of 
the English, the ‘Arabian character’ of the Arabs. In fact, cultural differences affirmed 
by groups and individuals appear to be reconfiguring the concept of citizenship, to the 
extent that citizenship is reclaimed not on the basis of that which people hold in 
common (territory, language, religion, ethnic belonging, etc.) but rather on that which 
makes them different (also language, religion, ethnic belonging, sexual identity, life 
style, etc.). It is the network society, as both a medium and mediator, in the context of 
a reconfigured capitalism where knowledge is increasingly central to the production 
process and where the needs of individuals and groups are simultaneously privatised 
and reflexively articulated in new forms of production, distribution and consumption, 
that provides the web of social relations promoting the exercise and development of 
new citizenship forms. 
 
In this sense the metaphor of the bazaar arises as an interesting way of (un)thinking 
both the context of the development of higher education and the different models of 
higher education being proposed. If the bazaar were to be defined as a scenario, it 
would have, at a minimum, the following characteristics: 
 
1. a public space (political, economic, social, cultural) that as such is susceptible to 
being regulated; 
2. a public space that enables a variety of configurations in different parts of the 
world, but whose dominant configuration results from it being configured by the 
state (which, although suffering reconfiguration, shows no sign of losing its 
strength over the next fifteen years) and the market (via the private nature of 
commodities and the public nature of consumption); 
3. a public space that accepts the legitimacy of individuals regulating their own lives 
(‘I pay my taxes (duty), but I want to educate my children (right) as I think they 
ought to be educated’); 
4. a public space that constitutes a variable geometry (at the same time consensual 
and arbitrary and, therefore, fragile) whose degree of variation depends upon the 
degree of power and conflict that exists between social, cultural and economic 
differences. 
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On Higher Education in the Bazaar 
In former work (Stoer, Magalhães and Rodrigues, 2004; Magalhães and Stoer, 2005), 
and on the basis of what has been said previously, we have developed four metaphors 
for thinking about European construction: the flag, the association, the network and the 
bazaar. These metaphors when related to higher education translate into the following 
table. 
 
Metaphors Political and Economic Indicators Form of Higher Education 
Flag 
 
• Territory-based 
• National identity 
Modern University 
Association • Deterritorialised 
• Cosmopolitan causes 
University of ideas as World 
Heritage 
Network • Circulation/production of  information/knowledge Entrepreneurial University 
Bazaar • Knowledge producer 
• Celebration of cultural diversity; 
• World presence on the web of informational 
 capitalism (Castells, 1996); 
• Meeting place for differences, in all their 
 incommensurability, and negotiation among 
 them 
University of the Europe of 
Knowledge 
 
On the basis of this framework, we will attempt a dialogue with the three CHEPS 
scenarios for higher education in 2020, confronting them with the metaphors 
developed and discussing the consequences for higher educational institutions with 
regard to each: from the scenario that conceives of the university as central, both at the 
national and European levels, to the scenario where the concepts of both the university 
and of higher education itself are dissolved into multiple institutions. 
 
The metaphors are different from the scenarios to the extent that their use is totally 
heuristic, while the scenarios present alternative visions of reality. The metaphors are 
an analytical device useful for identifying layers of a complex reality, whereas the 
scenarios have the tendency to treat each layer as if it were itself a reality. The 
metaphor of the bazaar attempts to portray all the layers, not in the sense of dissolving 
the various layers in some overarching synthesis, but rather in the sense of preserving 
their, and its own, specificities. For this reason, the metaphors constitute a good point 
of departure for discussing the three CHEPS scenarios. 
 
In the first place, such an approach allows one to recognise that, rather than 
articulation, there is considerable overlapping, with regard to higher education, of the 
second and the third scenarios. Even if one recognises that in the third there exists an 
increase of emphasis on institutional autonomy in the attribution of a central role to the 
institutions themselves in the development of higher education, as well as an increase 
in the degree of deregulation of the system and of institutions, it is still evident that the 
networking process is at the heart of Vitis Vinifera. In fact, even when recognising that 
the triumph of the market coordination system (conceived as ‘a far more nuanced 
analytical appreciation’) is clearer in this third scenario, it cannot be denied that this 
process can only take place via the network. Furthermore, with regard to higher 
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education, the design proposed for the concept and respective institutions can only be 
distinguished by degree: the second scenario refers to an accreditation agency (the 
‘European Accreditation Network’) that works directly with the universities to assure 
the ‘smallest common denominator’, the third refers to a ‘data-warehouse for higher 
education programmes’ that is conceived as ‘a body not to be messed with’; the second 
speaks of 3,500 education providers and the third speaks of 6,000. In addition, the 
degree of ‘fuzziness’, although only distinctly referred to in the scenario of Octavia, 
can equally be applied to the Vitis Vinifera scenario. 
 
In different ways, both the metaphors and the scenarios take knowledge as central to 
both higher education and economy. The metaphor of the flag underlines that which is 
normally identified with the perspective of Europe as a mega-nation. The Centralia 
scenario appears to echo this perspective, by implying that having a possible future 
relates to having a long past. Both the Humboldtian and the Napoleonic universities, at 
the same time that they celebrated the universal character of knowledge, were framed 
by a national level system. The education systems created within the scope of the 
consolidation of the nation-state were, and, to a certain extent, still are, the 
disseminating mechanism of this knowledge and of this national character and, as 
such, are part of the tension between the universality of the former and the particularity 
of the latter. Centralia updates, to a certain extent, this conception of the university. To 
turn higher education into a central device for making Europe an economically viable 
zone vis-à-vis other mega-nations a development strategy is outlined centred on 
knowledge that feeds a process of regulation through deregulation. The use of this 
metaphor appears to make the key role of the ‘European state’ as manager more 
evident, even if via remote control, not only of the privatisation of social needs but also 
as the preserver of traditional, meaning attributed, citizenship. 
 
In the sequence of work carried out by Beck (1994), it appears that one of the principal 
problems that knowledge faces is its own management. In other words, after that which 
he terms a ‘first scientisation’, the process through which modern science (in its 
attempt to impose human design on nature) de-codified and transformed (via 
technology) reality (both social and natural), we are now confronting the task of 
managing the impact of this process within the scope of a ‘second scientisation’. Here, 
taking into account both the impact and the consequences of the first scientisation (for 
example, the effects on health of chemical fertilisers, the effects of modern medicine 
on the increase in life expectancy, etc.), science is constantly obliged to justify not only 
itself but also to demonstrate its relevance due to the risks it has created for humanity. 
In this sense, the British sociologist, Anthony Giddens (1990) has referred to the 
impact of the Chernobyl disaster on the world community as a challenge for science to 
reflect upon itself. Cosmopolitan causes find here not only a basis for the legitimation 
of new forms of association (‘green causes’, ‘peace causes’, ‘the cause of the free 
movement of peoples and goods’, ‘causes related to the end of patriarchalism’, ‘the 
cause of the social economy’, and so on) but also place emphasis on the social and 
cultural relevance of knowledge itself. These forms of association do not arise as 
absolute alternatives to capitalist development; instead they are articulated by new 
forms of citizenship that develop in and against such development. This posture of 
being in and against finds its source of dissemination in the network (web), itself a 
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product of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ capitalism. It is this sort of articulation that the scenarios of 
Octavia and Vitis Vinifera apparently underestimate. In these scenarios higher 
education appears to dissolve in the diversity of the appeals made by the economic, 
social and cultural worlds. Our metaphor suggests, however, that the dissolution of the 
idea of higher education is itself an area of conflict and debate, and not only the object 
of thought of more-or-less-occupied philosophers. 
 
On the other hand, the management of knowledge now involves dealing with 
increasingly plural and contextualised knowledges that claim a place in higher 
education. This implies, in Santos’ (1994) words, the substitution of the ‘idea of the 
university’ by the ‘university of ideas’. However, if it is true that the university has lost 
hegemony as knowledge producer and disseminator, this does not mean that the 
university has totally lost social and political responsibility. On the contrary, its 
responsibility now depends not only on consolidating national culture but, even more 
importantly, on promoting the articulation between different forms of culture and 
knowledge produced. The scenarios, however, appear to function as if, between the 
entrepreneurialism of individuals and groups and the unbearable weight of the 
Humboldtian university, nothing else is possible.  
 
The metaphor of the bazaar as a heuristic device for (un)thinking change in higher 
education suggests the construction of Europe and of higher education as a multiple 
and heterogeneous process. In the same way that one finds a variety of intense smells, 
sounds and sights in the bazaar, one also finds in Europe a vast variety of projects, 
both national and trans-national, trends, with regard to institutional organisation and 
governance, and different ways of thinking with regard to the very nature of the 
structure of the system of higher education. Higher education itself is living an identity 
crisis (Magalhães, 2001) that is reflected in the manner in which the Bologna process 
is being managed, a process that appears to be divided between an option for post-
secondary education and the ‘good old’ higher education dominant under the metaphor 
of the flag. 
 
The metaphor of the bazaar assumes this somewhat cacophonous situation not as a 
development stage that will lead to a better and more tidy future but as a de facto 
situation that expresses the variable political, cultural and economic geometry referred 
to above. The heterogeneity of higher education and its continuing crisis in the context 
of an increasingly knowledge-intensive society constitutes, indeed, to paraphrase a 
prophet of 20th century social change, a ‘permanent revolution’. Whether regulation 
takes place via the market, the state, or even reflexive consumers, higher education 
will not easily be domesticated in a tidy idea. This does not mean that one takes a 
position of ‘anything goes’. It means, rather, taking on the assumption that privileged 
forms of higher education are being both dissolved and reinforced. On the one hand, 
without wishing to deny the positional value of higher education, the demands of the 
knowledge society, taking into account its different levels and seen from the 
perspective of what we have termed ‘soft’ capitalism, require diverse higher education 
forms. On the other hand, in order to escape from the dilemmas placed by the option 
between mass higher education and the ‘massification’ of higher education, traditional  
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forms of higher education tend to promote the renewal, on the basis of ‘hard’ 
capitalism, of distinction strategies and develop into hybrid forms of traditional 
collegiate institutions and entrepreneurial organisations. 
 
In contrast to the CHEPS scenarios, in the bazaar, the Oxbridge model will flourish in 
the same space as two- to three-year community college courses, national universities 
will coincide with higher education institutions based on e-learning, institutions 
dedicated solely to research will co-exist with institutions whose fundamental 
emphasis is on teaching, scientific knowledge (both mode 1 and 2) will be confronted 
with other more contextualised knowledges and biographical projects, both individual 
and group, that will be interiorised as organisational profiles (‘the greening of the 
universities’, ‘the inclusive university’, ‘the non-patriarchal university’, ‘the non-racist 
university’, ‘the entrepreneurial university’, ‘the indigenous university’), making 
higher education not only heterogeneous but also a site of conflicts and 
incommensurabilities.  
 
In summary, our comment on the CHEPS scenarios takes as a starting point the idea 
that in order to consider what will happen to higher education in the near future, one 
needs to look at the context within which it will develop. We have summarised this 
context as one of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ capitalism where social and individual 
reflexivity take on an increasingly important role. In this context, higher education is 
made up of the tension between individuals and groups who insist on writing their own 
scripts with regard to higher education and top-down political projects that insist on 
writing these scripts for them. 
 
Our emphasis on the intertwining of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ capitalism leads us to stress the 
mixed nature of the sociological and economic characteristics of present contexts. It is 
this mixture that has led us to develop the metaphor of the bazaar. In the bazaar, the 
scenarios do not arise as alternatives, nor as mere heterogeneity but rather as a 
relational logic of political, economic and cultural demands and needs. As referred to 
above, the metaphor of the bazaar does not suggest a better and more tidy future but, 
rather, a de facto situation that expresses the variable political, cultural and economic 
geometry of both Europe and higher education. 
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Introduction 
The great theories that have shaped our understanding of social change since the 19th 
century tend to have one important thing in common. They were based on assumptions 
of causation or some dominant logic that drive processes of social change, be it 
relations of economic production, the rationalisation of organisational forms, the 
normative foundation and social cohesion or individual self-interested behaviour to 
mention a few. One of the great strengths of the CHEPS scenarios is the broad and 
‘thick’ descriptions they give of possible futures for Europe only fifteen years from 
now. The scenarios provide three very rich and complex pictures that may furnish us 
with ideas about social change and help us think more profoundly about the forces that 
will shape the Europe of 2020. Yet, keeping some of the merits of classic social 
science theorizing in mind, we are also left to wonder about the decisive forces that 
have brought Europe to the states described in the scenarios, and that explain the 
differences between the paths along which the scenarios have developed. While there 
certainly are many implicit suggestions, from an explanatory and a comparative point 
of view there is a need to specify the underlying models of the scenarios so they may 
serve both as aides in explaining why a particular development occurred and in 
comparing what the major differences between the various development paths may be. 
When we move from the broad socio-political developments to higher education in 
particular, we also need to ask what the relationship is between the former and latter, 
and try to formulate assumptions about the factors most important in shaping the make 
up of higher education systems and their particular forms of institutional organisation, 
management and funding.  
 
During the last years we have seen several important contributions analysing ongoing 
trends in research and higher education relevant to the formulation of scenarios. Two 
traditional divisions in the literature on and debate about the development and future of 
universities are the following. The first is the belief universities are drastically 
changing in ways that will make them constantly more similar or uniform vs. the belief 
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that basic features of academic institutions are deeply institutionalised, as is the 
influence of nation states on the way which institutions are run. This contributes to 
preserving established patterns of diversity across institutional and national borders. 
Secondly, there is a fundamental division informing most discussions about the future 
of academic institutions between those who believe drastic change is needed and those 
who see it as a threat to the mission and function of these institutions. Among the core 
questions in these discussions is firstly to what extent universities are likely to preserve 
or defend their autonomy and the academic freedom of their scientific personnel, or 
whether they will increasingly come under managerial control aiming at expanding the 
accountability of universities at the expense of autonomy. Secondly, there is the 
normative question of to what extent further development in the direction of 
managerialism is needed or not.  
 
In the following I shall argue the scenarios may represent three trends visible today as 
universities are characterised by increasing managerialism, are becoming stakeholder 
organisations and increasingly are coordinated and regulated by market mechanisms. 
Then I shall point out these trends do not necessarily mean universities and university 
systems are becoming more uniform. Finally, I argue there are important continuities 
in the development of higher education systems, the implication of which is  
universities are not necessarily becoming less autonomous and unable to protect the 
academic freedom of their scientific staff. 
The Scenarios – Characteristics and Differences 
Let me first point out some of the major characteristics of the scenarios and the 
differences between them. I am not contending the characteristics and differences in 
themselves are the most important ones. However, from the perspective of 
organisational theory and theories of public policy, there are significant differences 
between the scenarios and this will hopefully aid our understanding of some of their 
implications for higher education and research. 
 
In terms of driving logic we may in a somewhat simplified way distinguish two of the 
scenarios as, at least implicitly, driven respectively by a predominantly public 
political-bureaucratic logic (Centralia) and a market logic (Vitis Vinifera). There is an 
established literature about these two social arrangements that spell out the normative 
and interest based rationales driving human behaviour under the two different sets of 
circumstances provided by them. These characteristics make the two scenarios both 
easily understandable, familiar and clearly if not radically different. The third scenario 
(Octavia) may be considered a ‘network’ scenario where social structures, their 
success and failures, depend on what kind of networks they form. It is more difficult in 
this case to identify a theory about what motivates the behaviour of social actors. The 
interesting thing about the network scenario is it assumes markets and ‘the welfare 
state’ have become harder to identify because the boundaries between them have 
become blurred. Instead of the invisible hand of the market or the visible hand of the 
state, the name of the game is ‘networking’. Correct as the argument may be, this 
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blurring of boundaries is hardly new.1 What is new is whereas previous theories used 
to assume identifiable systems became interwoven in new but stable patterns, network 
theory suggests more transient, flexible and less clearly defined networks. However, 
by pointing out these characteristics without providing more precise assumptions about 
how actors are motivated and the driving forces behind the process, the networking 
concept easily becomes more of a metaphor than part of a theory. 
 
In what follows I shall develop on these characteristics by discussing some of the ideas 
contained in the scenarios. I shall do so by focusing first on the assumptions they make 
about: 1) demographics, in particular student-mobility, 2) organisational implications 
of growth, and 3) location of political and economic power. 
 
One of the characteristics of the scenarios is they do not seem as radically different as 
one might expect. There are some striking similarities regarding the challenges with 
which European societies and higher education systems are faced, but although the 
challenges are similar the various scenarios assume they have been dealt with in 
different ways by society and governments. 
 
First of all the scenarios assume quite soberly that Europe’s population is aging or 
greying. The demographic source of variation across scenarios is the extent of 
immigration from other parts of the world. Thus the welfare state scenario does not 
only envision strong national and European political-administrative structures, but also 
that there are high barriers against immigration and student mobility. Immigration rates 
are accordingly kept low and there is little movement (of students) between the most 
integrated blocks, the US and the EU. The other scenarios presume higher student 
mobility but in somewhat different ways. The network scenario assumes ageing 
populations have led to a reduction in the number of younger traditional students, 
which is counter-balanced by an increasing number of international students 
particularly at the post-graduate level. The market scenario assumes on the other hand 
greater variations nationally of the student body and limited mobility. 
 
The second common characteristic is all scenarios presume, although to varying extent, 
growth in higher education. However, the way in which growth has been handled 
varies both in terms of the organisation of higher education systems as well as in terms 
of the number, size and diversity of institutions involved. According to the welfare 
state scenario the sector will be characterised by a wave of mergers that by 2020 will 
turn the HE landscape into one made up by big (if not mega sized) multi campus 
regional universities. One campus universities are mainly found in small countries. 
Some global players, such as Oxbridge, have also become stronger by mergers. 
Universities have become more managerial, but still the notion of leadership by 
academics, particularly in elite institutions, keeps academic freedom a major value. 
The institutional hierarchy is still sustained by prestige and concentration of public 
research funding. The network scenario predicts a diverse and more diffuse 
                                                        
1
 From the 1960s on there has been a rich literature on different forms of blurring of boundaries 
between the state and the market, suffice it to mention such classics as Charles Lindblom’s Politics 
and markets (1977) and Gösta Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). 
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institutional landscape. It will be harder than it is today to identify a university or a HE 
sector. Successful universities capitalise on traditional academic virtues. Other 
institutions are more network-like matrixes that may comprise public, semi-public and 
private entities for teaching, research and service. Open universities in Europe are 
affiliated with on-line providers on other continents. Some universities have 
disappeared through mergers. Others have organised themselves in specialised clusters. 
Most undergraduate students are still in national or regional universities. Inter-
university alliances between these universities and the many local low cost providers 
of tertiary education are a widespread phenomenon. The market scenario displays a 
more utility oriented and in several aspects more privatised and market oriented higher 
education system in which private- and student funding is ubiquitous, competition at 
all levels for private and public research funding is common and diversity is increased. 
After experiencing problems as a result of mergers, institutions tend to be relatively 
small, particularly many of the most successful ones. In spite of their diversity there is 
no formal differentiation between institutions by type. A small minority of them will 
resemble today’s comprehensive universities, while most are much more specialised. 
Research and Doctoral degree programmes are increasingly concentrated in elite 
universities in Western and Northern Europe. 
 
Finally, it is a shared assumption in all scenarios that the political and economic power 
of nation states to some extent has been reduced or at least circumscribed by 
supranational structures, such as the European Union and other international structures 
with a global reach. Here it is the relative strength of different levels of governance: 
local, national, regional or global, which is an important source of variation across 
scenarios. The welfare state scenario depicts a relatively strong welfare oriented and 
integrated EU, driven by the EU commission, in spite of its expansion to 37 member 
countries. The scenario assumes the current trend towards managerialism within 
public systems will continue. Yet values of leadership by academics and academic 
freedom, particularly in elite institutions, limit the spread of managerialism. Within the 
network scenario the EU is less dominant as an integrating force. Integration is served 
by a number of different multilayered networks (in politics, business or the voluntary 
sector) of varying geographical reach (local, national, regional, global). This is also 
reflected in the looser matrix-like structure of higher education institutions. The 
network scenario assumes the trend towards universities as stakeholder organisations 
in which a varying and changing number of stakeholders get a stronger say over 
decisions made by and within institutions. The market scenario portrays an EU that is 
quite recognizable, an uneasy cohabitation of national sovereignty and shared supra-
national interests and coordination. In this sense the market scenario further develops 
the trend towards use of market and quasi market mechanisms in higher education 
institutions and systems. 
Three Scenarios and two Higher Education Regimes 
The scenarios differ in other respects, such as regarding how and by what forces higher 
education, as well as social activities in general, tend to be coordinated. In order to 
conceptualise this coordination we may distinguish in broad and general terms 
between two types of emerging higher education regimes (Bleiklie 2005): One type is 
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an academic capitalist regime, driven by university-industry alliances, economic 
interests and a commercial logic. In spite of its huge influence on the discourse about 
higher education and as a symbol of current changes in higher education institutions, 
be it ‘academic capitalism’ (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997) or ‘entrepreneurial 
universities’ (Clark, 1998), industry funding is an important source for relatively few 
top research universities, particularly in the US (Powell & Owen-Smith 1998, Turk-
Bicakci & Brint 2004). In fact the dominant pattern is most higher education 
institutions are publicly funded and owned by national or regional governments. This 
might be taken as an argument to the effect that stability prevails in the face of all 
rhetoric about fundamental change. Stakeholder leadership (Neave 2002), according to 
the business enterprise ideal, may however support the spread of ‘capitalism’ and be 
supported by a combination of public austerity policies and stronger influence by other 
outside interests financially and through university board positions. It should also be 
pointed out that in the area of teaching market mechanisms play a more prominent role 
than in basic research funding. 
 
The way in which public authorities run universities has changed fundamentally, and 
this move towards increased ‘managerialism’ has been heavily influenced by notions 
of ‘academic capitalism’ and ‘entrepreneurial universities’. It manifests itself in the 
notion of universities as business enterprises and the introduction of quasi-market 
mechanisms in order to promote competition, cost effectiveness and increased 
accountability. These public managerialist regimes are driven by university-state 
alliances, political-administrative interests and a semi-competitive logic based on 
incentive policies where public support depends partly on teaching and/or research 
performance. They come, however, in different versions that may be understood 
against the backdrop of the previous public regimes from which they have developed. 
Based on the findings of our comparative study of the systems of England, Norway 
and Sweden, (Kogan et al. 2000) we pointed out the public regimes that characterised 
the systems until the 1980s or 1990s were different in important respects. Although all 
systems in principle were mainly public, different actor constellations, alliances and 
interests characterised the regimes. This raises two questions: To what extent does a 
particular type of regime determine the specific organisation of universities and the 
higher education systems to which they belong? To what extent are universities and 
university systems becoming more similar? If they are becoming more similar this may 
indicate the capacity of nation states to shape universities and provide protection for 
their cultural mission against short term utilitarian concerns is reduced. 
 
Based on evidence from a number of comparative studies of reform and change in 
higher education systems, it may be argued these variations cannot be deduced from a 
particular regime type. There are considerable variations within the same type of 
regimes, and this suggests those that dominate the European scene are deeply 
embedded in institutionalised patterns shaping the policies, administrative practises 
and educational traditions on which higher education systems are based. Thus one 
finds differences across Europe with respect to how higher education policies are 
formulated, administrative practices manifested and educational traditions play 
themselves out. Teichler (1988) has demonstrated how the exact implications of 
massification have varied across countries depending on what institutional and 
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organisational patterns were developed in order to deal with higher education 
expansion. Comparative evidence from countries such as England, France, Germany, 
Norway and Sweden suggests the solutions have been contested and shaped by 
established institutional structures (Kogan et al., forthcoming; Musselin, 1999). In 
particular, the comparative study of university reforms in England, Norway and 
Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates how reforms, apparently justified in 
terms of common ideals such as autonomy, accountability, efficiency and quality, were 
not only introduced in institutional settings that were quite different, but also followed 
different paths (Kogan et al., forthcoming). 
 
As for the capacity of nation states to keep up traditional values, a study comparing 
changes in government regulation of higher education in eight countries – Australia, 
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom and the United States 
– during almost the same period (late 1980s and 1990s), found  autonomous collegial 
decision making still plays an essential role in all university systems, but enjoys a 
stronger position in continental Europe than in the Anglo-American countries and 
Japan. Conversely, competition plays a stronger role in systems with many and 
influential private institutions (Japan, the US) and countries that have pursued more 
radical New Public Management policies (Hood et al., 2004). 
 
At the level of policy formulations and formal organisational arrangements there has 
been a noticeable movement towards what I have called the market model, i.e. a 
development in the direction of the Vitis Vinifera scenario. This is one that is 
characterised by Mode 2 practices and pragmatism and one in which the value of 
accountability ranks high. Yet there is also a concern for quality in teaching and 
research that in the final analysis must rest on good academic work as judged by 
academic peers. 
 
At a level of actual behavior, policies and practices combine to push in the direction of 
stronger public state structures, although with many quasi market features, such as 
increased competition, at the national and European levels. This might be taken to 
support an argument that the Centralia scenario, particularly regarding the role of the 
national and supra national state structures, is a probable one. In this scenario several 
of the actual trends we may observe today are taken a step further: intra-institutional 
mergers (departments and faculties) have become inter-institutional mergers, and after 
the build up of national quality assurance agencies in the first decade of the 21st 
century, European level quality insurance agencies have become much more salient 
actors in the policy landscape.  
 
Where does this leave the network or Octavia scenario? Today we can already observe 
market based and public operating modes tend to blend. Furthermore, the way in 
which those structures blend may be understood in terms of network characteristics of 
the actor constellations involved. Thus we may find systems in which networks are 
more or less under the influence of particular actors such as social and academic elites, 
interest organisations, state authorities or autonomous institutions (Bleiklie 
forthcoming). Such networks may furthermore vary in terms of social cohesion 
between tightly knit ‘policy communities’ to more loosely organised ‘issue networks’ 
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(Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). One of the lessons from comparative research on change in 
higher education systems is that although they may be exposed to similar pressures 
(e.g. massification) and political-ideological trends (new public management, 
privatisation) that may push them in the same direction, they tend to remain on parallel 
courses and do not necessarily move closer to one another (Kogan et al., forthcoming).  
Concluding Remarks on Autonomy and Academic Freedom 
The above argument means major trends in university organisation (managerialism, 
stakeholder organisations and the use of market mechanisms) are all likely to 
characterise higher education institutions and systems 15 years from now, but they are 
also likely to be limited by counter-forces represented by key functions of modern 
universities and knowledge production. These characteristics may be considered 
stabilizing elements in higher education and knowledge producing systems. The 
Swedish historian Sverker Sörlin argues in a recent paper that in the face of the 
fashionable idea that universities need to be held more clearly accountable for the 
products they offer society, in return for the resources invested in them by public or 
private agencies, there is little available evidence that universities over time perform 
better if they operate under conditions that provide less autonomy and academic 
freedom in order to achieve more accountability and entrepreneurial efficiency (Sörlin 
2004). There are several reasons for this. Firstly there is the fact that top rated 
universities generally operate under conditions of autonomy and offer considerable 
academic freedom to their professors. These universities are still the winners in the 
competition for public research funding. He argues further that although mission-
oriented research groups seem to perform well in basic research, there is also 
overwhelming evidence to support the claim that basic research in traditional academic 
settings – research universities, with traditional academic funding and with a large 
degree of autonomy – is an enormously efficient way of producing new theoretical and 
empirical, if not immediately applicable, knowledge (Sörlin, 2004). Secondly there is 
no conclusive evidence to support the notion that research institutions organised as 
entrepreneurial universities along the lines of the business enterprise produce more 
useful results (licenses, patents, start-ups, firm formation) than traditional academic 
research institutions. Thirdly the entrepreneurial university is, however, only one of 
several dimensions of the third mission of universities. There are other kinds of 
services that universities openly or tacitly are expected to deliver and have provided to 
a large extent since the 19th century. These services may be: independent criticism, 
credibility, reliability, special expertise and trust. Regarding the wider cultural role of 
universities and basic research there are no other institutions than universities that 
seem able to sustain such important functions, and we may conclude the legitimacy of 
universities has very much to do with the extent they are able to serve as upholders of 
criticism, credibility, and trust. If such properties are dependent on autonomy and non-
partisanship, which they are, autonomy and academic freedom is indeed something 
likely to find institutional protection 15 years from now. 
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Introduction 
Forecasts are typically difficult to make, especially about the future. 
 
Niels Bohr 
 
 
From Centralia to Vitis Vinifera to Octavia, CHEPS has taken us on a fascinating 
voyage of imagination and exploration, outlining three distinct scenarios for the future 
of tertiary education in Europe.2 The scenarios are constructed around a set of key 
variables such as the size of the sector, its institutional structure, the type of 
pedagogical organisation that would prevail, the role of private providers (both 
domestic and foreign), the focus of the research agenda, the quality assurance system 
and financing and management arrangements. 
 
To assess the usefulness and relevance of these scenarios, this chapter applies the tests 
of time and space. It starts with a question about the actual distance between these 
possible futures and the present situation. It then moves from Europe to other parts of 
the world to explore the implications of these scenarios for developing countries. The 
paper also attempts to identify some missing elements in the three scenarios. Finally, it 
                                                        
1
 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author 
and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, the members of its Board of Executive 
Directors or the countries the present. 
2
 This paper adopts the OECD definition of tertiary education as ‘a level or stage of studies beyond 
secondary education.  Such studies are undertaken in tertiary education institutions, such as public 
and private universities, colleges, and polytechnics, and also in a wide range of other settings, such as 
secondary schools, work sites, and via free-standing information technology-based offerings and a 
host of public and private entities.’  (Wagner, 1999). 
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briefly outlines how the changes represented by Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera 
might affect the way in which the World Bank supports tertiary education systems and 
institutions in developing countries. 
How Different is the Future? 
All things change. Yet nothing is extinguished… there is nothing in the whole 
world which is permanent. Everything flows onwards and all things are brought 
into being with a changing nature. The ages themselves glide by in constant 
movement, for still waters will never reach the sea. 
 
Ovid 
 
As provocative as some aspects of the three worlds anticipated by CHEPS may appear 
in the European context, in many ways the future has already arrived, at least in some 
countries and some institutions.  We can look at five dimensions to illustrate this point: 
new information and communication technologies (ICT), networking, quality 
assurance, management practices, and financing.  
 
The ICT revolution has already begun to transform the tertiary education landscape as 
well as the way institutions operate. The convergence of increased computing power 
and reduced communication costs has brought about the quasi neutralisation of 
physical distance, leading to the emergence of virtual universities and online 
programmes that can reach students anywhere in the world and compete with local 
institutions. The Virtual University of Monterrey in Mexico, for example, offers 15 
master’s degree programmes using teleconferencing and the Internet to reach more 
than 50,000 students throughout Latin America. The proliferation of distance 
education programmes within existing institutions all over the world has also increased 
opportunities for young people and adults whose circumstances prevent them from 
physically attending a tertiary education programme. In the United States, the largest – 
and fastest growing – university today is the for-profit private University of Phoenix, 
which expanded its reach from less than 20,000 students in 1995 to around 70,000 in 
2000 and 230,000 in 2005, catering to working young adults who study toward 
professionally oriented degrees and diplomas in a mixed delivery mode. 
 
Within existing universities and other tertiary education institutions, ICT can be 
applied to radically change pedagogical and administrative practices. The concurrent 
use of multimedia, computers and the internet can make more active and interactive 
learning experiences possible. For example self-directed learning and peer tutoring, 
experiential learning with virtual labs, problem-based learning through web-based 
artificial intelligence applications (‘cognitive tutors’), or any combination of these 
approaches can greatly enhance the quality and effectiveness of the education 
experience. Finally, appropriate management information systems and tools have the 
potential to streamline and reduce administrative tasks, making it possible to manage 
tertiary education systems and institutions with greater efficiency. 
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The development of university networks is also a phenomenon already in motion. For 
more than four decades North American and European universities have been 
supporting counterpart institutions in developing countries through various modalities 
of linkage programmes, often with donor agencies funding. In the past fifteen years, 
EU-sponsored programmes such as Tempus, Erasmus (now Erasmus Mundus) or 
Colombus have encouraged and supported the creation of alliances among European 
institutions of higher learning as well as between European universities and institutions 
in other parts of the world. More recently, teaching and research institutions in many 
countries have felt the need to forge alliances and partnerships with each other, 
sometimes even with foreign partners, in order to better compete on the global scene. 
While many of these initiatives have not been very successful – witness the recent 
debacle of the British E-University and the closing down of the US Open University, 
due to the absence of a real pedagogical project in the first instance and the lack of a 
proper business model in the second case – some of them have pioneered path-
breaking collaboration modalities. For instance, the partnerships between MIT and the 
University of Singapore, or between the University of Michigan and Seoul National 
University allow students in two continents to study together and do joint research 
projects through video-conferencing and the Internet. In the USA, many community 
colleges operate some of their courses through sub-contracting agreements with private 
training firms. 
 
It is important to underline these networking arrangements have been greatly 
facilitated by the availability of ICTs and the ongoing expansion of the Internet 2 
platform, which already links more than 200 universities and research centers in three 
continents and will likely multiply opportunities for joint activities, especially in the 
research area. 
 
Quality assurance is a third dimension worth mentioning in the context of this 
discussion. While it is true the establishment of independent evaluation and/or 
accreditation agencies in the realm of tertiary education is a fairly recent development 
in Europe, there has been a long accreditation tradition in the United States and many 
developing countries have also moved in this direction. In Latin America, for instance, 
Colombia, Chile and Argentina have been at the vanguard of accreditation efforts since 
the early 1990s, while Mexico has recently set up a meta-level accreditation body 
whose purpose is to accredit accreditation organisations. In Western Europe, the 
Bologna process has certainly accelerated the movement in this direction with the 
search for common accreditation criteria and mechanisms. In this context, it is striking 
to observe the eagerness of accession countries in Eastern Europe to make progress in 
this area in preparation for their integration into the European Union. 
 
Interestingly, one variation of quality assurance that has also emerged quite 
spontaneously in Europe is the increasingly frequent practice of calculating rankings to 
compare universities or programmes. Notwithstanding the usefulness of these often 
controversial exercises – in 2004, the New Zealand Council of Rectors successfully 
challenged the government’s attempt to publish rankings of the country’s universities  
– rankings are becoming a regular feature of the tertiary education scene. In the UK, 
for instance, the government has compiled and published peer rankings of individual 
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researchers and institutions for several years; daily newspapers such as the Financial 
Times, the Guardian and the Sunday Times have also done their own league tables of 
up to a dozen indicators; the Times even recently published a ranking of the top 200 
universities worldwide. In Germany, a think tank financed by the Council of Rectors 
has developed an interesting methodology showing rankings for a variety of criteria 
without calculating an overall rank, unlike the US News and World magazine which 
provides an overall ranking for programmes compared across universities. Rankings 
are also commonly published by newspapers and magazines in several other European 
countries, such as France, Germany and Poland. 
 
With respect to the management dimension, the move toward an entrepreneurial 
culture stressed as one of the salient features of the Vitis Vinifera scenario echoes the 
transformation of a growing number of European universities that have adopted more 
modern, business-like management practices. The entrepreneurial university was the 
theme of the OECD’s Institutional Management Higher Education annual conference 
in September 2002. The conference showcased the results of several years of research 
on the evolution of management practices in OECD countries’ universities, as well as 
the publication of Burton Clark’s celebrated book on this theme (Clark, 1998). 
 
Finally, it is worth noting the main features of financing presented in the Vitis Vinifera 
scenario, namely the generalisation of tuition fees with student loans, while novel in 
the European context with the notable exceptions of England and Wales, can be found 
in a growing number of Latin American (Chile, Colombia) and Asian nations (China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea) where the private sector enrolls a large share 
of the student population and the public universities charge significant fees. The 
European student voucher scheme sustaining the Octavia scenario is certainly bolder in 
concept. Even though many education economists have argued that a voucher system 
could be an efficient mechanism to encourage quality improvement through 
competition, this approach has hardly been tested at the tertiary education level. In that 
respect, it will be quite instructive to follow the evolution of the recent introduction of 
a voucher scheme in the state of Colorado in the US. 
 
In summary, these five areas (ICT, networking, quality assurance, management and 
financing) have served to illustrate the fact that the world of tertiary education has 
already evolved in more than one sense. To a large extent, the difference between the 
present and the future(s) explored by CHEPS is more a question of scale and scope 
rather than of significantly new trends. This observation does not diminish in any way 
the relevance of the Delphi projection process undertaken by CHEPS as a useful 
device to emphasise the possible consequences of existing trends by contrasting three 
possible evolution paths. It also suggests that elements of these scenarios may unfold 
sooner than the 2020 horizon of the CHEPS study. 
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Implications for Developing Countries 
In questions of mind, there is no medium term: 
either we look for the best or we live with the worst. 
 
John Gardner 
 
Another measure of the relevance of the three scenarios is to look at them from the 
viewpoint of developing countries and ask whether the salient features of Octavia, 
Vitis Vinifera or Centralia have any meaning for that part of the world. Despite the fact 
many developing nations are still struggling with basic issues of quantitative expansion 
and quality improvement in a resource-constrained environment, many of the 
challenges explored in the three CHEPS scenarios are indeed relevant to tertiary 
education institutions in the developing world. Key implications relate to tertiary 
education reform and quality assurance. 
 
In the first place all nations, poor and rich alike, are feeling the pressure to reform their 
tertiary education systems to better respond to the changing skill needs arising from 
economic restructuring efforts within the context of these countries’ competitiveness 
and globalisation agendas. In this context, the tertiary education system has the 
complex mission of imparting higher-level skills to a rising proportion of the 
workforce; fostering lifelong learning for all citizens with an emphasis on creativity 
and flexibility, to permit constant adaptation to the changing demands of a knowledge-
based economy; and promoting international recognition of the credentials granted by 
the country’s educational institutions. In the medium term this may lead to a 
progressive blurring between initial and continuing degree studies, as well as between 
young adult and mid-career training. Finland, one of the leading promoters of 
continuing education in Europe, is among the most advanced nations in terms of 
conceptualizing and organizing tertiary education along these new lines. Today, the 
country has more adults engaged in continuing education programmes (200,000) than 
young people enrolled in regular higher education degree courses (150,000). 
 
This evolution means the primary clientele of universities will no longer be young high 
school graduates. Universities will need to organise themselves to accommodate the 
learning and training needs of an increasingly diverse clientele:  working students, 
mature students, stay-at-home students, travelling students, part-time students, day 
students, night students, weekend students, etc. One can therefore expect a significant 
change in the demographic shape of tertiary education institutions, whereby the 
traditional structure of a pyramid with a majority of first degree students, a smaller 
group of post-graduate students and finally an even smaller share of participants in 
continuing education programmes will be replaced by an inverted pyramid with a 
minority of first time students, more students pursuing a second or third degree and the 
majority of students enrolled in short term continuing education activities. 
 
Secondly, the concern around setting up or consolidating a national quality assurance 
system is equally strong in developing countries which are faced with the rapid growth 
of private tertiary education institutions and increased competition from foreign 
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providers in the form of virtual universities or branches of overseas universities (Salmi, 
2002). Very few developing nations have an established accreditation and evaluation 
system, let alone access to the necessary information on these foreign programmes or 
institutional monitoring capacity to detect fraud and protect their students from low 
quality offerings. Many Latin American countries, for example, find themselves in the 
awkward situation of having more distance education doctoral programmes proposed 
by Spanish universities than conventional doctoral programmes offered in their 
national universities. These countries need to establish the capacity to accredit new 
providers and programmes and to recognise qualifications acquired through non-
traditional modes of delivery (e-learning, individualised degrees, etc.). As Sir John 
Daniel – one of the world’s experts on open universities and distance education – 
declared a few years back, ‘distance learning is a world of extremes, when you look at 
the best university education around the world, some of it is now distance learning, 
when you look for the worst, all of it is distance learning. Bad distance learning may 
now be given a new lease on life by the brave new world of online teaching.’ (Daniel, 
1999). With the increased focus on lifelong learning and multiple learning paths and 
the expansion of online educational modalities, there is an irreversible trend toward 
student evaluation approaches that emphasise learning outcomes and acquired 
competencies of students over the input and process aspects of education. Low-income 
countries and small states that cannot afford (or where it does not make sense) to set up 
a full-blown national quality assurance system can join forces for the establishment of 
a common regional accreditation scheme, as has happened with the six Spanish-
speaking countries of Central America. 
 
Finally, it is not too surprising that universities in developing countries are facing 
many of the same issues as their European sisters since they belong to the same 
historical tradition. In most developing nations, the universities were built on the 
European model, reflecting either the influence of the former colonial power, Great 
Britain or France in most cases, or the Humboldt model of the traditional research 
university. 
What is Missing in the CHEPS Scenarios? 
Learning is but an adjunct to ourself,  
And where we are our learning likewise is. 
 
William Shakespeare 
 
Understandingly the authors of the three scenarios had to be selective in the number of 
variables focused on. But there are several additional issues worth mentioning here 
which could have a significant influence on the role and shape of European tertiary 
education systems in 2020. 
Global Dimension 
A key issue is the global dimension and the effects, positive and negative, large 
countries such as the USA, China and India can have on Europe. The visa restrictions 
in the aftermath of September 11, for instance, have resulted in a dramatic decrease in 
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the number of foreign students enrolled in graduate programmes in the United States; 
for the 2004-05 academic year, applications from China have dropped 45 percent; from 
India, 28 percent. Countries with a proactive international vocation, such as the UK, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have been able to take advantage of this 
opportunity to attract a growing number of students from Eastern Europe and Asia. 
New Zealand is even considering charging foreign PhD candidates domestic student 
tuition fees, in sharp contrast to recent trends in the United Kingdom and Australia. 
 
Similarly, the fact that China has recently overtaken the USA in terms of overall 
number of universities and students, and that the Indian tertiary education market is 
also growing rapidly cannot be ignored by Europe. European universities will have to 
address the tension between a long tradition of solidarity with Third World universities 
and the recent evolution toward a more business-like model based on competitive 
behaviours. 
Brain Drain 
An inevitable consequence of an increasingly integrated global economy and an 
internationally linked knowledge society is a rise in the worldwide mobility of skilled 
human resources. While developing countries frequently view this mobility as a threat 
to national welfare and a loss of scarce resources, many European countries have 
benefited from the influx of professionals and skilled labour from Africa or Asia.  But 
in recent years, a new facet of the brain drain has appeared with the migration of 
engineers and technicians from Russia and other Eastern European countries to the 
West. This trend, which started after the fall of the Berlin wall, is likely to accelerate 
with the enlargement of the European Union. It could aggravate existing economic 
imbalances and create tensions between receiving and exporting regions. 
Role of Universities in Regional Development 
This issue received scant attention in the CHEPS scenarios. Studies on clusters have 
stressed the strategic importance of building up a nexus of universities, research 
centers, business incubators and innovative firms that can drive economic growth at 
the regional level. This geographical dimension is underlined by a rich body of 
evidence on the contribution of universities to regional development and the spillover 
effects of academic research on industrial research and technology and local 
innovation (Adams, 2001; Branstetter, 2001; Carrin et.al., 2004; Shahid et.al., 2003) 
Non-University Tertiary Institutions 
The focus of the CHEPS scenarios on the future of universities should be nuanced with 
a better appreciation of the important social and economic role of such institutions. 
Over the past 30 years, the development of a variety of new institutions alongside the 
traditional universities – short duration technical institutes (French ‘IUT’, Dutch 
‘HBO’), polytechnics and Fachhochschulen (German and Austrian), distance 
education centers and open universities – has created new opportunities to meet the 
growing social demand for tertiary education and provide professional qualifications 
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that are often as, if not more, relevant than many university programmes. In many 
European countries, these institutions enroll a large proportion of the overall student 
population. The scenarios need to take into account the challenge of creating 
comprehensive lifelong systems that integrate a variety of qualifications acquired in 
different types of institutions. 
Political Dimensions of Reform 
Greater attention is needed on the political dimensions of some of the potentially 
controversial reforms featured in the three scenarios, such as the generalisation of 
tuition fees (Vitis Vinifera) or the introduction of a European voucher system 
(Octavia). In his famous political manifesto, the Prince, Machiavelli wrote that ‘there 
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain 
in its success than to take the lead in introducing a new order of things’. While this 
observation is true in the political realm in general, it is even more valid in the case of 
the university community which tends to be among the most conservative 
constituencies in any country. In Germany, for example, the recent declaration of the 
Karlsruhe Constitutional Court to the effect that charging tuition fees is not 
unconstitutional was greeted by student protests in several states. The success of any 
tertiary education reform will depend on careful political management to build 
consensus and seek ownership among all stakeholders. 
Evolution of World Bank Support for Tertiary Education 
It is impossible to have a complete education system without an appropriate and 
strong higher education system. . . . I am not for a moment suggesting that 
primary education and secondary education are not at the very essence of 
development . . . (but that is) not enough. You have to have centers of excellence 
and learning and training if you are going to advance the issue of poverty and 
development in developing countries. . . . the key . . . is higher education, not just 
on the technological side, but to create people with enough wisdom to be able to 
use it.  
 
James D. Wolfensohn, Launch of the Report of the Task Force on Higher 
Education and Society, March 1, 2000. 
 
In a rapidly changing global world that is undergoing the kinds of deep transformations 
explored in the three CHEPS scenarios, the World Bank – and other donor agencies – 
cannot continue to interact with developing and transition countries in a ‘business as 
usual’ mode. The policy dialogue, knowledge sharing and financial assistance offered 
by the Bank need to focus on ways of helping tertiary education systems in these 
countries prepare effectively for continuous transformation. This implies two 
complementary approaches, discussed below. 
 
First, countries need to formulate a clear strategic vision of how their tertiary education 
system can most appropriately contribute to the development of a knowledge-driven 
economy, how each institution elects to evolve within that system and under what 
conditions the new information and communication technologies can be harnessed to 
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improve the effectiveness and relevance of the learning experience. The 2000 report on 
the Size and Shape of Higher Education in South Africa, or the 2001 India as 
Knowledge Superpower strategy illustrate recent attempts to develop such a vision at 
the national level, as a tribute to the wise words of the Roman philosopher, Seneca, 
who cautioned us two millennia ago that ‘there is no favorable wind for those who do 
not know where they are going.’ (Council on Higher Education Size and Shape Task 
Team, 2000; Planning Commission Government of India, 2001) 
 
Strategic planning exercises undertaken by individual tertiary institutions serve a 
similar purpose. By identifying both favourable and harmful trends in their immediate 
environment and linking them to a rigorous assessment of their internal strengths and 
weaknesses, institutions can better define their mission, market niche and medium-
term development objectives and formulate concrete plans to achieve them. Through 
lack of strategic planning, many new distance education institutions have adopted 
inappropriate technologies, failing to assess their adequacy against the purpose of their 
programmes, the competency of their professors and the learning needs of their 
students. It is also important to stress strategic planning is not a one-time exercise; the 
more successful organisations in both business and academia are those that are 
relentless in challenging themselves in the pursuit of better and more effective ways of 
responding to client needs. 
 
Second, there is a need for more flexible governance and management structures, 
complemented by appropriate financial incentives for innovation, to encourage tertiary 
education institutions to be responsive to changes in their economic and social 
environment. Effective labor market feedback mechanisms are indispensable to 
creating the capacity to react and adapt rapidly. Tracer surveys and regular 
consultations with employers and alumni, for instance, are useful instruments for 
orienting the curricula updates necessary to meet the changing needs of firms. 
 
Furthermore, globalisation and the growth of borderless education have brought about 
important issues that affect tertiary education in all countries but are often beyond the 
control of any one government. Among the challenges of particular concern to 
developing countries seeking to build up or retain their advanced human capital 
capacity are new forms of brain drain that result in a loss of local capacity in fields 
critical to development; the absence of a proper international accreditation and 
qualifications framework; the dearth of internationally accepted legislation regarding 
foreign tertiary education providers; the lack of clear intellectual property regulations 
governing the content and distribution of distance education programmes; and barriers 
to access to information and communication technologies, including the Internet. 
 
The World Bank is uniquely positioned to work with its partners in the international 
community – international organisations, bilateral donors and foundations – to help 
facilitate or create a discussion platform and promote an enabling framework for these 
global public goods that are crucial to the future of tertiary education in the developing 
world. In recent years, for example, the Bank has participated in the work on quality 
assurance guidelines for borderless education led by OECD and UNESCO.  Funding 
from the World Bank’s Development Grant Facility is supporting the establishment of 
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two regional accreditation networks, one in Asia and one in Latin America. To help 
countries tap the potential of new information and communication technologies, the 
Bank has become an active member of the Internet 2 network linking universities and 
research institutes in more than 50 countries. It is also exploring ways of distributing 
on a larger scale relevant resources (courses, tutorials, pedagogical tools) coming out 
of the Open Education movement spearheaded by the Hewlett Foundation, with the 
participation of prestigious universities like MIT and Carnegie Mellon. 
Conclusion 
We live in an era where everything is possible and nothing is certain. 
 
Vaclav Havel 
 
As plausible or convincing as they may appear, the three scenarios prepared by 
CHEPS remain, by definition, in the realm of uncertainty.  But their merit is to make 
us aware of the possible consequences of several key drivers of change. Indeed what 
we can be sure of, in the midst of many unknown factors, is many of the phenomena 
described in the scenarios are already in motion. One of them is the rapidly growing 
demand for tertiary education, translating into more differentiated and less local 
programme offerings catering to an increasingly diverse clientele. The second is the 
growing competition on many levels. With the exception of a number of Western 
European countries, in most parts of the world there is intense competition for 
resources and customers among public and private universities. This form of 
competition is nowhere more severe than in countries with declining school age 
population, such as South Korea and Taiwan, where the government is actively 
encouraging the merger of universities to reduce excess supply. In addition, the trend 
toward increased institutional diversification and the appearance of new categories of 
institutions (virtual universities, corporate universities, franchise universities) has led 
to more intense competition among a wider range of providers. Last, but not least, 
modern information and communication technologies have already revolutionised the 
world of tertiary education. 
 
This evolution has brought about many challenges, two of which are stressed in this 
conclusion. First comes the danger of a widening digital divide between countries in 
the North and South and, of course, between tertiary education institutions in the two 
parts of the world, fuelled by blatant differences in terms of Internet access and 
pricing. The findings of a recent study on connectivity in Africa dramatically illustrate 
the concrete dimensions of this digital gap. According to the survey undertaken in 
2004 among 83 African universities, these universities have, on average, no more 
bandwidth than a median household in the United States, while having to pay about 
100 times more than a US university would pay for the same level of access (African 
Virtual University, 2004). The challenge therefore, is to offer significantly better 
access and pricing conditions to tertiary institutions in developing countries. This 
would enable them to rely on the new information and communication technologies as 
agents of expanded equity and improved quality, assuming of course a proper 
integration of ICT into their pedagogical and managerial approaches. 
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The second even more important challenge is an ethical one. As increasing emphasis is 
placed on the role of science and technology in support of knowledge-driven economic 
development strategies, there is a danger of focusing exceedingly on the implacable 
logic of technical change and globalisation. Adapting to the changing environment is not 
only a matter of reshaping tertiary institutions and applying new technologies. It is equally 
vital to ensure universities play a leading role in building social capital by equipping 
students with the core values necessary to live as responsible citizens in complex 
democratic societies. The small private University of Monterrey in Northern Mexico has 
been able to compete effectively with the neighbouring Technology Institute of Monterrey 
because of its deliberate inclusion of community-related courses and activities stimulating 
the development of appropriate values and social skills among students. A meaningful 
education for the 21st century should stimulate all aspects of human intellectual potential, 
not only to give access to global knowledge but also to uphold the richness of local 
cultures and values, in support of which time-honoured disciplines like philosophy, 
literature, arts and social sciences will continue to remain essential. This overarching 
objective was artfully reemphasised by US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in a 
speech at the 1998 graduating ceremony of William and Mary College in Virginia, USA. 
 
Brains and learning, like muscle and physical skill, are articles of commerce.  They are 
bought and sold.  You can hire them by the year or by the hour.  The only thing in the 
world not for sale is character.  And if that does not govern and direct your brains and 
learning, they will do you and the world more harm than good. 
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 16 City of Dreams: Comments of a US Observer on the 
 European Experiment with Mass Higher Education  
David D. Dill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The American Advantage 
An obvious introductory question is what can an observer from the US contribute to 
the current European debate about the future shape of its higher education system?  
One answer is well argued by the US scholar Martin Trow, who first articulated the 
useful distinctions among elite, mass and universal access forms of higher education 
(2005). 
 
Trow (2000) has outlined what he terms ‘the American Advantage’ in higher 
education. By this he means the US higher education system is better adapted both 
normatively and structurally to the demands of a ‘post industrial’ age, which places a 
premium on the creation and wide distribution of knowledge and skill. Trow notes that 
the US was the first industrialised society to develop an organisational and structural 
framework for mass higher education, the basic characteristics of which were in place 
at the end of the 19th century. In a classic structural-functional analysis (Trow 2000) 
argues if other developed societies desire a productive mass system of higher 
education they will need to implement elements similar to those in the US: 
 
• a vertically integrated degree framework (e.g., Associate/BA/MA/PHD) 
• diversity of institutions and academic standards  
• institutional autonomy marked by strong administrative leadership and multiple 
sources of financial support (including tuition fees) 
• a relatively flat academic hierarchy 
• modular courses, credit accumulation, and transfer  
• competitive allocation of research funds 
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I will utilise these six elements to provide a US perspective for assessing the strengths 
and weaknesses of the three suggested scenarios for European higher education:  
Centralia, Octavia, and Vitis Vinifera.   
The Three Scenarios 
Let me note at the outset that providing a coherent critique of these three scenarios is 
particularly challenging because of the way that they were constructed. The scenarios 
are quite complex. They not only offer diverse higher education policies, but also 
present dissimilar worlds. The assumptions made in each scenario about technological, 
economic, political and social developments vary, which makes it especially difficult if 
not somewhat illogical to compare the strengths and weaknesses of the particular 
policies. That said, while there is some overlap the three scenarios do provide 
distinctive approaches to coordinating a system of higher education and the 
frameworks correspond respectively with Burton Clark’s (1983) well known 
distinction regarding state, academic oligarchy and market approaches. Therefore, 
given the basic differences in these policy frameworks, let me attempt to apply the 
previously introduced six elements to each scenario. 
The Centralia Scenario 
The Centralia scenario of state steering provides several of the elements I suggested for 
a successful mass system. The scenario also advances several enlightened public 
policies for steering higher education, not surprising since the scenario was written by 
researchers at the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) with a 
sophisticated understanding of higher education. Unfortunately one weakness of a 
state-centered scenario is that it is equally plausible to imagine an EU political process 
that would lead to the adoption of less enlightened policies. It is possible that ‘rent 
seeking’ behaviour by special interest groups, including academics, their institutions, 
and patrons, may lead to ‘government failure’ in the form of regulations that prove 
inefficient for the larger society (Weimer and Vining, 2005). Furthermore, the 
scenario’s reliance on government agencies as the primary instrument for defining 
crucial variables such as common degree standards and the appropriate numbers of 
different types of institutions raises questions as to whether the resulting system will 
produce the diversity and innovation that best serves the public interest (Dill and 
Teixeira, 2000). The policy of retaining the title ‘university’ for institutions dedicated 
principally to teaching may also not be efficient for society. One problem noted in 
many expanding European systems of higher education is the tendency toward 
‘academic drift’ in which all institutions seek to emulate the research university model 
and thereby drive up the costs of higher education. 
 
Furthermore the changing ratio of private to public sector employment in EU countries 
may affect the traditional institutional framework, which has steered higher education 
in the past. For example, civil service employment and exams as well as the advocated 
‘public good’ orientation to university education may become a less influential force in 
shaping higher education policies than the demands of private businesses and those of 
students interested primarily in the private benefits provided by higher education. In 
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addition, private sector higher education in Europe is less likely to play the prestige 
role suggested in this scenario. Private providers are more likely to flourish in life-long 
learning and vocational markets traditionally ignored by established universities (Dill, 
Teixeira, Jongbloed, and Amaral, 2004). The US experience would also suggest that 
competition will encourage existing institutions of high reputation to quickly co-opt 
any potentially prestigious degrees, as exemplified by the MBA programmes recently 
implemented at both Cambridge and Oxford. 
The Octavia Scenario 
The Octavia scenario better captures the elements of institutional entrepreneurialism, 
diversity and student mobility characteristic of the US mass system and essential to 
building a system of universal access. The development of short cycle academic 
programmes, multiple sources of institutional funding and more competitive forms of 
research funding are both more likely to occur and to be in the public interest (Trow, 
2005). As in the US, this will likely lead to greater institutional stratification, with 
some institutions focusing on prestige and others on scale. It will also probably lead to 
regional disparities in the location of research-intensive universities. 
 
While I endorse the view espoused in the Octavia scenario that network models could 
be an important coordinating device for the future of higher education, there is reason 
to doubt these will be similar to the disciplinary and departmental networks of the past 
(Dill, in press). The influence of these traditional networks is being eroded by the 
growing specialisation of academic knowledge, the proliferation of new 
interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary fields and increased mobility in the academic 
labor market. In contrast, the competitive advantages of formally organised and 
managed interdisciplinary research networks or centers have been well demonstrated 
in US higher education (Dill and Sporn, 1995). Furthermore, European experience 
seems to suggest an influential role for government steering in the development of 
effective accrediting or quality assurance networks (Schwartz and Westerheijden, 
2004) as well as in the provision of valid academic quality information by secondary 
markets such as newspapers and magazines (Dill and Soo, in press). One element of 
the Octavia scenario appears irrefutable to me – the prediction that in the year 2020 
university administrators will still be infatuated with the jargon of management!  
The Vitis Vinifera Scenario 
Finally, and unsurprisingly from a US perspective, I would argue that some form of the 
Vitis Vinifera scenario will most likely provide more of the outlined elements 
necessary for a successful mass higher education system as well as the necessary 
potential for developing truly universal access. 
Three Challenges for European Higher Education 
Although I think the Vitis Vinifera scenario is both more efficacious and more likely to 
occur, I don’t believe any nation/state – including the US – has yet identified the 
institutional framework of rules and policies that will maximise the production of 
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human capital in a market-oriented mass system of higher education. I would therefore 
like to conclude with a brief discussion of three challenges for European mass higher 
education that we in the US are experiencing and have not yet solved: 
 
• the ‘cost disease’ 
• inadequate assurance of academic standards 
• declining commitment to need-based financial aid 
The Cost Disease 
Over the last decade increases in costs for higher education in the US have been 
second only to those in the health care sector. Both public and private tuition increases 
have risen faster than inflation and the average family income. There is some evidence 
of a ‘market failure’ in that these increased costs are not matched by equivalent 
benefits in human capital (Kuh, 1999), but rather are being invested in an academic 
arms race to secure ‘world-class’ university reputations (Brewer, Gates, and Goldman, 
2002). The competition among higher education institutions is greater than at anytime 
in US history (Hoxby, 2002) and there is rapid growth in the IT-based distance 
learning sector (Hentschke, 2004). Nonetheless, the US thus far seems unable to garner 
the efficiency benefits of this competition and there is little evidence that government 
price controls will prove an effective remedy or can be sustained in an environment of 
high social demand for access to higher education. Recent debates about the declining 
reputation of universities in the UK and Europe may portend a costly international 
version of this academic arms race. It is possible the European experience with the 
organisation and financing of health care, which has produced average costs much 
lower than the US and outcomes significantly better, may offer some clues as to the 
design of an effective policy framework for controlling the costs of higher education. 
One implication of this observation is the European higher education system, while 
providing greater diversity in types of institutions and increased student access, will 
need to discover more effective means of ensuring a better match between student 
needs and institutional capacities than has thus far been achieved in the US system.  
Inadequate Assurance of Academic Standards 
A related issue is the assurance of academic standards. Over the last decade academic 
missionaries from the US have been touring the globe advocating academic 
accreditation as the means of assuring academic quality in systems of mass higher 
education. Within the US university community, however, academic accreditation is 
often viewed as irrelevant to academic quality (Ewell, 1999). There is little empirical 
evidence that US institutional accreditation influences educational decisions that affect 
academic standards or improve student learning (The Landscape, 1999). This year the 
US Congress, controlled by a Republican party suspicious of federal regulation, has 
actively discussed eliminating the long-standing policy linking institutional 
accreditation to eligibility for federal student aid and may, in the words of the 
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accreditation community, ‘federalise’ academic accreditation.1 While there are new 
experiments in academic accreditation underway in the US, a number of these reforms 
have been ironically inspired by Academic Audits first developed in the UK (Dill, 
2000). Accreditation as a concept may of course still have value as a regulatory 
approach for assuring academic standards in higher education, but we need to discover 
an academic accreditation process that assures value for money in the creation of 
human capital.2 New approaches to accreditation in Europe will therefore be watched 
with great interest.   
 
We should also consider the greater use of certification exams as a means of assuring 
academic standards as suggested in the Centralia scenario. National exams for 
traditional university subjects, such as those experimented with in Brazil 
(Schwartzman, 2004), are likely of debatable efficiency for society.  However, much 
of the social demand for higher education is not in university subjects but in vocational 
fields where the development of certification exams by educational providers and/or by 
business and industry may be more feasible (Adelman, 2000). Government incentives 
for the development of sophisticated and valid exams in these rapidly expanding 
applied areas may help preserve more qualitative forms of academic assessment for 
those academic fields where a subjective approach provides demonstrable social 
benefits (e.g., the traditional arts and sciences subjects). 
Declining Commitment to Need-based Financial Aid 
The third and final challenge is creating a mass higher education system that is both 
efficient and equitable. There is increasing evidence in the US that the availability of 
need-based financial aid is declining while merit-based aid for high achieving students 
regardless of need is rising (Geiger, 2004). One cause of this is the previously 
mentioned academic arms race, in which universities reallocate scarce financial 
resources from need-based aid to merit aid in order to build their reputation by 
attracting more high achieving students. But there is also some evidence of a 
‘democratic failure’ (Weimer and Vining, 2005) in recently implemented state policies 
for student aid. A number of states have adopted expensive merit scholarship 
programmes for achieving students regardless of need and have reduced public support 
for need-based student aid. These student aid policies, similar to low or free tuition 
policies, are very popular among middle and upper class voters whose children 
disproportionately attend higher education. This is leading to what one observer 
described as ‘aristocratic socialism’ (Fallows and Ganeshananthan, 2004). European 
social policies have traditionally been more sensitive to the needs of the lower class 
than those in the US. But as the dispersion of average incomes increases within 
European countries, sustaining the social consensus in support of the poor in higher 
education policy may pose more of a challenge. 
                                                        
1
 See for example the reports of US Congressional deliberations available from CHEA (Council for 
Higher Education Accreditation) at: http://www.chea.org 
2
 For an analysis of public policies for developing human capital that challenges the need to increase 
public subsidies for higher education, see Heckman (2000). 
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Concluding Thoughts 
Let me conclude by noting that we Americans fully appreciate the difficulty of 
designing an exemplary city. In 1630, while sailing aboard the Arbella for the New 
World, John Winthrop (1987, p. 26) wrote that he and his colleagues would build ‘a 
city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us’. The democratic community they 
founded in America is still a work in progress and the outcome is unclear. Europe is 
now building its own city of dreams in mass higher education and the world will be 
watching with great interest to see how this new system grapples with the modern 
challenges of cost, quality, and access. 
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The CHEPS scenarios on European higher education in 2020 are primarily underlined 
by the potential social development within Europe as well as the influence of European 
Union (EU) strategies with respect to higher education. Given that European higher 
education is not limited to the intra-European context but rather a worldwide one, the 
role of other world regions should also be taken into consideration. This chapter 
reflects upon the possible influence of China on European higher education, 
particularly in the dimension of internationalisation. The central theme is how Europe-
China cooperation might affect the development of European higher education. 
Amongst a wide range of issues, this paper focuses mainly on those that may have 
potential significance in the future but have not received enough attention to date.  
How Chinese and European Higher Education Relate to Each Other  
Discussion of this topic should not be isolated to the broad social and economic 
context. The social and economic relationships between two countries always include a 
significant education dimension; education exchange can strengthen the value of 
cultural ties and create potential mutual business opportunities. This proposition has 
been especially shaped by the historical development of relationships between China 
and the United States of America (USA). The importance of the USA attracting 
Chinese students was realised almost a century ago. In 1906 the president of the 
University of Illinois, Edwin James, wrote to the American President Roosevelt:  
 
The nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of the present 
generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of effort will reap the 
largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial influence… Trade 
follows moral and spiritual domination far more inevitably than it follows the 
flag’ (Smith, 1907).  
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While the USA has gained great social and economic benefits through education 
exchanges with China, the significance of such an approach has only been recently 
noticed in Europe, partly as a result of China’s ascent in the world. 
 
China with its 1.3 billion people, rapid economic growth and new ‘open door’ policy 
to the world, is fast becoming a major player in the world economy. It is estimated that 
by 2030 China will become the second largest economy in the world (People's Daily 
Online, 2002a). With this in mind, the financial rewards for building a strong 
relationship with China should seem irresistible to most European nations, despite their 
concerns over human rights issues. For instance, by 2003 China became the EU’s 
second largest trade partner, with trade increasing more than twenty-fold in the past 25 
years (Europa, 2004; Wiessala, 2002). It will be hardly surprising if this trade growth 
continues into the future. As China offers immense growth potential with its large 
market and skilled labour force, European countries are likely to adjust their strategies 
and policies in order to gain greater interest from China. Following the 1994 New Asia 
Strategy, the Commission of European Communities promulgated A long-term Policy 
for China-Europe Relations in 1995 and Building a Comprehensive Partnership with 
China in 1998. The significance of China’s role in Europe can also be seen through the 
introduction of annual EU-China summits since 1998. These have all affected the 
relationship between European and Chinese higher education due to its social and 
economic ties to society.  
 
However, the interaction between China and Europe with respect to higher education 
has not kept pace with their economic cooperation. Compared to the popular industry 
products such as ‘Mercedes-Benz’, ‘Philips’ and ‘Nokia’, the names of European 
universities are less known in China, with some exceptions such as Oxford and 
Cambridge. Chinese higher education institutions are probably even more unfamiliar 
to Europeans. The lack of mutual awareness is partly due to the fact that in the past 
there have been few exchanges of ideas and human resources with respect to higher 
education.  
 
Since Chinese higher education emerged at the turn of the 20th century, it has been 
successively influenced by Japan, the USA, Europe, the Soviet Union and the USA 
again in the post-reform era. The introduction of the Western European higher 
education system in China took place in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1932, the government 
of the Republic of China invited a number of advisors from Germany, France, England 
and Poland to participate in a national project on Chinese higher education reform 
(Hayhoe, 1999). The reform started with the intention to develop a French style system 
that was characterised by centralisation, but the implementation was undermined by 
civil wars and the anti-Japanese war. When the People’s Republic of China was 
established in 1949, a reconstruction of a socialist higher education system (which 
appeared to be an all-out emulation of Soviet patterns and practices) followed. That 
system remained intact until the launch of higher education reforms in the 1980s as a 
response to China’s economic transformation from a centrally planned system to a 
market oriented one.  
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In the post-reform era, Chinese higher education was largely influenced by American 
models (Yang, 2000). Although some researchers tend to compare the higher education 
policy changes in China with similar attempts in Europe, the initiation of most 
government policies in Chinese higher education were inspired by American ideas and 
experiences. Arguably the dominance of the American impact on Chinese higher 
education is attributable more or less to the thoughts of Chinese scholars who had 
graduated from American universities. Not only are there a considerable number of 
USA-educated Chinese, but many of them hold influential positions in China. 
 
The USA has become the main destination for Chinese overseas students since China 
started its economic reforms at the end of 1970s. By comparison, the flow of Chinese 
students to Europe was quite limited until the 1990s when Europe’s interest in 
developing relationships with China became clear, coupled with China’s growing 
demands for higher levels of education. 
Tensions in Expectations for Chinese Overseas Students 
The impact of globalisation on higher education influences not only the social, 
economic and cultural role of the university but also ushers higher education into 
competitive international markets. Student mobility is an important issue here. This is 
why in each scenario this topic has been given high priority. Along with the growth in 
the Chinese educational market over the past two decades, universities in countries 
other than the USA (including those in Europe) have been moving methodically to 
compete for Chinese students. Currently China has more students abroad than any 
other country and has become the world leader in the consumption and import of 
education. 
 
A survey by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
shows that at the end of 2000, there were 1.6 million overseas students studying in 108 
countries throughout the world. Of these, 380,000 students, in 103 countries are from 
China. (People's Daily Online, 2002b) 
 
Although Europe has received around one fifth of the total Chinese overseas students 
since 1978 (Zhang, 2003), the recent decade has seen a sharp increase in the number of 
Chinese students in Europe.  
 
Most European countries have three expectations of Chinese overseas students. The 
first highlights revenue generation. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
the tuition fees paid by international students have become an important financial 
source for higher education institutions. The British practice provoked a major change 
throughout Europe on tuition fee policies. Although many Western European countries 
traditionally have free higher education, recent practices and debates demonstrate a 
common tendency towards the introduction of, or an increase in tuition fees; at least 
for non-EU students so as to make up for dwindling public expenditures on higher 
education. Ireland is the exception and has taken a different approach.  In 1996, the 
Irish government abolished tuition fees for first-time undergraduate students (Swail & 
Heller, 2004). However the policy only applies to Irish students or conditional students 
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from other EU countries and the government has shown an increasing interest in 
expanding the revenue derived from international student fees (The International 
Education Board Ireland, 2004). Discussions on tuition fees took place in 
Scandinavian countries, which are renowned for their welfare state. For instance, 
Denmark has already decided to introduce fees from 2006 for degree students coming 
from countries outside the EU or European Economic Area, and something similar is 
currently underway in Finland. As Altbach (1997) predicted, ‘it seems only a matter of 
time until Europe’s public universities charge tuition (fees)’. The positive attitude 
towards tuition fees explicitly underlines the scenarios of both ‘Centralia’ and ‘Vitis 
Vinifera’. 
Aside from financial benefits, accepting foreign students is also a means to bring 
highly-skilled foreign talent into European labour markets. European countries mostly 
welcome foreign students in areas where there is a potential talent shortage. In those 
systems in which fees are introduced, the potential employability and availability of 
scholarships may become important factors determining where Chinese overseas 
students will choose to go. For national interests, those countries receiving foreign 
students expect the inflow of foreign talent will render more competitive economies, 
higher education and R&D, notwithstanding side effects such as employment pressure 
and cultural conflict. While Europeans are enjoying the benefits of this, the Chinese 
authorities are worrying about the brain drain. Although the scale of outflow of highly 
skilled Chinese professionals is relatively small, its negative impact cannot be ignored 
as they are the brightest talents (Zhang, 2003). Nevertheless, one third of overseas 
students return to China upon graduation and there is no sign that China’s policy 
concerning Chinese students studying abroad will change in the near future.  The trend 
of internationalisation is irreversible. The outflow of Chinese students can to some 
extent relieve some pressures, such as the shortage of advanced educational resources 
and underutilisation of human resources. Most importantly, China will benefit from 
today’s overseas students in the long run in terms of the information resources, 
business opportunities and intelligent human resources derived. 
 
Finally, the exchange of international students between China and Europe enriches  
mutual cultural awareness both socially and academically. Currently there are more 
students flowing from China to Europe than the other way around. Recruiting foreign 
students for degree studies not only provides new opportunities for contacts between 
students, researchers and institutions but also provides a firm basis for economic 
cooperation. On the one hand, student exchange between China and Europe can create 
immediate opportunities for Chinese-European business partnerships. On the other 
long-term benefits for European countries’ business interests with respect to China will 
be achieved through the development of a mutual awareness and understanding. Due to 
the large differences in societies, ideologies and cultures, the two sides should make 
full use of their education resources to expand cultural exchanges in order to boost 
understanding and friendship between their peoples. In this respect Chinese overseas 
students will play an important role in transforming the understanding of culture and 
values between China and Europe. For example the establishment of Erasmus Mundus, 
a cooperation and mobility programme in postgraduate higher education, was for this 
reason, though it does not specifically concern China. It aims to promote the European 
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Union as a centre of excellence in learning around the world, by attracting high quality 
students from countries outside the European Union to register for Joint Masters 
Degrees. Similar efforts have also been made by individual European countries. In the 
Netherlands, for example, recruiting Chinese students has been considered a long-term 
lucrative market strategy for Dutch business, following the proposition that Chinese 
students will gain high-level employment in the fast growing economy of their own 
country after studying in the Netherlands. They will also be good ambassadors for 
Dutch business. Even though Chinese students might be employed in Europe after 
graduation, or return to China without a significant position, their role in cultural 
transformation can hardly be neglected.   
The three expectations European countries have of Chinese students outlined above are 
associated with three corresponding approaches of ‘revenue-generating’, ‘skilled 
migration’ and ‘capacity building’ (Larsen & Vincent-Lancrin, 2004; OECD, 2004). 
However the philosophies underlying these approaches are somewhat contradictory to 
one another, which will make the policy orientation concerning international students, 
the Chinese in particular, more complicated and controversial. Those countries 
favouring tuition fees for international students may optimistically view the UK 
experience. Even though British universities have charged the highest fees in Europe 
since the 1980s the soaring cost has not stemmed the flow of international students, 
particularly those from China, into the UK. In the past decade the number of Chinese 
students in the UK increased almost 10 fold to 32,000 in 2003 (Leavey, 2004). The 
unique advantages of the UK, such as the availability of diversified courses delivered 
in English and the environment it provides for improving English language skills, are 
not available to many other countries. It should be noted, however, the UK is now 
threatened by a sharp fall in international student numbers, especially at postgraduate 
level. In some British institutions the Chinese student enrolment has fallen by about 50 
per cent (Green, 2005), the reasons for which are varied. They include a lack of job 
opportunities, the high cost of education and living expenses and poor living 
conditions for alien students (Chopra, 2005), and increasing alternative study 
opportunities elsewhere.  
For most non-English speaking European countries, especially those where the 
language is spoken by a relatively small population, their attraction to Chinese students 
is partly attributed to low or free tuition. The introduction of tuition fees will result in a 
dilemma. While there is a financial incentive to charge tuition fees for international 
students, the increasing education cost may negatively affect Chinese students’ choices 
of destination. Even though China’s growing middle class might ensure these countries 
still receive a significant percentage of Chinese students, the source of the students is 
likely to shift from those most academically inclined to those from wealthy families. 
Hence these countries could lose some of the potential advantages of bringing in 
Chinese talent and creating potential opportunities for business cooperation.   
If the trend of charging tuition fees for non-EU students is seemingly irreversible, how 
can those countries avoid the potential loss? Some immediate solutions may be found 
in developing more flexible and diversified study programmes with English as the  
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language of instruction and increasing the availability of scholarships. These have been 
commonly acknowledged so I will focus on another possible response – cooperation 
between Chinese and European higher education institutions.   
Participating in the Chinese Higher Education Market  
EU-China higher education cooperation has resulted in a number of Europe-China 
related research networks and study programme, such as the Europe-China Academic 
Network, the China-Europe International Business School, the EU-China Vocational 
Training programme, the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme and the 
EU-China European Studies Centres Programme (Wiessala, 2003). The on going EU-
AsiaLink programme has also stimulated inter-institutional cooperation between 
Europe and China. While such inter-institutional cooperation has become common 
some recent changes in Chinese higher education, which may expand the agenda of 
international cooperation and provide new opportunities for European higher 
education, should be noted.  
 
In China there is a gap between the provision of adequate higher education resources 
and increasing demand. In response the Chinese authorities have attempted to diversify 
education services, for example through allowing and encouraging the establishment of 
private institutions. Although private higher education has undergone rapid 
development in recent years, few could compete with public institutions due to a 
shortage of financial and human resources. After joining the World Trade Organisation 
in 2002, China opened its internal higher education market to the world as a 
commitment to the General Agreement on Trade in Services. According to the 
‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China of Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in 
Running Schools’ issued in March 2003, cooperation between foreign education 
institutions and Chinese counterparts is encouraged, especially in the private domain.  
 
The Chinese government expects the involvement of foreign partners will make up for 
the limited education resources available in China. In the mean time, this will provide 
a challenge for national higher education institutions, but China will gain more 
benefits through the expansion of financial resources, experiencing advanced 
educational ideas and hence filling the gap between China and Europe at the scientific, 
technological and educational levels and the research and marketing environment.  
In recent years the level of Chinese-foreign cooperation between higher education 
institutions has increased dramatically. However it still does not meet the society’s 
demands and the quality of these institutions is far from satisfactory (Liu, 2002). This 
may be partly due to foreign participation in joint educational services in China being 
driven largely by the motivation of those seeking greater economic benefits. As such 
those institutions under financial threat in their home countries are more enthusiastic, 
while the higher prestige institutions do not have the same financial incentives for 
running campuses in China. However, running joint institutions in China will not only 
provide financial rewards for the foreign institutions involved but will benefit these 
institutions’ home countries.  
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While more European enterprises establish their businesses in China, they demand 
increasing numbers of competent local employees to both master the technologies or 
skills required by European companies in China and also to understand the cultures 
and values of both China and the European countries. The Europe-China joint 
education services may facilitate training the Chinese labour force in line with the 
needs of these European companies. Furthermore, through running joint programmes 
in China European countries will promote cultural and economically valuable ties with 
China.  
Compared to the USA, Australia, Canada, Japan and Singapore, the participation rate 
of European higher education institutions in joint projects is quite low. Although some 
countries have ambitions to provide higher education elsewhere, in practice little 
activity has occurred. When the governments and industries in Europe realise the 
significance of running joint higher education institutions in China, they will be more 
active in supporting their national institutions in taking their share of the Chinese 
higher education market. Consequently high-quality European higher education 
resources will be involved. In the mean time the possible loss caused by the decline of 
the number of Chinese overseas students in Europe may be counter-balanced. 
Although joint institutions might not offer students the same cultural and linguistic 
experiences gained through studying in foreign countries, ‘they involve lower personal 
costs than studying abroad and can lead to beneficial spillovers in the receiving 
country’s higher education’ (Larsen & Vincent-Lancrin, 2004). Compared with 
educating Chinese students in European universities, the services in China may be 
much more cost effective due to the lower cost of living.  
The Potential in China for European Higher Education  
It is becoming clear that most European countries place emphasis on China and the 
issues relating to this are holding a higher priority in their agenda for economic 
development. As such higher education stakeholders, including both government and 
business sectors, become willing to exert their influence through policy and financial 
intervention. The aim is to enhance the dialogue and cooperation between European 
and Chinese higher education at both government and institution levels in order to 
maximise potential economic interests from Chinese markets.  
 
Under these influences, the contemporary patterns of internationalisation of European 
higher education are likely to change in the future in the following directions. First, the 
dominance of traditional student mobility, namely studying abroad, will be 
supplemented by an ‘offshore’ education defined as ‘taking a degree or other post-
secondary courses offered by a foreign university without leaving their home country’ 
(Larsen & Vincent-Lancrin, 2004). For instance, the offshore education taking place in 
China in the form of joint educational services is characterised by programme and 
institution mobility rather than students. While the number of Chinese students 
studying abroad remains relatively stable, the expansion of cross-border education will 
be notably reflected in the growth of ‘offshore’ enrolments.  
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Next, the Europe-China joint education services will aim at meeting the needs of 
European enterprises in China. While European companies will create growing 
professional vacancies in China, joint institutions can be more competitive among the 
diversified higher education institutions, serving the national interests of both China 
and Europe. In this respect, as indicated by all scenarios, the study programme 
emphasis will be on continuing education or lifelong learning rather than traditional 
degree study.    
 
Finally, in order to respond to the above trends European universities may adjust their 
study programmes and conduct corresponding research with links to China. With 
regards to further academic or vocational training the EU Commission’s 2001 paper 
stresses, ‘the number of European academics or students with links to Asia remains 
very small, while European Studies remains an underdeveloped field in most Asian 
countries’. Both international study programmes in European countries and China-EU 
joint educational services in China have the capacity to fill the gap. 
 
Despite the promising future for cooperation between Chinese and European higher 
education institutions, it is not without weaknesses and problems. Although English 
has commonly been used in international education programmes, the difficulty of 
learning Chinese languages and the diversity of languages in Europe are still big 
obstacles to education exchanges and collaboration. The language barrier is especially 
significant for European students studying in Chinese universities where the English 
programmes are quite limited. In addition strategies and policies in China need to be 
adjusted in response to intensified international cooperation. With respect to higher 
education, the real challenge for China is to find a suitable approach to resolve the 
tensions between local interests and the impact of internationalisation (Cai, 2004).   
Implications for the Scenarios 
The discussion above has presented a Chinese perspective on the future of European 
higher education, implying there are basic conditions important to education exchanges 
between China and Europe. One of which is that both states and industries have their 
say in higher education and the other requires a flexible structure in which there are 
few barriers to the mobility of students, academics and institutions. With this said, 
systems such as ‘Centralia, the City of the Sun’ may provide the most effective ways 
for both EU and national states’ intervention in higher education, which could 
guarantee the development of higher education in line with EU strategies. On the other 
hand through exercising tight control the EU may hamper industry sectors or higher 
education institutions in expressing their interests and expectations with respect to the 
cooperation with China. As an illustration of this scenario, the flow of Chinese 
students to Europe may by largely undermined by the implementation of a restrictive 
EU visa policy, irrespective of the growing demands from both Chinese students and 
European universities.  
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In contrast, internationalisation may best be highlighted in the system of ‘Vitis 
Vinifera, the City of Traders and Micro-climates’, in which exporting higher education 
will become one of the most important trading services in Europe. As such, European 
countries try to entice increasing numbers of international students by competing with 
the USA and Australia and even other European countries. The problem is the 
prosperity of internationalisation in this scenario is mainly underlined by the revenue 
generation approach. Relatively little attention is given to long-term cultural and 
economic benefits for society.  
 
‘Octavia, the Spider-web City’ may be advantageous to educational exchange between 
China and Europe in all aspects. Despite the fundamental changes in governance 
structure in ‘Octavia’, the state and market still have their role to play but in the game 
of ‘networking’. The network structure enables a healthy interaction between higher 
education stakeholders’ expectations and interests as well as higher education 
institutions themselves. Moreover, the flexibility and diversity of institutions and study 
programmes constitute a good infrastructure for different types of international 
cooperation. This scenario seems to be the most favoured. However, there is still little 
evidence that this will have taken place by 2020. The challenge comes not only from 
the dramatic structural transformation of the higher education system, but also the 
revolutionary changes of the underlying ideas. It may take some time for higher 
education stakeholders to reach such a consensus, but hopefully ‘Octavia’ represents 
the direction higher education development in Europe will take. 
Discussion 
Throughout the chapter I have stressed China’s role in the future of European higher 
education, but this will not be a dominant one. The future of European higher 
education will be the outcome of a dynamic interaction of a range of influences, such 
as the development of a common EU framework, higher education competition 
influences across European nations and the role of other world regions. These affect 
higher education in Europe in different, sometimes opposing, directions. Future 
scenarios will be associated with the points at which they come into equilibrium. I use 
the plural forms of scenario to indicate the future of European higher education will 
probably not be homogenous, in spite of the implementation of the Bologna Process 
and the realisation of the European Higher Education Area in 2010. The reasons can be 
explained through traditional diversities in social culture and education systems, as 
well as various higher education expectations within Europe. For example, though the 
strategies and practices regarding China among EU member states may appear 
different and the priorities and practices of European higher education institutions 
accordingly may not be the same, they are likely to tend towards convergent reforms. 
Moreover, the competition for shares in Chinese higher education markets may also 
increase the gap between European countries, particularly between South and Eastern 
Europe and North and Western Europe.  
Despite variations in government strategies in their relationship with China, both EU 
and other European governments have sent clear signals to their higher education 
sectors by selecting Asia, in particular China, as a priority with regards to policies. 
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These have largely influenced the orientation of institution strategies in their efforts to 
attract Chinese students. So far I have compared the USA and Europe from a historical 
perspective in terms of their strategies and ability to attract Chinese students. One 
should also try to predict future events. In order to do this, one needs to know the 
factors influencing Chinese students’ decisions in their choice of destinations for 
overseas study (Yao, 2004):  
 
1. the quality and reputation of the universities in the destination countries; 
2. the languages and standards demanded by destination countries;  
3. the cost of studying and living;  
4. the employment opportunities available in the destination countries;  
5. the scholarship situation and 
6. the visa application procedures. 
 
Europe has the advantage in most of the above when compared to its major competitor 
the USA. Language diversity has been a big obstacle to Chinese students studying in 
Europe, but today is no longer a serious issue due to the increasing availability of 
programmes and courses taught in English and a growing interest among Chinese 
students in European languages, such as German and French. The main reason 
European countries are unable to take advantage of this situation is the limited 
information available to Chinese students about European education providers. Some 
institutions prioritise the development of study programmes or courses in English, but 
spend relatively little time marketing them. The information can sometimes not even 
be found on the universities’ webpages. Europe, as the origin and centre of modern 
higher education, has a number of prestigious institutions which provide high quality 
education at less cost than the USA. The problem is the majority of Chinese students 
have not realised this due to the limited information available. Within the strategic 
framework of strengthening relationships with China at  government level, the active 
participation of individual institutions in the future will not only create more 
programmes for Chinese students, but will also stimulate rich information flows 
between Europe and China. By 2020, it would not be surprising to see Europe catching 
up to the USA, at least in terms of its ability to attract Chinese students. There is 
already evidence that this is occurring. At the 8th China International Education 
Exhibition Tour in 2003, a report on a survey of Chinese students’ preferred 
destinations was presented. The results showed North America in the top position, 
preferred by 35% of Chinese students, followed by Europe with 28%. When a similar 
survey was conducted one year later and presented at the 9th China International 
Education Exhibition Tour, the data had changed notably: 35% of Chinese students 
chose Europe as their preferred destination while 28% chose North America.  However 
it is worthwhile to note that European reforms in tuition policy might undermine this 
trend if not handled properly.  
I have discussed the potential role of China in the future of European higher education 
with respect to the CHEPS scenarios. What should be stressed is that although the 
scenarios were developed in the European context, the philosophies underlying them, 
namely strongly coordinated, market coordinated and network coordinated, also have 
universal implications for higher education systems such as in China. The recent 
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higher education reforms in China are moving it from a strongly coordinated system to 
a market-oriented one. However the current market-oriented system still leaves much 
room for improvement in practice and the involvement of industry and civic groups in 
the policy process has been rather symbolic. Higher education institutions have not 
been granted sufficient autonomy in financial matters, human resource management or 
programme development and therefore they are far from being managed as businesses. 
It is even harder to find any sign Chinese higher education will move towards 
becoming a network system. The sluggish movement is largely determined by the 
country’s political structure, traditional ideology and the people’s mindset forged in a 
centrally planned system. According to the social structure and the pace of social 
reform and development in China currently, none of these factors is likely to fade in 
the near future, say within the next 15 years. In 2020, Chinese higher education is 
unlikely to become purely market oriented but there will definitely be many more 
market elements involved. As Chinese reforms always attach great importance to 
international experiences, especially those of advanced systems, the reforms in 
European higher education towards either a network or market coordinated system, or 
a combination of the two, may possibly speed up the transformation of Chinese higher 
education.  
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Between two Empires  
As a Latin American reflecting on Europe as a world region, I must inevitably make 
reference to the immediate context. I began writing this section before the French and 
Dutch referenda on the EU constitution in May 2005 and concluded it immediately 
after the results were in. This was a vital moment, brimming with contradictions. For 
some in Latin America, it was a thin thread hanging between hope and uncertainty, 
between the possibility of a united Europe and the real difficulties facing this 
fascinating project. But others ask why Europe and its future should concern Latin 
America more than, say, the United States? Just as a united Europe has its own 
champions and sceptics, among Latin Americans opinions are divided over whether 
European integration is a crucial issue for the world. The Latin American defenders of 
a united Europe recall the multitude of historical, political and cultural affinities that 
have always linked the two regions and they see in Europe today a model for the 
future. On the other hand, the Latin American ‘eurosceptics’ affirm that in the wake of 
galloping globalisation those old ties have dissolved making a united Europe part of 
the problem, not the solution, for Latin America. 
 
Latin America’s very existence stems from European colonisation, and until the rise of 
the United States as a new imperial presence, Europe was the principal point of 
reference – for better or worse – for the very diverse Latin American nations. Once 
Spanish colonialism was defeated in Cuba by the emerging American empire in 1898 
and especially after World War II, the United States fulfilled President Monroe’s 
doctrine, supplanting Europe as an imperial power in Latin America. 
 
Nevertheless the European presence has survived and even flourished throughout Latin 
America in various ways. It is useful to review some of these historical links. In the 
Southern cone – Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil – the balance between the two empires 
tilts more to the European side than in the northern part of the continent where the 
United States has a deep hold: in Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Venezuela. 
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Another example of these ongoing ties is the ebb and flow of political and economic 
refugees, which has a long trans-Atlantic history. Just as poverty-stricken Irishmen 
flocked to Boston and New York in the late 19th century, Spaniards in the same 
situation emigrated to Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina shortly thereafter. The Italian 
emigration to Argentina at that time was just as important for that country as it was for 
the United States. Later, Republicans escaping defeat in the Spanish Civil War went to 
Mexico and Argentina in the 1940s. Their impact on Mexican universities, publishing 
houses and the arts, humanities and sciences was deep and long lasting. Throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, political refugees from US-supported military regimes in South 
America fled to Europe and Mexico, which has always maintained an open door policy 
for political asylum.  
 
However, over the past two decades the powerful solvent of globalisation has called 
into question those old ties. The flows have changed direction. The issues are different. 
Whereas today poor Mexicans go north to the United States in search of work; poor 
Colombians, Ecuadoreans and Peruvians find their way to Spain. On the other hand, 
the offspring of the Latin American elites flock to US universities for their PhDs in 
economics, engineering and science, and even more for their MBAs. However, 
European universities, especially the Spanish ones, are still the center of attraction for 
people interested in the humanities, arts and some of the social sciences. 
 
There are other flows whose importance and sinister implications are on the rise. 
Cocaine cultivated and refined in Colombia and Bolivia makes its way through Mexico 
to the massive US market as well as to Europe through conduits in Spain. The 
international drug cartels are firmly entrenched on both sides of the Atlantic and are 
spreading their roots in the teeming Latin American cities through which they pass. 
Democracy, Europe and Latin America 
It must be said that for many Latin Americans, with the obvious exception of the 
Brazilians, the word ‘Europe’ has a specific meaning: it means Spain. The Spanish 
resurgence after Franco and the peaceful transformation of that country into a 
democratic and economically vibrant nation represent powerful symbols for Latin 
American societies struggling with similar problems: overcoming authoritarian 
regimes, developing democratic processes, restructuring their economies and 
strengthening their cultural and educational institutions.  
 
For quite a while, the experience of building democratic institutions in Spain was 
perceived as an exclusively Spanish phenomenon. Now, Latin American admirers of 
this experience understand the role played in it by the European Union. In the minds of 
the Latin ‘euro-optimists’, the benefits received by Spain from its European ties 
symbolise the EU as a positive force for social reconstruction. It is possible the recent 
referendum on the EU constitution has jarred this vision of Europe as an unstoppable 
machine for integration. It will also surely contribute to widening the debate among 
Latin Americans over the reasons behind Europeans voting against political 
integration. The euro-optimists in Latin America may now begin to appreciate 
integration is a two-sided coin. In any case, Latin American euro-optimists insist on 
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drawing an important lesson from the link between democratisation in Spain and its 
membership in the EU: just as globalisation can be a destructive force, it is impossible 
to understand democracy in one country in isolation from its international ties.  
 
Thus, the realities of international politics in Latin America are also part of the 
European connection. It is well known that Latin American diplomacy often plays this 
connection off with the influence of the United States in international power politics. 
The United States knows it can count on the support of certain Latin American 
countries, and Europe has its own allies. Special mention must be made of the 
‘democracy clause’ in commercial agreements the EU establishes with other countries. 
Unlike the trade pacts with the United States, the question of democratic governance in 
Latin America is an important aspect of its relationships with Europe. This issue has 
been especially salient in the EU position on human rights violations in Cuba. There is 
an understanding among Latin American nations that their relationships with Europe 
are not limited to commercial and financial spheres, as is usually the case with the 
United States. Clearly, the existence of a European pole in international relations is in 
the best interest of Latin America. 
Universities, Culture, Language 
Universities on both sides of the Atlantic have constituted one of the most enduring 
links between Europe and Latin America. This institutional relationship goes back a 
very long way. The first universities in the New World were founded by 
representatives of the Spanish crown. The various orders of the Catholic Church have 
also played a leading role in the creation of Latin American universities. In the 
succeeding centuries, universities that cropped up in most Latin American countries 
were organised on the basis of the so-called ‘continental model’. During the long 
period of ‘Spanish decadence’ in the 19th century, the French universities – and to a 
certain extent also the German universities – took up the slack and became the focal 
point for intellectuals and professionals in Latin America. The French educational 
reforms of the late 19th century were also closely observed by educators on the other 
side of the Atlantic. 
 
Since the middle of the 20th century, the influence of US higher education has 
increased significantly. The reforms of the 1990s – evaluation, strategic planning, 
market-oriented management – that have swept Latin American higher education are 
the most obvious signs of US influence. Yet the basic mode of organisation in Latin 
American universities has changed relatively little, except for the newly founded 
institutions which have attempted to follow the US model. It is slightly ironic that 
today, as the ‘continental model’ is being called into question by the Bologna Accord, 
some Latin American universities retain the old format and do not seem to grasp the 
implications of the rapidly changing scenario of European higher education. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting that whereas some transformations in European higher 
education (such as the new degree structure) arise from formal decision making 
processes, similar changes in Latin America seem to emerge silently, within the 
existing structures, and therefore perhaps more chaotically. 
Kent 
 
206 
The Spanish language is spoken by more than 400 million people today, many more 
than the population of Spain itself. The Portuguese speaking population of  
Brazil surpasses that of Portugal many times over. This cultural reality has been 
recognised by Spanish policy makers, universities and cultural institutions, and is 
symbolised by the fact that the venues for the last two international conferences on the 
Spanish language – sponsored by the Spanish Academy –have been Mexico and 
Argentina. Spain’s vigorous editorial industry counts heavily on the mass market for 
books and magazines in Latin America. Although without question the second 
language for many Latin Americans today is no longer French but English, the 
Spanish-American cultural and educational markets continue to thrive. 
Integration and Disintegration 
The preceding argument comes down to this: from one of the several possible Latin 
American perspectives, the European project represents a positive historical force in 
the world today.  The long lasting endeavor to democratically integrate a continent as 
diverse as Europe stands out against the dismal trends in the rest of the world that are 
pulling in exactly the opposite direction. Regardless of the future of the European 
Constitution, it can be argued that the European project symbolises the long and 
difficult process of construction of a common vocation among disparate countries, 
some of which have gone to war with each other in the cruel 20th century (not unlike 
Latin America in the 20th century). In international relations it can present a 
counterpoint to the imperial designs of the United States. It may symbolize the 
audacity to take commercial agreements beyond economic issues toward cultural and 
educational integration. In sum, the debate over the European project reflects a basic 
issue: whether a country or a region has some measure of control or decision over its 
future in the face of the growing economic and social disorganisation brought about by 
globalisation. 
 
Now, this admittedly rosy picture of European integration can be readily torn apart by 
another Latin American perspective. The anti-globalists in Latin America are not 
happy with the formation of an economic block in Europe that subsidises its own 
farmers, pollutes the environment, raises tariffs on agricultural products from the rest 
of the world and closes its doors to immigration.  
 
Thus when reflecting on Europe from other geographical standpoints, it is necessary 
also to examine different visions of the future. The vision of CHEPS on the European 
Higher Education and Research Landscape 2020 is inevitably and understandably a 
positive one. The three scenarios it poses – Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera – are 
different in many ways, but they share a common presupposition: that the future will 
be better, more prosperous, more developed. The three scenarios constitute three 
different paths toward such a future. The question about the future, however, may 
admit other options. Imagining the future from the Latin American standpoint does not 
necessarily imply purely positive outcomes.  
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In his seminal book, The Work of Nations, Robert Reich suggested that the 
‘knowledge society’ will be increasingly stratified into basically two groups: the 
‘symbolic analysts’ who will work with advanced knowledge and will receive the 
economic and status benefits thereof; and most other people whose educational 
qualifications will be insufficient to reap those rewards. This suggests a divided future: 
on the one hand, the group that is integrated into the international economy, the 
knowledge society and its benefits, and on the other the group that lives on the margins 
or is excluded from this knowledge society. I do not suggest that such a Manichaean 
and reductionist outlook is an accurate forecast, but it does serve to bring out the 
contradictions (or more accurately, the silences) in contemporary debates on higher 
education and the future.  
 
This contradiction is definitely present in Latin American reflections on higher 
education and its role in society. To simplify once again, the positions in this debate 
come down to the following: 
The neoliberal vision, spawned in the long shadow of the United States, that envisions 
higher education as a producer of knowledge and skills readily applicable in the 
market; 
The idea higher education should fulfil a cultural and civic role as well as an economic 
and technical one. This ‘civilizing’ function of higher education arises as much from 
the European influence (especially the debates leading up to the Bologna agreement) 
as from Latin America’s own university tradition. 
 
In order to understand the context for this debate, it is important to remember most 
Latin American countries (in all their diversity, which is really quite vast) have 
experienced two decades of social, political and economic turmoil and have been 
struggling to build stable democracies and effective economies. Latin American 
nations face complex issues stemming from social disorganisation and instability. 
Corruption and crime are becoming major problems. Uncontrolled urbanisation and 
vast currents of internal and international migration are in full sway. In the wake of 
economic liberalisation, small agriculture and rural society have undergone enormous 
changes.  
 
In this dialectic of integration and disintegration, Robert Reich’s proposition makes 
sense to many people. Higher education is being used by the ‘incorporated youth’ of 
the elites to fuel their trajectory as the ‘symbolic analysts’ of tomorrow, for whom the 
term ‘knowledge society’ has a definite meaning. For those who have been through the 
school system but have not made it to a good university, being ‘incorporated’ is a more 
remote possibility. It may simply mean having some kind of a job that may or may not 
be related to one’s training and whose stability is subject to the vagaries of the market. 
For yet others higher education and the ‘knowledge society’ are simply abstractions 
beyond their reach. 
 
Thus, the debate between higher education as a ‘civilizing’ force or merely as an 
instrument for the preparation of the workforce takes on significance. Can higher 
education be called upon to contribute to citizenship, cultural integration and social 
equity? Is it feasible for higher education to serve as a cohesive force for society?  
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These questions are important to Latin America. They are also questions that have 
been placed on the European agenda. If leaders in Latin American higher education 
can see this and learn from it, the European project will have contributed to a discourse 
that seems almost completely submerged by the neoliberal agenda. 
 19 Cities of Angels and the Barbarians at the Gates 
Simon Marginson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scenarios are charming and their presentation is exquisite. Centralia looks 
backward and inward, but within their city, its ever-learning citizens find the best in 
themselves. Octavia, with its elastic networks, its ‘new forms of vertical and horizontal 
integration’ and its fecund individuality, is a beautiful realisation of modernity. Vitis 
Vinifera is a fine crafting of realism and conviviality. Virtue, beauty and truth: each 
one arranged before us like choices in a boutique department store (and no doubt 
higher education studies need to attend to these qualities). These are cities of angels. 
Each is true to its own moving ideal, whilst also having much in common with the 
others. Each speaks to us of freedoms we might have in a world of modest and 
respectful states: markets so differentiated and interplayed that small exceeds big, and 
universities do not hurt one another. Each is dazzling and detailed within its city walls, 
while the world beyond remains in shadow and the barbarian is somewhere outside the 
gate.  
 
It goes without saying that none of these cities will ever be seen, none of the scenarios 
will happen as written, if only because in their perfection each of them is strangely 
incomplete. Like an unfinished jigsaw, that has been carefully arranged on a table in an 
empty room with its doors and windows open; a jigsaw for which the missing pieces 
do not and cannot exist. Jorge Luis Borges? Yet we learn from all these cities. They 
each speak to salient parts of higher education and what it might become. No doubt 
European higher education will combine Centralia, Octavia and Vitis Vinifera in some 
form or another and that is the underlying wisdom of this exercise.  
 
But European higher education in 2020 will also have other components not listed here 
and will be less Eurocentric than these cases suggest. In a global era, mediaeval city 
walls no longer exclude the world outside. A singular City Continent of the Intellect, 
whether drenched in virtue, beauty or truth, is no longer possible. Worldwide our fates 
are bound together. You in Europe are of us in the southeast of the Asia-Pacific, and 
we are of you: we are just 21 hours and a conference paper away; we are a 
microsecond away; and we share a common discursive, political and economic space. 
Networking, imaging, ideas, data flows and ever changing identities: the ‘outside’ is 
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now and forever part of the ‘inside’ whether good or bad. To know the world beyond 
Europe is to become joined to it. This is inescapable and is the price scholarship and 
research always pay. Barriers can be erected against political and military power and 
(with more difficulty) against the power of money, but there is no evading the 
convergence of words and cultures. Octavia understands this better than Centralia and 
a little better than Vitis Vinifera; its sensibility is more cosmopolitan than pan-
European; but Octavia too is shaped to be a thing in itself with a bounded logic. Hence 
the sense of fragility that is made explicit. ‘Suspended over the abyss, the life of 
Octavia’s inhabitants is less uncertain than in other cities. They know the net will last 
only so long’. The flaw in the image is that the net does not connect only Octavia. The 
fragility derives from the fact that its conditions of existence are impossible. There are 
no isolated utopias. It seems the creators of Octavia understand this and their intention 
is irony. Europe as imagined, with a continental horizon of vision in a globalising 
world, can last so long only if it has not already vanished.  
 
It is not necessary to be quite so pessimistic as Octavia about the possibility of 
survival, but there is an underlying wisdom about the European project common to all 
three scenarios. In each, the target figure of 3 per cent of GDP on research and 
innovation is exceeded. In each, this does not position Europe as the world’s leading 
‘knowledge power’: the larger intention of the Bologna project fails. Ours is more than 
a global era, it is also an era of empty rhetoric about the ‘knowledge economy’; a 
discursive escape-route from having to grapple with the complexities of the global, one 
that preserves the illusion of a world of autarkic nation-states in which each 
government carries ‘its own’ GDP on a stick. It is sensible to refute the absurd policy 
expectations about knowledge-led nirvanas that have been imposed on higher 
education systems and have made such a mess of research policy in many countries 
(though often, of course, with the willing connivance of the internal actors). After all it 
is preposterous to imagine universities are the new manufacturers, or information has 
substituted capital. There is much more to national or global competitive economic 
advantage than skills and R&D, as Octavia knows. But these scenarios are also 
grappling with a deeper difficulty they have not overcome. They conjure up their jolly 
old learners, networked symbolic creators and entrepreneur consumers; each in its 
different ways talks about what a Europe, that we might like, might be like; especially 
if you are an ageing baby-boomer, entrepreneurial and viticultural and abuzz with 
technology and lateral friendship. It is less clear that they have a sense of how and why 
this might be ‘Europe’, or how to get there.  
 
Perhaps the angels know Europe has a hollow heart, at least as Europe is presently 
conceived? Do they realise this is connected to the failure of Bologna as a global 
strategy? Perhaps not. In their own imagining, the scenarios reproduce one of the chief 
conditions of that failure. It seems to this sympathetic outsider that Europeanisation in 
education and elsewhere has been much too defensive, much too place and time-bound 
in a mobile and connected world, and designed to secure ‘what we are’ rather than 
‘what we are becoming’. It is premised on keeping out the power of America, and the 
rising power of China, by turning away and erecting still higher city walls that will 
block those other metropolises from view. The scenarios share this myopia: America 
haunts every scenario but is scarcely ever mentioned despite the colossal impact of 
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Americanisation in every facet of worldwide higher education – alas, pretending a 
global hegemon is not there does not make it go away! – while China is mentioned but 
little understood. Bologna sets out to unify the European higher education zone 
(loosely) first to defend Europe and second as a precondition for taking on the world. It 
placed the cart before the horse. European identity will not be the precondition for 
global success. Global identity will be the precondition for success in the unification 
project.  
 
Europe’s starting point is necessarily different to that of the USA and China, which 
already know who they are. Bologna made the mistake of assuming the undoubted 
need for Europe to define itself to itself somehow reduced, or at least postponed, the 
global imperative. It would have been better for Bologna to conceive European global 
initiatives that all could support and many join (loosely, of course), an enterprise 
taking European universities to Asia, Africa, and the Americas, as a chief condition of 
building European educational identity. Unity would follow. Success breeds success.  
 
Bologna was right in some ways. European higher education is a potential global 
resource and at the core of future European identity, and many European universities 
have the firepower. Europe has 35 of the Jiao Tong top 100 research universities 
compared to 53 in the USA, and European educational strength is more widely 
distributed regionally, creating potential for diverse specialisations; Europe has 41.0 
per cent of the world’s top 500 compared to 33.6 per cent in the USA where the 
market, government and philanthropy between them have concentrated status and 
resources in the top universities (Shanghai Jiao Tong University Institute of Higher 
Education, 2005). But no successful global strategy will postpone the moment of going 
global, as American and Chinese universities know. The meta-strategy of the global 
era is to sustain and develop a self-determining self-altering identity, while engaged 
effectively all round with everyone else. This is what the USA has always done (as 
much on its own non-reciprocal terms as possible) and this is what China is now 
learning to do. This is how to survive, to prosper and to leave a mark on the world at 
the same time. Unlike European universities, Chinese universities are weak. Despite its 
economic weight China has 3.6 per cent of the top 500 research universities and none 
of the top 100. China’s project of modelling itself as a world class university nation 
will almost certainly succeed. It shows that self-formation and global engagement are 
combined and not sequential.  
 
Does Europe still need the barbarians outside the walls, that old Greco-Roman 
sensibility, in order to be itself? It could be very different if the city walls came down 
and the world outside was brought in by a confident higher education Europe, eager at 
the same time to venture outside, where the objective would not be to seize territory to 
exploit but to find international partners in common enterprises. But as long as the city 
walls survive; as long as Europe is conceived primarily as a defensive project with its 
relationship-building in stages (one us, two them), then it will remain divided between 
pan-European defence and national defence and between the competing claims of 
various national defence corps, like feuding suburbs. Constricted behind city walls that  
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are all too easy to imagine, forever turning inwards, it will eat up its own potential for 
common identity. It is in that sense that whether they separate or merge, these cities of 
angels are ultimately impossible.  
 
Centralia boldly ignores this logic. It names its barbarians.  
 
In the global risk society (a popular euphemism for the never-abating fear for 
terrorism) the EU has implemented a restrictive visa policy… discouraging 
mobility only for study… Free movement of persons across ‘world blocs’ has 
almost come to a standstill at least to the integrated blocs, i.e. the USA and the 
EU. Movement of goods and especially information is where the bulk of 
globalisation since 2000 is to be found.  
 
In Centralia inward movement from Asia and Africa would largely be blocked because 
it is those people who are the potential terrorists, the ones who are the most different to 
‘us’. In a walled city of angels by definition pathology is forever on the outside. 
Slamming the door to non-whites on the neo-racist ground of cultural distinction 
would please Samuel Huntington. Centralia’s collective good is a privileged circle of 
anti-global people ‘like us’. In the American confederacy they were ‘good old boys’. 
Jolly public climes and good old wealth are protected by confining the moral compass 
of the global public good to the city of Europe.  
 
While this combination of public values is all too possible, one suspects the impact of 
the security climate will be more marginal than Centralia suggests. In the absence of an 
intensive militarisation, that would render jolly old anything impossible, it is 
inconceivable that temporary migration for tourism, business and education from Asia, 
Africa and Latin America would largely shut down. The proposed semi-closure of 
permanent migration would be almost as difficult to enforce. The education/migration 
nexus has become a fact of life (Lee, Maldonado-Maldonado & Rhoades, 2005) and 
some universities will need those foreign students badly. The optimistic Lifelong 
Learning scenarios of Centralia and Vitis Vinifera will not be met and the demographic 
hole is already obvious.  
 
Octavia and Vitis Vinifera are more relaxed about foreign students. In Vitis Vinifera 
internationalisation is ‘one of the most important dimensions of system diversity’. 
Octavia has ‘growing virtual and physical mobility of students within global university 
partnerships and networks’. Half its PhD graduates are from abroad. The Anglo-Asian 
Academy is plausible: it might be on the drawing boards already. The Delphi-Phoenix 
Programme has hit upon the only way to market a global e-University: programmes in 
each of the major global languages (Arabic might need to be added). This is better. 
Perhaps the wall will come down. Perhaps the angels will not stay at home. Perhaps 
the beautiful Octavia will spin a wider stronger web. We can hope. We need Europe to 
be a world region. 
 
There is also another kind of difficulty here. It derives from the state/market 
antinomies that animate all of the scenarios. Centralia assumes Europe could only be 
anti-global by closing out the market. Or is it that Centralia could only be publicly-led 
if it closed out the global? This is not the only possible way that collective values 
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might be reasserted. We can envisage societies led by public values open to the global; 
and a global sphere primarily regulated by nation-states and cross-border communities 
rather than markets, in which one supreme global public good would be 
cosmopolitanism itself. Arguably it is the only antidote to terror. It is no coincidence 
the spirit of an open Europe in a converging world is a target that terror, and every 
other kind of cultural or national particularism (Sen, 1999) inside or outside Europe 
and the USA, is desperate to defeat. Security needs walls and vice versa. Only in 
Centralia is this connection obvious and direct. In the obverse cases of Octavia and 
Vitis Vinifera, the state stands back, the market runs, and more or less automatically it 
seems global relations come back on the agenda. Here is the zero-sum reasoning again: 
the less public the more market, and vice versa. The less national the more global, and 
vice versa. Yet another (and all too likely) configuration is possible, that of Thatcher’s 
free market and strong state joined to global closure. The crude zero-sum tradeoffs that 
shape Centralia and Vitis Vinifera in particular originated in the nineteenth century 
liberal dualism that so often blocks our understanding: free market vs. nation-state. 
There is also a variant for the global era: national public good vs. global market 
(Marginson, forthcoming). But the actual tendency in higher education is different.  
 
All over the world the signs of marketisation, competition between institutions, tuition 
fees and university rankings are advancing in tandem with the newer methods of state 
steering via ‘arms length’ techniques developed from the mid 1980s onwards: funding 
for service, performance measures, audit and so on. Control over process and product 
is tighter than before. These are state-created markets. Rhetorical claims of market 
deregulation as the antinomy of state control ring hollow, given the coupling of the 
two is integral to neo-liberal government. Vitis Vinifera is the scenario that 
foreshadows the largest part of what higher education will become. Where it falters is 
where it imagines market deregulation as neo-classical economists want it, rather than 
the neo-liberal deregulation actually practised.  
 
It is likely research will become more concentrated and teaching more diversified 
across a great range of institutions and types; that the functions of some higher 
education will be ‘unbinded’, boundaries with sub-degree programmes will blur and 
definitions will become more ‘fuzzy’ as Octavia suggests; and also that traditional 
universities will survive and gain prestige within the broader sector. It is likely that, as 
all scenarios promise, the sector will be stratified between high prestige research 
universities in the North and West and a mass teaching sector in the South and East. 
This was an easy prediction to make. Things are not so different in 2005 if German 
speaking nations are included in the West. Perhaps basic research in the South and East 
has surprises in store; and the North and West will also parent a mass commercial 
sector along University of Phoenix lines. It is also quite possible that not only will 
public-private partnerships flourish, but one third of students will enrol in the private 
sector, as Vitis Vinifera suggests. It is also possible enrolments in foreign campuses 
will be either small as in Vitis Vinifera or large as in Centralia. This time the smart 
money is on Centralia, though it is unlikely the graduates of foreign university 
campuses in Europe will monopolise all the ‘dazzling careers in international 
business’. It is very possible that, as in Vitis Vinifera, public funding will average 57 
per cent or less from heterogeneous sources; that universities will set their own fees 
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and their culture will more corporate and their management professional. 15 years is a 
long time in policy. Those changes have already occurred in many other nations. What 
stretches credibility are propositions that governments and the EU/EC will become 
more modest, ‘realistic and selective’ about what can be achieved; or that ‘markets will 
drive most of what happens’; or that the boutique market producers leading Octavia 
and Vitis Vinifera would triumph so easily over IT companies or university chains 
with local franchises and old fashioned monopolies that fit easily with the traditions of 
the sector. Small is beautiful, but it is only sometimes competitive.  
 
Because Vitis Vinifera and Octavia know the future has more market allocation not 
less, it is curious they underplay the elements structuring global and European 
stratification in the world status competition now emerging. Little is said about 
indicators of comparison: there is nothing much about global league tables, though we 
know the Shanghai Jiao Tong data on research performance have forced policy 
reflections in much of Europe, and the normative power of the Ivy League model is 
being strengthened. Octavia and Vitis Vinifera are soft markets driven more by 
consumption ‘quality’ than producer status. But is this how Europe’s higher education 
markets will work (Marginson, forhtcoming)? A shift towards market production and 
distribution, in which the principal product is that of status goods and universities 
become singularly positioned as status producers, tends to steepen the status hierarchy 
in higher education, unless this is flattened again by compensatory public policy. There 
is not much state egalitarianism in Vitis Vinifera, yet somehow the edge is off status. 
There is also an odd absence of tensions between collaboration and competition and 
between access and social hierarchy. Vitis Vinifera is right about the 
complementarities of institutional autonomy and risk, but misses the threat of social 
risk. Somehow this market has found a way to largely dispense with accreditation, 
recognition protocols and quality assurance, even though in the Europe of 2005 these 
phenomena are currently growing in proportion to marketisation.   
 
In contrast, both primarily non-market Centralia and marketised Octavia know 
accreditation functions are crucial. In Centralia, multiple accreditation has become a 
positioning strategy and there is a growing emphasis on data-driven indicators of 
‘graduate employability’ despite the intellectual reduction this entails. Both predictions 
are likely to be realised. In Vitis Vinifera, beyond a ‘rudimentary system of regulation, 
quality and relevance are widely believed to be matters best left to the markets to 
assess’. Not likely. Have information asymmetries been abolished? In any market, 
where accreditation and quality assurance are primary tools of marketing and 
positioning strategies, only the state can set the ring. More market means not less state 
but a different state. The market/state antinomy cannot see it.  
 
Yet Vitis Vinifera promises a more nuanced social science where variety in markets, 
states and education is no longer marginalised by the categories used; and this takes us 
beyond the old liberal antinomy of market and state. We should wish for this, but a 
related promise will come to pass: each of states, markets and institutional identity will 
remain relevant and they will interface in complex ways. It is no longer Burton Clark’s 
triangle (Clark, 1983). Corporate university identity has become crucial in its own 
right, supported by the weight of professional functions, and has partly replaced the 
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academic profession which all these scenarios know is becoming more fragmented and 
less decisive to university identity and subject to greater cross-professional variations 
in pay and work practices. Faculty authority survives in Centralian university 
governance, but this does not ring true when placed alongside a professionalised 
management with budget control. Something would have to give. But the scenarios do 
not say all that much about academic work or the disciplines (will the rise and rise of 
biomedicine continue? Will Europe follow the Anglo-American fascination with 
business studies?). Only Octavia notices the ‘major generation change’ in 2005-2015 
when the retirement of the demographic bulge of baby-boom faculty creates conditions 
for wholesale disciplinary innovations and the emergence of a more entrepreneurial 
culture.  
 
Nevertheless, for each thing missing something else is said, though often with tongue 
in cheek. This response might have seemed harsh but the brief was to be critical; and it 
is true that if value is to be added in a short space then criticism is more economical 
than praise. Let the last note then be positive. The achievement is respected. The 20th 
Anniversary CHEPS Scenarios are a rich exercise, full of insights and superbly 
written. Please do it again at 30. 
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